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EMILIUS AND SOPHIA.

V O L. III.



EMILIO SUTHERLAND

VOL. II



Frontispiece to Vol. III.



Cochin.

Orpheus.

EMILIUS AND SOPHIA;
O R,
A NEW SYSTEM
O F
E D U C A T I O N.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF

Mr. J. J. ROUSSEAU,

CITIZEN OF GENEVA.

BY THE TRANSLATOR OF *ELOISA*.

V O L. III.

L O N D O N:

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EMILIUS AND SOPHIA

A NEW SYSTEM



EDUCATION

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Mrs. J. J. ROUSSEAU

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VOL. III.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY H. BARNES,
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MDCCCXXIII.

EMILIUS;

OR,

A NEW SYSTEM

OF

EDUCATION.

CONTINUATION OF BOOK IV.

The Savoyard Curate's PROFESSION of FAITH
Continued.

“IT is pretended that every one contributes to the publick good for his own interest; but whence comes it that the virtuous man contributes to it to his prejudice? Can a man lay down his life for his own interest? It is certain all our actions are influenced by a view to our own good; but unless we take moral good into the account, none but the actions of the wicked can ever be explained by motives of private interest. We imagine, indeed, no more will be attempted; as that would be too abominable a kind of philosophy, by which we should be puzzled to account for virtuous actions; or could extricate ourselves out of the difficulty only by attributing them to base designs and sinister

VOL. III.

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views.

views, by debasing a Socrates and calumniating a Regulus. If ever such doctrines should take rise among us, the voice of nature as well as of reason would check their growth, and leave not even one of those who inculcate them the simple excuse of being sincere.

“ It is not my design here to enter into such metaphysical investigations, as surpass both your capacity and mine, and which in fact are useless. I have already told you I would not talk philosophy to you, but only assist you to consult your own heart. Were all the philosophers in Europe to prove me in the wrong, yet, if you were sensible I was in the right, I should desire nothing more.

“ To this end you need only to distinguish between our acquired ideas, and our natural sentiments, for we are sensible before we are intelligent; and, as we do not learn to desire our own good and to avoid what is evil, but possess this desire immediately from nature, so the love of virtue and hatred of vice are as natural as the love of ourselves. The operations of conscience are not intellectual, but sentimental; for though all our ideas are acquired from without, the sentiments which estimate them arise from within: and it is by these alone, that we know the agreement or disagreement which exists between us and those things which we ought to seek or shun.

“ To exist is, with us, to be sensible; our sensibility is incontestably prior to our intelligence, and we were possessed of sentiment before we formed



formed ideas. Whatever was the cause of our Being, it hath provided for our preservation in furnishing us with sentiments agreeable to our constitution, nor can it possibly be denied that these at least are innate. These sentiments are, in the individual, the love of himself, aversion to pain, dread of death, and the desire of happiness. But if, as it cannot be doubted, man is by nature a social Being, or at least formed to become such, his sociability absolutely requires that he should be furnished with other innate sentiments relative to his species: for to consider only the physical wants of men, it would certainly be better for them to be dispersed than assembled.

“ Now it is from this moral system, formed by its duplicate relation to himself and his fellow-creatures, that the impulse of conscience arises. To know what is virtuous, is not to love virtue. Man has no innate knowledge of virtue, but no sooner is it made known to him by reason, than conscience induces him to love and admire it: this is the innate sentiment I mean.

“ I cannot think it impossible, therefore, to explain, from natural consequences, the immediate principle of conscience independent of reason; and, though it were impossible, it is not at all necessary; for since those who reject this principle (admitted, however, and acknowledged in general by all mankind) do not prove its non-existence, but content themselves with affirming it only: when we affirm that it doth exist, we

stand at least on as good a footing as they; and have besides that internal testimony for us, the voice of conscience deposing in behalf of itself. If the first glimmerings of the understanding dazzle our sight and make objects, appear at first obscure or confused, let us wait but a little while till our opticks recover themselves and gather strength, and we shall presently see those same objects, by the light of reason, to be such as nature at first presented them: or rather let us be more simple and less vain; let us confine ourselves to the sentiments we first discovered, as it is to these our well-regulated studies must always recur.

“ O Conscience! Conscience! thou divine instinct, thou certain guide of an ignorant and confined, though intelligent and free Being; thou infallible judge of good and evil, who makest man to resemble the Deity; in thee consist the excellence of our nature and the morality of our actions: without thee I perceive nothing in myself that should elevate me above the brutes, except the melancholy privilege of wandering from error to error, by the assistance of an ungovernable understanding and unprincipled reason.

“ Thank Heaven, we are delivered from this formidable apparatus of philosophy: we can be men without being sages; without spending our days in the study of morality we possess, at a cheaper rate, a more certain guide through the immense and perplexing labyrinth of human opinions. It is not enough, however, that such
a guide

SYSTEM OF EDUCATION.

a guide exists, it is necessary to know and follow him. If he speaks to all hearts, it may be said how comes it that so few understand him? It is, alas! because he speaks to us in the language of nature, which every thing conspires to make us forget. Conscience is timid, she loves peace and retirement; the world and its noise terrify her: the prejudices she has been compelled to give rise to are her most cruel enemies, before whom she is silent, or avoids their presence; their louder voice entirely overpowers her's, and prevents her being heard: fanaticism counterfeits her nature, and dictates in her name the greatest of crimes. Thus, from being often rejected, she at length ceases to speak to us, and answers not our enquiries after being long held in contempt, also, it costs us as much trouble to recall, as it did at first to banish her from our bosoms.

“ How often have I found myself fatigued in my researches from my indifference! How often hath uneasiness and disgust, poisoning my meditations, rendered them insupportable! My insensible heart was susceptible only of a lukewarm and languishing zeal for truth. I said to myself, why should I take the trouble to seek after things that have no existence? Virtue is a mere chimera, nor is there any thing desirable but the pleasures of sense. When a man hath once lost a taste for the pleasures of the mind, how difficult to recover it! How much more difficult is it also for one to acquire such a taste, who never possessed it! If there be

in the world a man so miserable as never to have done an action in his life, the remembrance of which must make him satisfied with himself, that man must be ever incapable of such a taste; and, for want of being able to perceive that goodness which is conformable to his nature, must of necessity remain wicked as he is, and eternally miserable. But can you believe there exists on earth an human creature so depraved as never to have given up his heart to the inclinations of doing good? The temptation is so natural and seductive, that it is impossible always to resist it, and the remembrance of the pleasure it hath once given us, is sufficient to represent it to us ever afterwards. Unhappily this propensity is at first difficult to gratify; there are a thousand reasons for our not complying with the dictates of our hearts; the false prudence of the world confines our good inclinations to ourselves, and all our fortitude is necessary to cast off the yoke. To take a pleasure in virtue is the reward of having been virtuous, nor is this prize to be obtained till it be merited. Nothing is more amiable than virtue, but we must possess it, in order to find it such. When we court at first its embraces, it assumes, like Proteus in the fable, a thousand terrifying forms, and displays at last, its own, only to those who are tenacious of their hold.

“Wavering perpetually between my natural sentiments, tending to the general good of mankind, and my reason, confining every thing to my own, I should have remained all my life in
this

this continual dilemma, doing evil yet loving good, in constant contradiction with myself, had not new knowledge enlightened my heart; had not the truth, which determined my opinions, ascertained also my conduct, and rendered me consistent. It is in vain to attempt the establishment of virtue on the foundation of reason alone; what solidity is there in such a base? Virtue, it is said, is the love of order; but can, or ought, this love of order to prevail over that of my own happiness? Let there be given me a clear and sufficient reason for my giving it the preference. This pretended principle is, at the bottom, only a mere play upon words; as I may as well say, that vice also consists in the love of order taken in a different sense. There is some kind of moral order in every thing that has sentiment and intelligence. The difference is, that a good Being regulates himself according to the general order of things, and a wicked Being, regulates things agreeably to his own private interest: the latter makes himself the centre of all things, and the former measures his radius, and disposes himself in the circumference. Here he is arranged, with respect to the common centre, as God, and with respect to all concentrick circles, as his fellow-creatures. If there be no God, the wicked man only reasons right, the good man is a mere fool.

“ O my child! may you be one day sensible how great a weight we are relieved from, when, having exhausted the vanity of human opinions,

and tasted of the bitterness of the passions, we see ourselves at last so near the path to wisdom; the reward of our good actions, and the source of that happiness we had despaired to attain. Every duty prescribed by the laws of nature, though almost effaced from my heart by the injustice of mankind, again revived at the name of that eternal justice, which imposed them, and was a witness to my discharge of them. I see in myself nothing more than the work and instrument of a superior Being, desirous of, and doing good; desirous also of effecting mine, by the concurrence of my will to his own, and by my making a right use of my liberty. I acquiesce in the regularity and order he hath established, being certain of enjoying one day or other that order in myself, and of finding my happiness therein: for what can afford greater felicity than to perceive one's self making a part of a system, where every thing is constructed a right? On every occasion of pain or sorrow I support them with patience, reflecting that they are transitory, and that they are derived from a body which is detached from myself. If I do a good action in secret, I know that it is nevertheless seen, and make the consideration of another life the rule of my conduct in this. If I am ever dealt with unjustly, I say to myself, that just Being, who governs all things, knows how to indemnify me. My corporeal necessities, and the miseries inseparable from this mortal life, make the apprehensions of death
more

more supportable. I have hence so many chains the less to break when I am obliged to quit this mortal scene.

“ For what reason my soul is thus subjected to the organs of sense, and chained to a body which lays it under so much restraint, I know not; nor presume to enter into the decrees of the Almighty. But, I may without temerity form a modest conjecture or two on this head. I reflect that, if the mind of man had remained perfectly free and pure, what merit could he have pretended to, in admiring and pursuing that order which he saw already established and which he would lie under no temptation to disturb? It is true he would have been happy, but he could not have attained that most sublime degree of felicity, the glory of virtue and the testimony of a good conscience; we should in such a case have been no better than the angels, and without doubt a virtuous man will be one day much superior. Being united on earth to a mortal body, by ties not less powerful than incomprehensible, the preservation of that body becomes the great concern of the soul, and makes its present apparent interests contrary to the general order of things, which it is nevertheless capable of seeing and admiring. It is in this situation, that the making a good use of his liberty becomes at once his merit and his reward; and that he prepares for himself eternal happiness, in combating his earthly passions, and preserving the primitive purity of his will.

“ But even supposing that in our present state of depravity, our primitive propensities were such as they ought to be, yet, if all our vices are derived from ourselves, why do we complain that we are subjected by them? Why do we impute to the Creator those evils which we bring on ourselves, and those enemies we arm against our own happiness? Ah! let us not spoil the man of nature, and he will always be virtuous without constraint, and happy without remorse! The criminals, who pretend they are compelled to sin, are as false as they are wicked: is it possible for them not to see that the weakness they complain of is their own work; that their first depravation was owing to their own will; that by their wilfully yielding at first to temptations, they at length find them irresistible? It is true, they now cannot help their being weak and wicked; but it is their fault that they at first became so. How easily might men preserve the mastery over themselves and their passions, even during life, if, before their vicious habits are acquired, when the faculties of the mind are just beginning to be displayed, they should employ themselves on those objects which it is necessary for them to know, in order to judge of those which are unknown; if they were sincerely desirous of acquiring knowledge, not with a view to make a parade in the eyes of others, but in order to render themselves wise, good, and happy in the practice of their natural duties! This study appears
difficult,

difficult, because we only apply to it, after being already corrupted by vice, and made slaves to our passions. We place our judgement and esteem on objects before we arrive at the knowledge of good and evil, and then referring every thing to that false standard, we hold nothing in its due estimation.

“ The heart, at a certain age, while it is yet free, arduous, restless, and anxious after happiness, is ever seeking it with an impatient and uncertain curiosity; when deceived by the senses, it fixes on the shadow of it, and imagines it to be found where it doth not exist. This illusion hath prevailed too long with me. I discovered it, alas! too late; and have not been able entirely to remove it: no, it will remain with me as long as this mortal body, which gave rise to it. It may prove as seductive, however, as it will, it can no longer deceive me. I know it for what it is, and even while I am misled by it despise it. So far from esteeming it an object of happiness, I see it is an obstacle to it. Hence, I long for that moment when I shall shake off this incumbrance of body, and be myself, without inconsistency or participation with matter, and shall depend on myself only to be happy. In the mean time, I make myself happy in this life, because I hold the evils of life as trifling in themselves; as almost foreign to my being; and conceive at the same time that all the real good which may thence be deduced depends on myself.

“ To anticipate as much as possible that desirable state of happiness, power, and liberty, I exercise my mind in sublime contemplations. I meditate on the order of the universe, not indeed with a view to explain it by vain systems, but to admire it perpetually, and to adore its all-wise Creator, whose features I trace in his workmanship. With him I am thus enabled to converse, and to exert my faculties in the contemplation of his divine essence: I am affected by his beneficence, I praise him for his mercies, but never so far forget myself as to pray. For what should I ask of him? That he should for my sake pervert the order of things, and work miracles in my favour? Shall I, who ought to love and admire above all things that order which is established by his wisdom, and maintained by his providence, desire that such order should be broken for me? No! such a rash petition would rather merit punishment than acceptance. Nor can I pray to him for the power of acting aright: for why should I petition for what he hath already given me? Has he not given me conscience to love virtue, reason to know what it is, and liberty to make it my choice? If I do evil I have no excuse; I do it because I will; to desire him to change my will, is to require that of him which he requires of me: this would be to desire him to do my work, while I receive the reward. Not to be content with my situation in the order of things, is to desire to be no longer a man; it is to wish things were otherwise constituted

stituted than they are, to wish for evil and disorder. No, thou source of justice and truth, God! merciful and just! placing my confidence in thee, the chief desire of my heart is, that thy will be done. By rendering my will conformable to thine, I act as thou dost, I acquiesce in thy goodness, and conceive myself already a partaker of that supreme felicity, which is its reward.

“ The only thing which, under a just diffidence of myself, I request of him, or rather expect from his justice, is that he will correct my errors when I go astray. To be sincere, however, I do not think my judgement infallible: such of my opinions, as seem to be the best founded, may, nevertheless, be false; for what man hath not his opinions, and how few are there who agree in every thing? It is to no purpose that the illusions by which I am misled arise from myself; it is he alone can dissipate them. I have done every thing in my power to arrive at truth; but its source is elevated beyond my reach: if my faculties fail me, in what am I culpable? It is necessary for truth to stoop to my capacity.”

THE GOOD PRIEST spoke with some earnestness; he was moved, and I was also greatly affected. I imagined myself attending to the divine Orpheus, singing his hymns and teaching mankind the worship of the gods. A number of objections, however, to what he had said, suggested

gested themselves ; though I did not urge one, because they were less solid than perplexing ; and though not convinced, I was, nevertheless, persuaded he was in the right. In proportion as he spoke to me from the conviction of his own conscience, mine confirmed me in the truth of what he said.

“ The sentiments you have been delivering (said I to him) appear newer to me in what you confess yourself ignorant of, than in what you profess to believe. I see in the latter nearly that theism or natural religion which Christians affect to confound with atheism and impiety, though in fact diametrically opposite. In the present situation of my mind, I find it difficult to adopt precisely your opinions, and to be as wise as you. To be, at least as sincere, however, I will consult my own conscience on these points. It is that internal sentiment which, according to your example, ought to be my conductor, and you have yourself taught me, that, after having imposed silence on it, for a long time, it is not to be awakened again in a moment. I will treasure up your discourse in my heart, and meditate thereon. If, when I have duly weighed it, I am as much convinced as you, I will trust you as my apostle, and will be your proselyte till death. Go on, however, to instruct me: you have only informed me of half what I ought to know. Give me your thoughts of revelation, the scriptures, and those mysterious doctrines, concerning which I have been
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in the dark from my infancy, without being able to conceive or believe them, and yet not knowing how either to admit or reject them."

"Yes, my dear child (said he) I will proceed to tell you what I think further; I meant not to open to you my heart by halves: but the desire which you express to be informed in these particulars was necessary to authorise me to be totally without reserve. I have hitherto told you nothing but what I thought might be useful to you, and in the truth of which I am most firmly persuaded. The examination which I am now going to make is very different; presenting to my view nothing but perplexity, mysteriousness, and obscurity: I enter on it, therefore, with distrust and uncertainty; I almost tremble to determine about any thing, and shall rather inform you, therefore, of my doubts than of my opinions. Were your own sentiments more confirmed, I should hesitate to acquaint you with mine; but in your present sceptical situation, you will be a gainer by thinking as I do*. Let my discourse, however, carry with it no greater authority than that of reason; for I plainly confess myself ignorant, whether I am in the right or wrong. It is difficult, indeed, in all discussions, not to assume sometimes an affirmative tone; but remember that all my affirmations, in treating these matters, are only so many rational doubts. I leave you to investigate the truth of them;

* This I conceive, is what the good curate means to say also to the publick.

them; on my part, I can only promise to be sincere.

“ You will find my exposition treat of nothing more than natural religion: it is very strange that we should stand in need of any other! By what means can I find out such necessity? In what respect can I be culpable, for serving God agreeably to the dictates of the understanding he hath given me, and the sentiments he hath implanted in my heart? What purity of morals, what system of faith useful to man, or honourable to his Creator, can I deduce from any positive doctrines, that I cannot deduce as well without it, from a good use of my natural faculties? Let any one show me what can be added, either for the glory of God, the good of society, or my own advantage, to the obligations we are laid under by nature; let him show me what virtue can be produced from any new worship, which is not also the consequence of mine. The most sublime ideas of the Deity are inculcated by reason alone. Take a view of the works of nature, listen to the voice within, and then tell me what God hath omitted to say to your sight, your conscience, your understanding? Where are the men who can tell us more of him than he thus tells us of himself? Their revelations only debase the Deity, in ascribing to him human passions. So far from giving us enlightened notions of the Supreme Being, their particular tenets, in my opinion, give us the most obscure and confused ideas. To the incon-

ceivable

ceivable mysteries by which the Deity is hid from our view, they add the most absurd contradictions. They serve to make man proud, persecuting, and cruel; instead of establishing peace on earth, they bring fire and sword. I ask myself to what good purpose tends all this, without being able to resolve the question. Artificial religion presents to my view only the wickedness and miseries of mankind.

“ I am told, indeed, that revelation is necessary to teach mankind the manner in which God would be served; as a proof of this, they bring the diversity of whimsical modes of worship which prevail in the world; and that without remarking that this very diversity arises from the whim of adopting revelations. Ever since men have taken it into their heads to make the Deity speak, every people make him speak in their own way, and say what they like best. Had they listened only to what the Deity hath said to their hearts, there would have been but one religion on earth.

“ It is necessary that the worship of God should be uniform, I would have it so: but is this a point so very important, that the whole apparatus of divine power was necessary to establish it? Let us not confound the ceremonials of religion with religion itself. The worship of God demands that of the heart; and this, when it is sincere, is ever uniform; men must entertain very ridiculous notions of the Deity, indeed, if they imagine he can interest himself in the
gown;

gown or cassock of a priest, in the order of words he pronounces, or in the gestures and genuflexions he makes at the altar. Alas! my friend, where is the use of kneeling? Stand as upright as you will, you will be always near enough the earth. God requires to be worshipped in spirit and in truth: this is a duty incumbent on men of all religions and countries. With regard to exterior forms, if, for the sake of peace and good order, their uniformity be expedient, it is merely an affair of government; the administration of which surely requires not the aid of revelation.

“ I did not set out, at first, with these reflections. Hurried on by the prejudices of education, and by that dangerous self-conceit, which ever elates mankind above their sphere, as I could not raise my feeble conceptions to the Supreme Being, I endeavoured to debase him to my ideas. Thus I connected relations infinitely distant from each other, comparing the incomprehensible nature of the Deity with my own. I required still further a more immediate communication with the Divinity, and more particular instructions concerning his will: not content with reducing God to a similitude with man, I wanted to be further distinguished by his favour, and to enjoy supernatural lights: I longed for an exclusive and peculiar privilege of adoration, and that God should have revealed to me what he had kept secret from others, or that
others

others should not understand his revelations so well as myself.

“ Looking on the point at which I was arrived, at that whence all believers set out, in order to reach an enlightened mode of worship, I regarded natural religion only as the elements of all religion. I took a survey of that variety of sects which are scattered over the face of the earth, and who mutually accuse each other of falsehood and error: I asked which of them was the right? Every one of them in their turns answered *their's*. I and my partizans only think truly; all the rest are mistaken. *But, how do you know that your sect is in the right?* Because God hath declared so. *And who tells you God hath declared so?* My spiritual guide, who knows it well. My pastor tells me to believe so and so, and accordingly I believe it: he assures me that every one who says to the contrary speaks falsely; and therefore I listen to nobody who controverts his doctrine*.

How,

* All of them, says a certain wise and good priest, pretend that they derive their doctrines not from men, nor from any created Being; but from God. But to say truth, without flattery or disguise, there is nothing in such pretensions: however they may talk, they owe their religion to human means; witness the manner in which they first adopt it. The nation, country and place where they are born and bred determine it. Are we not circumcised or baptised, made Jews, Turks, or Christians before we are men? Our religion is not the effect of choice: witness our lives and manners so little accordant to it; witness how we act contrary to the tenets of it, on the most trifling occasions.—*Charron, on Wisdom.*

“How, thought I, is not the truth every where the same? Is it possible that what is true with one person can be false with another? If the method taken by him who is in the right, and by him who is in the wrong, be the same, what merit or demerit hath the one more than the other? Their choice is the effect of accident, and to impute it to them is unjust: it is to reward or punish them for being born in this or that country. To say that the Deity can judge us in this manner is the highest impeachment of his justice..

“Now, either all religions are good and agreeable to God, or if there be one which he hath dictated to man, and will punish him for rejecting, he hath certainly distinguished it by manifest signs and tokens, as the only true one. These signs are common to all times and places, and are equally obvious to all mankind, to the young and old, the learned and ignorant, to Europeans, Indians, Africans, and Savages. If there be only one religion in the world that can prevent our suffering eternal damnation, and there be on any part of the earth a single mortal who is sincere, and is not convinced by its evidence, the God of that religion must be the most iniquitous and cruel of tyrants. Would we seek the truth therefore in sincerity, we must lay no stress on the place and circumstance

There is great reason to believe that a sincere profession of faith from the virtuous Divine of Candom would have differed but little from that of our Savoyard curate.

stance of our birth, nor on the authority of fathers and teachers; but appeal to the dictates of reason and conscience concerning every thing that is taught us in our youth. It is to no purpose to bid me subject my reason to the truth of things of which it is incapacitated to judge; the man who would impose on me a falsehood, may bid me do the same: it is necessary, therefore, I should employ my reason even to know when it ought to submit.

“All the theology I am myself capable of acquiring, by taking a prospect of the universe, and by the proper use of my faculties, is confined to what I have laid down above. To know more, we must have recourse to extraordinary means. These means cannot depend on the authority of men: for all men being of the same species with myself, whatever another can by natural means come to the knowledge of, I can do the same; and another man is as liable to be deceived as I am: when I believe, therefore, what he says, it is not because he says it, but because he proves it. The testimony of mankind, therefore, is at the bottom that of my reason, and adds nothing to the natural means God hath given me for the discovery of the truth.

“What then can even the apostle of truth have to tell me, of which I am not still to judge? *But God himself hath spoken; listen to the voice of revelation.* That indeed is another thing. God hath spoken! This is saying a great deal: but to whom hath he spoken? *He hath spoken*

to man. How comes it then that I heard nothing of it? *He hath appointed others to teach you his word.* I understand you: there are certain men who are to tell me what God hath said. I had much rather have heard it from himself; this, had he so pleased, he could easily have done: and I should then have run no risk of deception. Will it be said I am secured from that, by his manifesting the mission of his messengers by miracles? Where are these miracles to be seen? are they related only in books? Pray, who wrote these books?—Men.—Who were witnesses to these miracles? Men.—Always human testimony! It is always men, that tell me what other men have told them. What a number of those are constantly between me and the Deity! We are always reduced to the necessity of examining, comparing, and verifying such evidence. O! that God had deigned to have saved me all this trouble! should I have served him with a less willing heart?

“Consider, my friend, in what a terrible discussion I am already engaged; what immense erudition I stand in need of to recur back to the earliest antiquity; to examine, to weigh, to confront prophecies, revelations, facts, with all the monuments of faith that have made their appearance in all the countries of the world; to ascertain their time, place, authours, and occasions. How great the critical sagacity which is requisite to enable me to distinguish between pieces that are supposititious, and those which
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are authentick; to compare objections with their replies, translations with their originals; to judge of the impartiality of witnesses, of their good sense, of their capacity; to know if nothing be suppressed or added to their testimony, if nothing be changed, transposed, or falsified; to obviate the contradictions that remain, to judge what weight we ought to ascribe to the silence of our opponents, in regard to facts alleged against them; to discover whether such allegations were known to them; whether they did not disdain them too much to make any reply; whether books were common enough for our's to reach them; or, if we were honest enough to let them have a free circulation among us; and to leave their strongest objections in full force.

“ Again, supposing all these monuments acknowledged to be incontestible, we must proceed to examine the proofs of the mission of their authours: it would be necessary for us to be perfectly acquainted with the laws of chance, and the doctrine of probabilities, to judge what prediction could not be accomplished without a miracle; to know the genius of the original languages, in order to distinguish what is predictive in these languages and what is only figurative. It would be requisite for us to know what facts are agreeable to the established order of nature, and what are not so; to be able to say how far an artful man may not fascinate the eyes of the simple, and even astonish the
most

most enlightened spectators; to know of what kind a miracle should be, and the authenticity it ought to bear, not only to claim our belief, but to make it criminal to doubt it; to compare the proofs of false and true miracles, and discover the certain means of distinguishing them; and after all to tell why the Deity should choose, in order to confirm the truth of his word, to make use of means which themselves require so much confirmation, as if he took delight in playing upon the credulity of mankind, and had purposely avoided the direct means to persuade them.

“Suppose that the divine Majesty hath really condescended to make man the organ of promulgating its sacred will, is it reasonable, is it just to require all mankind to obey the voice of such a minister, without his making himself known to be such? Where is the equity or propriety in furnishing him, for universal credentials, with only a few particular tokens displayed before a handful of obscure persons, and of which all the rest of mankind know nothing but by hearsay? In every country in the world, if we should believe all the prodigies to be true which the common people, and the ignorant, affirm to have seen, every sect would be in the right; there would be more miraculous events than natural ones; and the greatest miracle of all would be to find that no miracles had happened where fanaticism had been persecuted. The supreme Being is best displayed by the

fixed and unalterable order of nature: if there should happen many exceptions to such general laws, I should no longer know what to think; and, for my own part, I must confess I believe too much in God to believe in so many miracles, so little worthy of him.

“What if a man should come and harangue us in the following manner:—‘I come, ye mortals, to announce to you the will of the most high; acknowledge in my voice that of him who sent me. I command the sun to move backwards, the stars to change their places, the mountains to disappear, the waves to remain fixed on high, and the earth to wear a different aspect.’ Who would not, at the sight of such miracles, immediately attribute them to the authour of nature? Nature is not obedient to impostors; their miracles are always performed in the highways, in the fields, or in apartments where they are displayed before a small number of spectators, previously disposed to believe every thing they see. Who is there will venture to determine how many eye-witnesses are necessary to render a miracle worthy of credit? If the miracles, intended to prove the truth of your doctrine, stand themselves in need of proof, of what use are they? There might as well be none performed at all.

“The most important examination after all, remains to be made into the truth of the doctrines delivered; for as those, who say that God is pleased to work these miracles, pretend that

the devil sometimes imitates them, we are not a jot nearer than before, though such miracles should be ever so well attested. As the magicians of Pharoah worked the same miracles, even in the presence of Moses, as he himself performed by the express command of God, why might not they, in his absence, from the same proofs, pretend to the same authority? Thus after proving the truth of the doctrine by the miracle, you are reduced to prove the truth of the miracle by that of the doctrine*, lest the
works

* This is expressly mentioned in many places in scripture, particularly in Deuteronomy, Chap. xiii. where it is said that, if a prophet, teaching the worship of strange Gods, confirm his discourse by signs and wonders, and what he foretels comes really to pass, so far from paying any regard to his mission, the people should stone him to death. When the Pagans, therefore, put the Apostles to death, for preaching up to them the worship of a strange God, proving their divine mission by prophecies and miracles, I see not what could be objected to them, which they might not with equal justice have retorted upon us. Now, what is to be done in this case? There is but one step to be taken, to recur to reason and leave miracles to themselves: better indeed had it been never to have had recourse to them, nor to have perplexed good-sense with such a number of subtle distinctions. What do I talk of subtle distinctions in christianity! If there are such, Our Saviour was in the wrong surely to promise the Kingdom of Heaven to the weak and simple? How came he to begin his fine discourse on the mount, with blessing the poor in spirit, if it requires so much ingenuity to comprehend and believe his doctrines? When you prove that I ought to subject my reason to his dictates, it is very well; but to prove that, you must render them intelligible to my understanding; you must adapt your arguments to the poverty of my genius, or I shall not acknowledge you to

works of the devil should be mistaken for those of the Lord. What think you of this alternative?

“ The doctrines, coming from God, ought to bear the sacred characters of the divinity; and should not only clear up those confused ideas which unenlightened reason excites in the mind; but should also furnish us with a system of religion and morals, agreeable to those attributes by which only we form a conception of his essence. If then they teach us only absurdities, if they inspire us with sentiments of aversion for our fellow-creatures, and fear for ourselves; if they describe the Deity as a vindictive, partial, jealous, and angry Being; as a God of war and of battles, always ready to thunder and destroy; always threatening slaughter and revenge, and even boasting of punishing the innocent, my heart cannot be incited to love so terrible a Deity, and I shall take care how I give up my natural religion to embrace such doctrines. Your God is not mine, I should say to the professors of such a religion. A Being, who began his dispensations with partially selecting one people, and proscribing the rest of mankind, is not the common father of the human race; a Being, who destines to eternal punishment the greatest part of his creatures, is not that good and merciful God who is pointed out by my reason.

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be the true disciple of your Master, or think it is his doctrines which you would inculcate.

With regard to articles of faith, my reason tells me, they should be clear, perspicuous, and evident. If natural religion be insufficient, it is owing to the obscurity in which it necessarily leaves those sublime truths it professes to teach: it is the business of revelation to exhibit them to the mind in a more clear and sensible manner; to adapt them to his understanding, and to enable him to conceive, in order that he may be capable of believing them. True faith is assured and confirmed by the understanding, the best of all religions is undoubtedly the clearest: that which is clouded with mysteries and contradictions, the worship that is to be taught me by preaching, teaches me by that very circumstance to distrust it. The God whom I adore is not a God of darkness; he hath not given me an understanding to forbid me the use of it. To bid me give up my reason is to insult the authour of it. The minister of truth doth not tyrannise over my understanding, he enlightens it.

“ We have set aside all human authority, and without it I cannot see how one man can convince another, by preaching to him an unreasonable doctrine. Let us suppose two persons engaged in a dispute on this head, and see how they will express themselves in the language generally made use of on such occasions.

Dogmatist.—Your reason tells you that the whole is greater than a part, but I tell you, from God, that a part is greater than the whole.

Rationalist.—

Rationalist.—And who are you, that dare to tell me God contradicts himself? In whom shall I rather believe? In him who instructs me, by means of reason, in the knowledge of eternal truths, or in you who would impose on me, in his name, the greatest absurdity?

Dogmatist.—In me, for my instructions are more positive, and I will prove to you incontrovertibly that he hath sent me.

Rationalist.—How! will you prove that God hath sent you to depose against himself? What sort of proofs can you bring to convince me, it is more certain that God speaks by your mouth than by the understanding he hath given me?

Dogmatist.—The understanding he hath given you! Ridiculous and contemptible man! you talk as if you were the first infidel, who ever was misled by an understanding depraved by sin.

Rationalist.—Nor may you, man of God! be the first knave whose impudence hath been the only proof he could give of his divine mission.

Dogmatist.—How! can Philosophers be thus abusive.

Rationalist.—Sometimes, when Saints set them the example.

Dogmatist.—Oh! but I am authorised to abuse you. I speak on the part of God Almighty.

Rationalist.—It would not be improper, however, to produce your credentials before you assume your privileges.

Dogmatist.—My credentials are sufficiently authenticated. Both heaven and earth are witnesses in my favour. Attend, I pray you, to my arguments.

Rationalist.—Arguments! why you do not dare pretend to any! To tell me that my reason is fallacious, is to refute whatever it may say in your favour. Whoever refuses to abide by the dictates of reason, ought to be able to convince without making use of it. For, supposing that in the course of your arguments you convince me, how shall I know whether it be not through the fallacy of reason depraved by sin, that I acquiesce in what you affirm? Besides, what proof, what demonstration, can you ever employ more evident than the axiom which destroys it? It is full as credible that a just syllogism should be false, as that a part is greater than the whole.

Dogmatist.—What a difference! my proofs admit of no reply; they are of a supernatural kind.

Rationalist.—Supernatural! What is the meaning of that term? I do not understand it.

Dogmatist.—Contraventions of the order of nature; prophecies, miracles, and prodigies of every kind.

Rationalist.—Prodigies and miracles! I have never seen any of these things.

Dogmatist.—No matter; others have seen them

them for you: We can bring clouds of witnesses—the testimony of whole nations.—

Rationalist.—The testimony of whole nations! Is that a proof of the supernatural kind?

Dogmatist.—No! But when it is unanimous, it is incontestible.

Rationalist.—There is nothing more incontestible than the dictates of reason, nor can the testimony of all mankind prove the truth of an absurdity. Let us see some of your supernatural proofs then, as the attestation of men is not so.

Dogmatist.—Infidel wretch! It is plain the grace of God doth not speak to thy understanding.

Rationalist.—Whose fault is that? Not mine; for, according to you, it is necessary to be enlightened by grace to know how to ask for it. Begin then, and speak to me in its stead.

Dogmatist.—Is not this what I am doing? But you will not hear: What do you say to prophecies?

Rationalist.—As to prophecies; I say, in the first place, I have heard as few of them as I have seen miracles. And in the second, I say that no prophecy bears any weight with me.

Dogmatist.—Thou disciple of Satan! And why have prophecies no weight with you?

Rationalist.—Because, to give them such weight, requires three things; the concurrence of which is impossible. These are, that I should

in the first place be a witness to the delivery of the prophesy; next that I should be witness also to the event; lastly, that it should be clearly demonstrated to me that such event could not have followed by accident: For though a prophesy were as precise, clear, and determinate as an axiom of geometry; yet as the perspicuity of a prediction, made at random, does not render the accomplishment of it impossible, that accomplishment, when it happens, proves nothing in fact concerning the fore-knowledge of him who predicted it.—You see, therefore, to what your pretended supernatural proofs, your miracles, and your prophecies reduce us:—to the folly of believing them all on the credit of others, and of submitting the authority of God speaking to our reason, to that of man. If those eternal truths, of which my understanding forms the strongest conceptions, can possibly be false, I can have no hope of ever arriving at certitude, and so far from being capable of being assured that you speak to me from God, I cannot even be assured of his existence.—

“ You see, my child, how many difficulties must be removed before our disputants can agree; nor are these all. Among so many different religions, each of which proscribes and excludes the other, one only must be true: if, indeed, there be such a one among them all. Now to discover which this is, it is not enough to examine that one; it is necessary to examine them all, as we should not, on any occasion whatever, condemn
without

without a hearing. It is necessary to compare objections with proofs, and to know what each objects to in the rest, as well as what the others have to offer in their defense. The more clearly any sentiment or opinion appears demonstrated, the more narrowly it behoves us to enquire, what are the reasons which prevents its opponents from subscribing to it. We must be very simple indeed, to think an attention to the theologists of our own party sufficient to instruct us in what our adversaries have to offer. Where shall we find divines, of any persuasion, perfectly candid and honest? Do they not all begin to weaken the arguments of their opponents, before they proceed to refute them? Each is the oracle of his party, and makes a great figure among his own partisans, with such proofs as would expose him to ridicule among those of a different persuasion. Are you desirous of gaining information from books? What a fund of erudition will not this require! How many languages must you learn! How many libraries must you turn over! And who is to direct you in the choice of the books? There are hardly to be found in any one country the best books on the contrary side of the question, and still less is it to be expected we should find books on all sides. The writings of the adverse and absent party, were they found also, would be very easily refuted. The absent are always in the wrong, and the most weak and insufficient arguments laid down with a confident

assurance, easily efface the most sensible and valid, when exposed with contempt. Add to all this, that nothing is more fallacious than books, nor exhibit less faithfully the sentiments of their writers. The judgement which you formed, for instance, of the Roman Catholick religion, from the treatise of Bossuet, was very different from that which you acquired by residing among us. You have seen that the doctrines we maintain in our controversies with the protestants are not those which are taught the common people, and that Bossuet's book by no means resembles the instructions delivered from the pulpit. To form a proper judgement of any religion, we are not to deduce its tenets from the books of its professors; we must go and learn it among the people. Each sect have their peculiar traditions, their customs, prejudices, and modes of acceptance, which constitute the peculiar mode of their faith; all which should be taken into consideration when we form a judgement of their religion.

“ How many considerable nations are there, who print no books of their own, and read none of our's ! How are they to judge of our opinions, or we of their's ? We laugh at them, they despise us ; and though our travellers have turned them into ridicule, they need only to travel among us, to ridicule us in their turn. In what country are there not to be found men of sense and sincerity, friends of truth, who require only to know, in order to embrace it ? And yet every
one

one imagines truth confined to his own particular system, and thinks the religion of all other nations in the world absurd; these foreign modes, therefore, cannot be in reality so very absurd as they appear, or the apparent reasonableness of our's is less real.

“ We have three principal religions in Europe. One admits only of one revelation, another of two, and the third of three. Each holds the other in detestation, anathematizes its professors, accuses them of ignorance, obstinacy, and falsehood. What impartial person will presume to decide between them, without having first examined their proofs, and heard their reasons? That which admits only of one revelation is the most ancient, and seems the least disputable; that which admits of three is the most modern and seems to be the most consistent; that which admits of two, and rejects the third, may possibly be the best, but it hath certainly every prepossession against it; its inconsistency stares one full in the face.

“ In all these three revelations, the sacred books are written in languages unknown to the people who believe in them. The Jews no longer understand Hebrew; the Christians neither Greek nor Hebrew; the Turks and Persians understand no Arabick, and even the modern Arabs themselves speak not the language of Mahomet. Is not this a very simple manner of instructing mankind, by talking to them always in a language which they do not comprehend? But these

books, it will be said, are translated; a mighty pretty answer! Who can assure me they are translated faithfully, or that it is even possible they should be so? Who can give me a sufficient reason why God, when he hath a mind to speak to mankind, should stand in need of an interpreter?

I can never conceive that what every man is indispensably obliged to know can be shut up in these books; or that he who is incapacitated to understand them, or the persons who explain them, will be punished for involuntary ignorance. But we are always plaguing ourselves with books. What a frenzy! Because Europe is full of books, the Europeans conceive them to be indispensable, without reflecting that three fourths of the world know nothing at all about them. Are not all books written by men? How greatly, therefore, must man have stood in need of them, to instruct him in his duty, and by what means did he come to the knowledge of such duties, before books were written? Either he must have acquired such knowledge of himself or it must have been totally dispensed with.

We, Roman Catholics, make a great noise about the authority of the church: but what do we gain by it, if it requires as many proofs to establish this authority as other sects require immediately to establish their doctrines? The church determines that the church have a right to determine. Is not this a special proof of its authority?

SYSTEM OF EDUCATION.

authority? And yet depart from this, and we enter into endless discussions.

“ Do you know many Christians, who have taken the pains to examine carefully into what the Jews have alledged against us? If there are a few who know something of them, it is from what they have met with in the writings of Christians: a very pretty manner truly of instructing themselves in the arguments of their opponents! But, what can be done? If any one should dare to publish among us such books as openly espouse the cause of Judaism, we should punish the author, the editor, and the bookseller*. This policy is very convenient, and very sure to make us always in the right. We can refute at pleasure those who are afraid to speak.

“ Those among us, also, who have an opportunity to converse with the Jews, have but little advantage. These unhappy people know they lie at our mercy; the tyranny we exercise over them, renders them justly timid and reserved; they know how far cruelty and injustice are compatible with Christian charity: what, therefore,

* Among a thousand known instances, the following stands in no need of a comment. The Catholick divines of the sixteenth century having condemned all the Jewish books without exception to be burnt, a learned and illustrious theologue, who was consulted on that occasion, had very nigh involved himself in ruin, by being simply of opinion that such of them might be preserved as did not relate to Christianity, or treated of matters foreign to religion.

fore, can they venture to say to us, without running the risk of incurring the charge of blasphemy? Avarice inspires us with zeal, and they are too rich not to be ever in the wrong. The most sensible and learned among them are the most circumspect and reserved. We make a convert, perhaps, of some wretched hireling, to calumniate his sect; set a parcel of pitiful brokers disputing, who give up the point merely to gratify us; but while we triumph over the ignorance or meanness of such wretched opponents, the learned among them smile in contemptuous silence at our folly. But do you think that in places where they might write and speak securely, we should have so much the advantage of them? Among the doctors of the Sorbonne, it is as clear as day-light, that the predictions concerning the Messiah relate to Jesus Christ. Among the Rabbins at Amsterdam, it is just as evident they have no relation at all to him. I shall never believe that I have acquired a sufficient acquaintance with the arguments of the Jews, till they compose a free and independent state, and have their schools and universities, where they may talk and dispute with freedom and impunity. Till then, we can never truly know what they have to say.

“At Constantinople, the Turks make known their reasons, and we durst not publish our's: there it is our turn to submit. If the Turks require us to pay to Mahomet, in whom we do
not

not believe, the same respect which we require the Jews to pay to Jesus Christ, in whom they believe as little; can the Turks be in the wrong, and we in the right? On what principle of equity can we resolve that question, in our own favour?

“ Two thirds of mankind are neither Jews, Mahometans, nor Christians, how many millions of men, therefore, must there be who never heard of Moses, of Jesus Christ, or of Mahomet! Will this be denied? Will it be said that our missionaries are dispersed over the face of the whole earth? This, indeed, is easily affirmed; but are there any of them in the interior parts of Africa, where no European hath ever yet penetrated? Do they travel through the inland parts of Tartary, or follow on horseback the wandering Hords, whom no stranger ever approaches, and who, so far from having heard of the Pope, hardly know any thing of their own Grand Lama? Do our missionaries traverse the immense continent of America, where there are whole nations still ignorant that the people of another world have set foot on their's? Are there any of them in Japan, from whence their ill behaviour hath banished them for ever, and where the fame of their predecessors is transmitted to succeeding generations, as that of artful knaves, who, under cover of a religious zeal, wanted to make themselves imperceptibly masters of the empire? Do they penetrate into the harems of the Asiatick princes, to preach the

the gospel to millions of wretched slaves? What will become of the women, in that part of the world, for want of a missionary to preach the gospel to them? Must every one of them go to hell for being a recluse?

“ But were it true that the gospel is preached in every part of the earth, the difficulty is not removed. On the eve preceding the arrival of the first missionary in any country, some one person of that country expired without hearing the glad tidings. Now what must we do with this one person? Is there but a single individual in the whole universe, to whom the gospel of Christ is not made known, the objection which presents itself, on account of this one person, is as cogent as if it included a fourth part of the human race.

“ Again, supposing the ministers of the gospel actually present and preaching in those distant nations, how can they reasonably expect to be believed on their own word, and that their hearers will not scrupulously require a confirmation of what they teach? Might not any one of the latter very reasonably say to them, ‘ You tell me of a God who was born and put to death near two thousand years ago, at the other end of the world, and in I know not what obscure town; assuring me that all those who do not believe in this mysterious tale are damned. These are things too strange to be readily credited on the sole authority of a man, who, is himself a perfect stranger. Why hath your God brought those

those events to pass, of which he requires me to be instructed, at so great a distance? Is it a crime to be ignorant of what passes at the Antipodes? Is it possible for me to divine that there existed in the other hemisphere, the people of the Jews, and the city of Jerusalem? I might as well be required to know what happens in the moon. You are come, you say, to inform me; but why did you not come time enough to inform my father, or why do you damn that good old man because he knew nothing of the matter? Must he be eternally punished for your delay; he who was so just, so benevolent, and so desirous of knowing the truth? Be honest, and suppose yourself in my place. Do you think, upon your testimony alone, that I can believe all these incredible things you tell me, or reconcile so much injustice with the character of that just God, whom you pretend to make known? Let me first, I pray you, go and see this distant country, where so many miracles have happened totally unknown here; let me go and be well informed why the inhabitants of that Jerusalem presumed to treat God like a thief or a murderer? They did not, you will say, acknowledge his divinity. How then can I, who never have heard of him but from you? You add, that they were punished, dispersed, and led into captivity; not one of them ever approaching their former city. Assuredly they deserved all this: but its present inhabitants, what say they of the unbelief and *Deicide* of their
prede-

predecessors? They deny it, and acknowledge the divinity of the sacred personage just as little as did its ancient inhabitants.

‘What! in the same city in which your God was put to death, neither the ancient nor present inhabitants acknowledge his divinity! And yet you would have me believe it, who was born near two thousand years after the fact, and two thousand leagues distant from the place! Do not you see that, before I can give credit to this book, which you call sacred, and of which I comprehend nothing, I ought to be informed from others, when and by whom it was written, how it hath been preserved and transmitted to you, what is said of it in the country, what are the reasons of those who reject it, though they know as well as you every thing of which you have informed me? You must perceive the necessity I am under, of going first to Europe, to Asia, and into Palestine, to examine into things myself: and that I must be an idiot to listen to you before I have done this.’

“Such a discourse as this, appears to me not only very reasonable; but I affirm that every sensible man ought, in such circumstances, to speak in the same manner, and to send a missionary about his business, who should be in haste to instruct and baptize him, before he had sufficiently verified the proofs of his mission. Now I maintain that there is no revelation against which the same objections might not be made, and that with greater force than against Christianity.

Christianity. Hence it follows, that if there be in the world but one true religion, and every man be obliged to adopt it under pain of damnation, it is necessary to spend our lives in the study of all religions, to visit the countries where they have been established, and examine and compare them with each other. No man is exempted from the principal duty of his species, and no one hath a right to confide in the judgment of another. The artisan, who lives only by his industry, the husbandman who cannot read, the timid and delicate virgin, the feeble valetudinarian, all, without exception, must study, meditate, dispute, and travel the world over in search of truth: there would be no longer any settled inhabitants in a country; the face of the earth being covered with pilgrims, going from place to place, at great trouble and expense, to verify, examine, and compare the several different systems and modes of worship to be met with in various countries. We must in such a case bid adieu to arts and sciences, to trade, and all the civil occupations of life. Every other study must give place to that of religion; while the man who should enjoy the greatest share of health and strength, and make the best use of his time and his reason, for the greatest term of years allotted to human life, would, in the extreme of old age, be still perplexed where to fix; and it would be a great thing after all, if he should learn before his

his death what religion he ought to have believed and practised during life.

“Do you endeavour to mitigate the severity of this method, and place as little confidence as possible in the authority of men? In so doing you place the greatest confidence; for if the son of a Christian does right, in adopting, without a scrupulous and impartial examination, the religion of his father, how can the son of a Turk do wrong, in adopting in the same manner the religion of Mahomet? I defy all the persecutors in the world to answer this question in a manner satisfactory to any person of common-sense. Nay, some of them, when hard pressed by such arguments, will sooner admit that God is unjust, and visits the sins of the fathers on the children, than give up their cruel and persecuting principles. Others, indeed, elude the force of these reasons by civilly sending an angel to instruct those, who, under invincible ignorance, lived, nevertheless, good moral lives. A very pretty device truly that of the angel! Not contented with subjecting us to their machinery, they would reduce the Deity himself to the necessity of employing it.

“See, my son, to what absurdities we are led by pride, and the spirit of persecution, by being puffed up with our own capacity, and conceiving that we possess a greater share of reason than the rest of mankind. I call to witness that God of peace whom I adore, and whom I would make known to you, that my researches
have

have been always sincere ; but seeing, that they were, and always must be, unsuccessful, and that I was launched out into a boundless ocean of perplexity, I returned the way I came, and confined my creed within the limits of my first notions. I could never believe that God required me, under pain of damnation to be so very learned. I, therefore, shut up all my books. That of nature, lies open to every eye : it is from this sublime and wonderful volume that I learn to serve and adore its Divine Authour. No person is excuseable for neglecting to read in this book, as it is written in an universal language, intelligible to all mankind. Had I been born in a desert island, or never seen a human creature beside myself ; had I never been informed of what had formerly happened in a certain corner of the world ; I might yet have learned, by the exercise and cultivation of my reason, and by the proper use of those faculties God hath given me, to know and to love him ; I might hence have learned to love and admire his power and goodness, and to have discharged my duty here on earth. What can the knowledge of the learned teach me more ? •

“ With regard to revelation, could I reason better or were I better informed, I might be made sensible perhaps of its truth and of its utility to those who are so happy as to believe it : but if there are some proofs in its favour which I cannot invalidate, there appear also to me many objections against it, which I cannot resolve.

solve. There are so many solid reasons both for and against its authority, that, not knowing what to conclude, I neither admit nor reject it. I reject only the obligation of submitting to it, because this pretended obligation is incompatible with the justice of God, and that, so far from its removing the obstacles to salvation, it raises those which are insurmountable by the greatest part of mankind. Except in this article, therefore, I remain respectfully in doubt concerning the scriptures. I have not the presumption to think myself infallible: more able persons may possibly determine in cases that to me appear undeterminable: I reason for myself, nor for them; I neither censure nor imitate them: their judgment may probably be better than mine; but am I to blame that it is not mine?

“ I will confess to you further, that the majesty of the scriptures strikes me with admiration, as the purity of the gospel hath its influence on my heart. Peruse the works of our philosophers with all their pomp of diction; how mean, how contemptible are they, compared with the scripture! Is it possible that a book at once so simple and sublime should be merely the work of man? Is it possible that the Sacred Personage, whose history it contains, should be himself a mere man? Do we find that he assumed the tone of an enthusiast or ambitious sectary? What sweetness, what purity in his manners! What an affecting gracefulness in his delivery! What sublimity in his maxims! What profound wisdom

dom in his discourses! What presence of mind, what subtilty, what truth in his replies! How great the command over his passions! Where is the man, where the philosopher who could so live and so die, without weakness and without ostentation? When Plato described his imaginary good man * loaded with all the shame of guilt, yet meriting the highest reward of virtue, he describes exactly the character of JESUS CHRIST: the resemblance was so striking that all the fathers perceived it.

“ What prepossession, what blindness must it be to compare the son of Sophroniscus to the son of Mary? What an infinite disproportion there is between them! Socrates, dying without pain or ignominy, easily, supported his character to the last, and if his death, however easy, had not crowned his life, it might have been doubted whether Socrates, with all his wisdom, was any thing more than a vain sophist. He invented, it is said, the theory of morals. Others, however, had before put them in practice; he had only to say what they had done, and reduce their examples to precepts. Aristides had been *just*, before Socrates defined justice; Leonidas gave up his life for his country before Socrates declared patriotism to be a duty; the Spartans were a sober people, before Socrates recommended sobriety: before he had even defined virtue, Greece abounded in virtuous men. But where could JESUS learn, among his compatriots, that pure
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* De Rep. dial. 1.

and sublime morality of which he only hath given us both precept and example*. The greatest wisdom was made known amidst the most bigotted fanatasm, and the simplicity of the most heroick virtues did honour to the vilest people on the earth. The death of Socrates, peaceably philosophising with his friends, appears the most agreeable that could be wished for; that of JESUS, expiring in the midst of agonizing pains, abused, insulted, cursed by a whole nation, is the most horrible that could be feared. Socrates, in receiving the cup of poison, blessed indeed the weeping executioner who administered it; but JESUS, in the midst of excruciating tortures prayed for his merciless tormentors. Yes, if the life and death of Socrates are those of a sage, the life and death of JESUS are those of a God. Shall we suppose the evangelick history a mere fiction; indeed, my friend, it bears not the marks of fiction; on the contrary the history of Socrates, which nobody presumes to doubt, is not so well attested as that of JESUS CHRIST. Such a supposition in fact only shifts the difficulty without removing it: it is more inconceivable that a number of persons should agree to write such a history, than that one only should furnish the subject of it. The Jewish authours were incapable of the diction, and strangers to the morality contained in

* See, in his discourse on the mount, the parallel he makes between the morality of Moses and his own, Matt. v. 21. &c.

in the gospel; the marks of whose truth are so striking and inimitable, that the inventor would be a more astonishing character than the hero. And yet, with all this, the same gospel abounds with incredible relations, with circumstances repugnant to reason, and which it is impossible for a man of sense either to conceive or admit. What is to be done amidst all these contradictions? Be modest and circumspect: regard in silence what cannot be either disproved or comprehended, and humble thyself before the Supreme Being, who only knows the truth.

“ Such is the involuntary scepticism in which I remain: this scepticism, however, is not painful to me, because it extends not to any essential point of practice; and as my mind is firmly settled regarding the principles of my duty, I serve God in the sincerity of my heart: in the mean time I seek not to know any thing more than what relates to my moral conduct; and as to those dogmas, which have no influence over the behaviour, and which many persons give themselves so much trouble about, I am not at all solicitous concerning them. I look upon the various particular religions as so many salutary institutions, prescribing, in different countries, an uniform manner of publick worship; and which may all have their respective reasons, peculiar to the climate, government, genius of the people adopting them, or some other motive which renders the one preferable to the other, according to the circumstance of

time and place. I believe all that are convenient to be good, when God is served in sincerity of heart. This service is all that is essential. He rejects not the homage of the sincere, under whatsoever form they present it. Being called to the service of the church, I comply, therefore, with a scrupulous exactness, to all the forms it prescribes in my duty, and should reproach myself for the least wilful neglect of them. After having lain under a long prohibition, I obtained, through the interest of M. de Mellerade, a permission to re-assume the functions of the priesthood, to procure me a livelihood. I had been accustomed formerly to say mass with all that levity and carelessness with which we perform the most serious and important offices after having very often repeated them. Since I entertained my new principles, however, I celebrate it with greater veneration: penetrated by reflecting on the majesty of the Supreme Being, and the insufficiency of the human mind that is so little able to form conceptions relative to its authour, I consider that I offer up the prayers of a people under a prescribed form of worship, and therefore carefully observe all its rites. I recite carefully; and strive not to omit the least word or ceremony; when I am just going to communicate, I recollect myself, in order to do it with all those dispositions that the church and the importance of the sacrament require: I endeavour on this occasion to silence the voice of reason before
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the Supreme Intelligence: I say to myself, who art thou, to presume to set bounds to omnipotence? I reverently pronounce the sacramental words, and annex to them all the faith that depends on me. Whatever be the truth with regard to that inconceivable mystery, I am not fearful, therefore, of being charged at the day of judgement with profaning it in my heart.

“Honoured with the ministerial office, though of the lowest rank, I will never do, or say, any thing that may make me unworthy to fulfil its sacred functions. I will always inculcate virtue, exhort my auditors to pursue it, and, as far as it is in my power, set them an example. It does not depend on me to make their religion amiable, nor to confine the articles of their faith to what is useful and necessary for all to believe: but God forbid that I should ever preach up the cruel tenets of persecution; that I should even induce them to hate their neighbours, or to consign over others to damnation*. Were I, indeed, in a superior station, this reserve might

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* The duty of adopting and respecting the religion of one's country does not extend to such tenets as are contrary to moral virtue; such as that of persecution. It is this horrible dogma which arms mankind inhumanly against each other, and renders them destructive to the human race. The distinction between political and theological toleration is puerile and ridiculous, as they are inseparable, so that one cannot be admitted without the other. Angels themselves could not live in peace with men whom they regarded as enemies to God.

incur censure; but I am too insignificant to have much to fear, and I can never fall lower than I am. But whatever may happen, I will never blaspheme divine justice, nor lie against the Holy-Ghost.

“ I have long been ambitious of the honour of being a pastor; I am indeed still ambitious, though I have no longer any hopes of it. There is no character in the world, my good friend, which appears to me so desirable as that of a pastor. A good pastor is a minister of goodness, as a good magistrate is a minister of justice. A pastor can have no temptation to evil; and though he may not always have it in his power to do good himself, he is always in his duty when soliciting it of others, and very often obtains it when he knows how to make himself truly respectable. O, that I enjoyed but some little benefice among the poor people in our mountains! how happy should I then be! for I cannot but think that I should make my parishioners happy! I should never, indeed, make them rich, but I should partake their poverty; I would raise them above meanness and contempt, more insupportable than indigence itself. I would induce them to love concord, and to cherish that equality which often banishes poverty, and always renders it more supportable. When they should see that I was no richer than themselves and yet lived content, they would learn to console themselves under their lot, and to live contented too. In the instructions I should give them, I should be less directed by the sense of
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the church than that of the gospel; whose tenets are more simple, and whose morals more sublime; that teaches few religious forms and many deeds of charity. Before I should teach them their duty, I should always endeavour to practise it myself, in order to let them see that I really thought as I spoke. Had I any protestants in my neighbourhood, or in my parish, I would make no distinction between them and my own flock, in every thing that regarded acts of Christian charity: I would endeavour to make them all equally love each other, regard each other as brothers; respecting all religions, and at peace enjoying their own. I conceive that, to solicit any one to quit the religion he is brought up in, is to solicit him to do wrong, and is of consequence to do wrong one's self. Let us, therefore, preserve the publick peace, and wait the progress of further information: the laws in every country should be respected; we should never disturb the established worship, nor excite the people to disobedience; for we know not absolutely whether it be better for them to change their present opinions for others, and we know of a certainty that it is an evil to transgress the laws.

“ Thus, my young friend, have I given you with my own lips, a recital of my creed, such as the Supreme Being reads it in my heart. You are the first person to whom I have made this profession; you are also the only one, perhaps, to whom I shall ever make it. So long

as men cherish any salutary belief at all, we ought not to disturb the weak, nor excite the doubts of the simple, by difficulties which they cannot resolve, and which disquiet their minds, without informing their understandings. But when once scepticism hath taken entire possession of the mind, we ought to save the trunk at the expense of the branches; in such a state the agitated and dubious consciences of men are just as I have seen your's, almost extinct, and require to be awakened and confirmed: to establish them on the basis of eternal truths, it is necessary, therefore, entirely to loosen the hold they may still retain of the floating seeds of uncertainty.

“ You are now arrived at that critical term of life, in which the mind opens itself to conviction, in which the heart receives the form and character which it bears during life, whether good or ill. Its substance grows afterwards hard, and receives no new impressions. Now is the time, therefore, to impress on your mind the seal of truth. If I were more positive in myself, I should have assumed a more decisive and dogmatical air; but I am a man ignorant and subject to error. What can I do more? I have opened to you my heart, without reserve: what I have thought certain, I have given you as such; my doubts I have declared as doubts, my opinions as opinions; and have given you my reasons for both. It remains, now, for you to judge; you have taken time; this precaution
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is wise and makes me think well of you. Begin by bringing your conscience to a state desirous of being enlightened. Be sincere with yourself. Adopt those of my sentiments which you are persuaded are true, and reject the rest. You are not yet so much depraved by vice to run the risk of making a bad choice. I should propose to confer together sometimes on these subjects; but as soon as ever we enter into disputes we grow warm; obstinacy and vanity interfere, and sincerity is banished. Never dispute, therefore, with any one, for in so doing we neither inform ourselves nor others. For my own part, it was not till after several years of meditation that my sentiments became fixed; these, however, I still retain, my conscience is easy and I am content. Were I desirous to begin a new examination into the truth of these sentiments, I could not do it with a more sincere love to truth; and my mind, at present less active, would be less in a state to discover it. I purpose, therefore, to remain as I am, lest my taste for contemplation should become insensibly an idle passion; lest it should make me indifferent to the discharge of my practical duties, and reduce me into my former state of scepticism, without leaving me force enough to extricate myself. Above half my life is already spent, the remainder will not afford me time more than sufficient to repair my errors by my virtues. If I am mistaken, it is not wilfully. That Being, who searches the hearts of men, knows that I

am not fond of ignorance. But under my present incapacity to instruct myself better, the only method that remains for me to extricate myself, is a good life; and if out of stones God can raise up children to Abraham, every man may justly hope to be enlightened when he becomes worthy to be so.

“ If my reflexions should lead you to think as I do, if my sentiments should be the same as your’s, and we should both be of the same belief, I would give you the following advice—Expose yourself no more to the temptations of poverty and despair; lead no longer a life of ignominy, subsisting, at the mercy of strangers, on the bread of charity. Return to your own country, embrace again the religion of your fathers, adopt it in sincerity of heart, and give it up no more: it is very simple and very pure: of all the religions in the world, I believe it is that which may boast the most refined and rational system of morality. With regard to the expenses of the journey, give yourself no trouble about that; you shall be amply provided. Be not abashed, also, by the false shame of a mortifying return: we may blush at the commitment of a fault, but ought not to blush at repairing it. You are as yet at an age wherein every thing is forgiven, but beyond which you cannot proceed to err with impunity. If you attend to the voice of conscience, a thousand vain obstacles will be dissipated. You will perceive that, in our present state of uncertainty, it is an inexcusable

cuseable presumption to profess any other religion than that in which we were educated; and a great error not to practice sincerely that which we profess. By a different conduct, if we err, we deprive ourselves of a powerful excuse at the tribunal of our Sovereign Judge; for will not he rather pardon us the errors in which we were born, than those of which we have ourselves made choice?

“ Preserve your mind, my son, always in a state to wish there should be a God, and you will never doubt of his existence. As for the rest, whatever religion you may embrace, remember that its real duties are independent of human institutions; that an upright heart is the temple of the Divinity; and that in every country, and in every sect, to love God above all things, and thy neighbour as thyself, is the summary of the law; remember that no religion upon earth can dispense with the obligations of morality, that nothing is truly essential but these, that the heart-felt adoration of the Deity is the first of these obligations, and that without faith there can be no true virtue.

“ Avoid all those, who, under pretence of explaining natural causes, plant the most destructive doctrines in the hearts of men; and whose apparent scepticism is an hundred times more dogmatical and affirmative than the decisive tone of their adversaries. Under the haughty pretext of being the only persons who are truly enlightened, honest, and sincere, they

subject us imperiously to their magisterial decisions, and give us, for the true principles of things, only unintelligible systems, which they have raised in their own imaginations. Add to this, that while they overturn, destroy, and trample under feet every thing that is respectable among mankind, they deprive the afflicted of the last consolation in their misery; take from the rich and powerful the only check to the indulgence of their passions; they eradicate from our hearts the remorse of guilt and the hopes of virtue; absurdly boasting themselves at the same time the friends and benefactors of mankind. The truth, say they, can never be hurtful: so far I am of their opinion, and this is to me a great proof that what they teach, cannot be true*. Young man, be sincere without vanity;

* The contending parties reciprocally attack each other with so many sophisms, that it would be a rash enterprise to undertake to expose them all. One of the most common on the philosophical side of the question is, to contrast an imaginary people, supposed to be all good philosophers, with another people all bad christians; as if it were more easy to make a people true philosophers than good christians. I know not whether among individuals one be more easily met with than the other; but this I know, that when we speak of a whole people, we must suppose that they would as much abuse a philosophy without religion as they do a religion without philosophy; and this consideration seems to me to make a great difference in the question. Bayle has proved very acutely, that fanaticism is more pernicious than Atheism; and this is not to be disputed; but he neglected to observe what is nevertheless true, that fanaticism, the sanguinary

vanity; while you acquiesce in your ignorance you neither deceive yourself nor others. If

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and cruel, is a great and animating passion; that it elevates the heart of man, and makes him look down with contempt on death; that it is a prodigious spring of action, and requires only to be duly regulated in order to produce the most sublime virtues; whereas, on the contrary, irreligion and a philosophical spirit in general, attaches us to life, enervates and debases the soul, concentrating all our passions in self-interest, and thus sapping by degrees the foundations of society. If atheism be less sanguinary it is less out of a love to peace than from an indifference to virtue; let the world go how it will it little concerns these pretended sages, provided they can loll at ease in their closets. Their principles do not excite them to slaughter mankind, but they prevent them from adding to their number, by corrupting the manners which tend to their increase; by detaching themselves from their species, and reducing all their affections to a selfish egotism, as fatal to population as to virtue. The indifference of the philosopher resembles the tranquillity of a state under a despotick government: it is the tranquillity of death, and more destructive than war itself. Thus fanaticism, though more fatal in its immediate effects than what is called the philosophick spirit of the age, is much less so in its remoter consequences.

Philosophy, on its own principles, cannot be productive of any virtue, which does not flow from religion, and religion is productive of many virtues to which philosophy is a stranger. As to practice, it is another thing, and remains to be examined. There is no man who practices in every particular the duties of his religion, when he has one; that is true; the greater part of mankind have hardly any religion at all, and practice nothing of what little they have; this also is very true: but after all some people have religion, and practice it at least in part; and it is incontestible, that motives of

ever you cultivate your talents so far as to enable you to publish your sentiments to the world,
speak

religion prevent them often from falling into vice, and excite to virtuous and commendable actions, which they had not performed but for such motives. Let a Priest be guilty of a breach of trust; what does this prove but that a blockhead had confided in him? If Paschal himself had done it, this would have proved Paschal a hypocrite; nothing more.—But a Priest!—Well, and what then? Are those who make a traffick of religion the truly religious? The crimes of the clergy by no means prove that religion is useless, but that few persons are religious.

Modern governments are undoubtedly indebted to christianity for their most solid authority, and the rarity of revolutions; it has even rendered them less sanguinary: this is proved by comparing them with the ancient governments. Religion better understood hath, by banishing fanaticism, given a greater mildness to christian manners. This alteration is not the effect of letters, for we do not find that wherever literature hath flourished, humanity hath been at all the more respected; the cruelty of the Athenians, of the Egyptians, the Roman Emperours, and the Chinese are evidence of this. On the other hand, what deeds of charity and mercy have been effected by the gospel! how many restitutions, and reparations, hath not the practice of confession brought about among the Catholicks? Among us, how many reconciliations are effected, how many alms are distributed before an approaching communion? Among the Jews, avarice let go its hold, and misery was banished from among them, on the approach of their Jubilee. Not a beggar was to be seen in their streets, as there is not among the Turks, whose charitable foundations are innumerable. By the principles of their religion, they are taught to be hospitable even to the enemies of it. Chardin tells us that the Mahometans imagine there is a bridge, which they call *Poul-Serrbo* thrown

speak from the dictates of your own conscience, without troubling yourself about applause. The abuse of knowledge produces incredulity. The man of science disdains the sentiments of the vulgar, and would ever be singular in his own. The vanity of philosophy leads to infidelity, as a blind devotion leads to fanaticism. Avoid both extremes, remain ever firm in the way of truth, or in that which appears so to you in the simplicity of your heart, without ever being drawn aside by pride or weakness. Be not afraid to acknowledge God among philosophers, nor to stand up an advocate for humanity among persecutors. You may perhaps be thought singular, but you will carry about you the innate testimony of a good conscience, which will enable you to dispense with the approbation of men.

over the flames of hell, which they are to pass at the general resurrection; and this they cannot do till they have repaired the injuries they have committed. Can I conceive that this bridge which is to repair so many iniquities does not actually prevent some? Suppose we were to deprive the Persians of this idea, by persuading them there is no such thing as their *Poul Serrho*, nor any thing like it, where the oppressed shall be revenged on their oppressors after death; is it not clear that the latter would be very much at their ease, and would be freed from the trouble of appeasing the former? It is, therefore, false that this doctrine is not hurtful; and therefore it cannot be true.

Your moral precepts, my philosopher, are very fine, but pray let me know what sanction you have for them. Forbear a moment to wander from the point, and tell me plainly what you would substitute in the place of the *Poul-Serrho*

men. Whether they love or hate you, whether they admire or despise your writings, it is no matter. Speak what is true, do what is right; for the object of greatest importance is to discharge our duty. Our private interest, my child, deceives us; but the hopes of the just cannot be deceived."

I HAVE TRANSCRIBED the foregoing tract, not as a rule we ought to follow in matters of religion; but as an example of the manner in which we ought to reason with our pupil, in order to prevent his wandering from the method I have endeavoured to establish. While we place no confidence in the authority of men, nor are influenced by national prejudices, the light of reason can carry us no farther than to the truths of natural religion: to which also I confine myself in the education of Emilius. If it be needful for him to adopt any other, I have no right to be his director there; he should in this be left to make his own choice.

We labour in concert with nature, and while she is forming the physical man, we endeavour to form the moral one; but the degrees of our progress are not the same. The body is become robust and strong, while the soul is yet languishing and feeble; for, in spite of all the efforts of human art, the temperament will always go before the understanding. It is to restrain the one and incite the other, that our endeavours
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have been hitherto directed, in order that the man should be as uniform and consistent as possible. In the developement of his constitution, we have diverted his growing sensibility, and in cultivating his reason have endeavoured to regulate it. The intellectual objects presented him, have moderated the impressions of those which were sensible. In recurring to the first principle of things, we drew him off from the influence of sense; nor could any method be more simple than to elevate him from the study of nature to the investigation of its Divine Author.

When we arrived so far, we had got new hold of our pupil; we had secured new means of making way to his heart. He saw not till then his interest in being virtuous, in extending his views to the good of others, and, without being compelled to it by laws, in being just to God and himself; in doing his duty, even at the peril of his life, and in cherishing virtue, not only for the sake of any moral order preferable to the love of himself, but for the sake of the Author of his being; a love consistent with that he bears to his own person, and for the sake of enjoying, at length, that lasting happiness, which a good conscience, and the contemplation of a Supreme Being, promise him in another life, after having well employed the present. If we throw aside these considerations, I see nothing but injustice, hypocrisy, and falsehood among mankind; private interest, which in their mutual

tual intercourse is necessarily uppermost, teaching them to hide the deformity of vice by the mask of virtue. Let all mankind contribute to my happiness at the expense of their own; let every thing be made subservient to my purposes, let all mankind perish, in pain and misery, to spare me for a moment the uneasiness of desire or hunger. Such is the language of every reasoning infidel. Yes, I will maintain it all my life, that whoever saith in his heart, there is no God, and speaks otherwise, is either a liar or a fool.

I perceive, reader, let me do what I will, that you and I shall never behold Emilius in the same light: you will always imagine him to be like other young people, giddy, petulant, flighty, running from one entertainment or amusement to another, without settling to any thing. You smile at my making a young man, in the most unruly state of his passions, a contemplative philosopher and a sober theologist: you will be apt to say, this visionary is constantly in pursuit of chimeras; in describing a pupil educated in his manner, he does not model a real, but creates an imaginary being. He deduces an example merely from his own brain, and while he conceives himself pursuing the track of nature, at every step departs from it. On my part, again, in comparing my pupil with your's, I hardly see any thing in which they agree. Being educated so differently, it would be almost a miracle, if they resembled each

each other in any circumstance. As Emilius hath passed his infancy in the enjoyment of all that liberty which your pupils take in their youth, he begins in his youth to make use of that rule, to which they are made to submit when children: this rule hence becoming their plague, they conceive a distaste for it, and perceive in it only the lasting tyranny of their preceptors: they imagine themselves still in a state of childhood, unless they are permitted to throw off all kind of restraint;* and when permitted to do this indemnify themselves for the long constraint they have lain under, as a prisoner, whose irons are just knocked off, joyfully stretches and exercises his limbs.

Emilius, on the contrary, is ambitious of becoming a man, and subjecting himself to the yoke of his growing reason: his body, already formed, no longer stands in need of the same degree of action, but begins to affect rest, while his mind, as yet but half displayed, makes its efforts to expand itself, in its turn. Thus in arriving at the age of reason, your pupils enter upon an age of licentiousness, and mine on the age of discretion.

Would you know whether, in this respect, he or they pursue best the order of nature? Consider

* No persons regard a state of infancy with so much contempt as those who are just risen out of it, as there is no country where rank is more scrupulously distinguished than in those where the inequality is not very great, and every one is constantly afraid of being confounded with his inferior.

sider the difference between those who are more or less removed from it. Observe the young people among the peasants, and see if they are as petulant as your's in town. "During the infancy of savages (says M. Le Beau) they are observed to be always active, and employed in various kinds of bodily exercises; but they no sooner attain the age of youth, than they become tranquil and contemplative: applying themselves afterwards only to serious diversions or games of hazard*." Now Emilius, having been brought up in the use of the same freedom as young peasants or savages, ought accordingly to take the same turn as they, in growing up. All the difference between them is, that instead of his acting only with a view to his amusements or nourishment, he hath acquired, together with his labours and diversions, the advantage of reflection. Arrived, therefore, by such means to this term, we find him properly disposed for that to which I introduce him; those objects of reflection which I present to him, excite his curiosity; because they are not only beautiful in themselves, but also because they are new, and at the same time such as he is able to comprehend. On the contrary, fatigued and wearied out with your insipid lectures, your tedious morals, and endless catechisms, can it be otherwise expected than that your youth should refuse to give any attention to subjects which have been made so disagreeable; to those heavy documents they

* Adventures du Sieur le Beau.

they have been so constantly plagued with, and even to meditations on the Authour of their being, who hath by such means been made an enemy to their pleasures? They have conceived a disgust and aversion for all these topicks, and require something new to awaken their curiosity and fix their attention; they must be no longer talked to about things they were told of when children. Such is the case with my pupil; as he becomes a man, I speak to him as a man, and yet the topicks of our conversation are new: thus, for the very same reason that they are disgusting to others, they should be pleasing to him.

In this manner you see the double advantage my pupil gains in point of time, by my retarding the progress of nature, to the improvement of his reason: but have I, in fact, retarded that progress? No, I have only hindered the imagination from accelerating it; I have only prevented by precepts of a different kind, those premature instructions he might otherwise receive. When borne along by the torrent of custom on one side, to guide him the contrary way, by a different force, is not to thrust him out of his place, but to keep him in it.

At length nature's time arrives; it is necessary it should. As men die, it is necessary that children should be begotten; for the continuation of our species and the preservation of the order of things. When by the tokens I have already described, you foresee the critical moment nigh,
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give up for ever your former manner of conversing with him. He is still indeed your scholar, but no longer your pupil. He is your friend; he is a man; treat him, therefore, for the future as such.

What! must I give up my authority over him, when it is the most necessary? Must I abandon the adult to himself at the time when he is least able to conduct himself, and is the most liable to be led astray? Must he be deprived of my authority over him, when he stands in the most need of it?—Your authority! Who hath told you to renounce your authority? I do not know that, till this moment, you have had any over him. Hitherto you have been able to obtain nothing of him, except by cunning or force. Authority, the law of duty, has been unknown to him. But you have now many and various means of engaging his heart—Reason, friendship, gratitude, and a thousand other motives of affection, speak to him a language he cannot misunderstand. Vice hath not as yet rendered him deaf to their voice. He is as yet susceptible only of natural passions. The principal of all these, that of self-love, attaches him to you; and he is confirmed in that attachment by habit. If a transient fit of passion detach him for a moment, his regret brings him instantly back again; the sentiment which binds him to you is alone permanent; the others are transitory and mutually efface each other. Suffer him not to become corrupted, and he will be always
docile;

docile; he begins not to be intractable till he is already spoiled.

I confess that, if you directly oppose his growing desires, and foolishly treat the new inclinations he perceives within himself as criminal, you will not be long attended to; but as soon as you reject my method I do not pretend to answer for the consequence. Remember always that you are the assistant of nature, and you will never be her enemy.

But what method you will say must be taken? There is but one alternative, either to favour his propensities or to oppose them; either to be his tyrant or his pander; and both are so dangerous in their consequences, that there is sufficient reason to hesitate in the choice.

The first expedient that offers to obviate this difficulty, is to marry him as soon as possible; this is undoubtedly the most certain and most natural one. I doubt much, however, whether it be the best, or the most useful. I shall give my reasons for this hereafter: in the mean time I agree, that young people should be married as soon as they arrive at a marriageable age; but this term may be anticipated; we render it frequently premature, whereas we ought to defer it to years of greater maturity.

If nothing more was required than to listen to propensities and follow certain indications, the matter might be soon determined; but there are so many contradictions between the rights of nature and the laws of society, that, in order to
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reconcile them, we must make use of perpetual shifts and tergiversations: a great deal of art is required to prevent social man from becoming altogether artificial.

I imagine, for the reasons before given, that by the means already prescribed, and others of a similar nature, we might extend the ignorance of the desires and purity of the senses till the age of twenty: this imagination is so well grounded, that in some nations a young man who should part with his virginity before that age would be esteemed infamous; and authours very justly observe that such people are remarkable for strong constitutions, and a numerous offspring, owing to their continence in youth.

This term may even be still prolonged, and it is not many ages ago since nothing was more common, even in France itself. Among other notorious examples was that of Montagne's father, a man not less upright and conscientious than of a strong and healthy constitution, who protested he was married, a true bachelor, at the age of thirty-three, after having served several years in the wars in Italy; and we may see, in the writings of his son, what vigour and gaiety the father preserved when upwards of sixty. The contrary opinion certainly rises more from our manners and prejudices, than from a knowledge of the species in general.

I may lay aside, therefore, entirely the example of our young people, as they prove nothing with regard to those who are educated in a different

ferent manner. The term of nature not being so certainly fixed on this head, as that it may not be accelerated or retarded, I conceive I may, without trespassing against her laws, suppose Emilius to have reached this term, through my means, in his primitive innocence; and that I see this happy term nearly at an end. Surrounded with perils daily increasing, do what I will, he will soon escape me. On the first occasion (and this occasion will soon happen) he will follow the dictates of instinct; and it is an hundred to one but he ruins himself. I have seen and reflected too much on men and manners, not to know the great influence of this moment over the remainder of his life. If I dissemble and pretend to see nothing of this change, he will take the advantage of my weakness; thinking himself able to deceive, he will despise me; and I shall become an accomplice in his ruin. If I endeavour to restrain him, I shall find it too late; he will listen to me no longer; I shall become disagreeable to him, troublesome, and insupportable; and he will not be long before he finds means to get rid of me. I have then but one reasonable method to take; and that is to render him accountable for his actions to himself; to guard him at least against unforeseen errors, and to expose to him the dangers by which he is surrounded. Hitherto I have restrained him, by means of his ignorance; at present I must make use of his knowledge to that end.

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These new instructions are important; it is necessary, therefore, to examine things more deeply. It is now the time for me to give him up, as it were, my accounts; to show him what hath been the employment both of his time and mine; to make known to him what he is and what I am, what we have each been doing, and the obligations we are under to each other. I should now make known to him the several moral relations he stands in to the world, all the engagements he hath contracted, those which have been contracted with him; the degree to which he is arrived in the progress of his faculties, what remains for him to make, the difficulties he will find therein, the means of surmounting such difficulties; as well those in which I may still assist him, as those which he must for the future encounter by himself; in short, he should be made fully acquainted with his critical situation, the dangers that surround him, and all those substantial reasons which ought to engage him to look carefully to himself before he gives himself up to his growing desires.

Remember that to conduct a grown person requires we should take contrary methods to those we employed in conducting an infant. Hesitate not to instruct him in those dangerous mysteries which you so long and so carefully kept secret from him. Since he must be acquainted with them some time or other, it is best that he should not learn them of others,
nor

nor discover them himself, but of you alone: since he will be obliged to enter hereafter into the combat, it is proper, for fear of a surprise, that he should be made acquainted with his enemy.

Those young people who are found intelligent in these matters, without our knowing how they come by their knowledge, never acquire it with impunity. Such indiscreet instruction, as it could not have a virtuous object, defiles at least the imagination of those who receive it, and disposes them to the vices of those who impart it. Nor is this all; domesticks too often insinuate themselves, by such means, into the good-will of children, gain their confidence thereby, and represent their governour as a peevish, ill-natured tyrant; and make it the favourite topick of their private conversation to plot against him. When a pupil has made such a kind of confidence, his tutor may withdraw; he can be no longer of any use.

But wherefore should a child make choice of such confidents, unless on account of the tyranny of those who take care of his education? Why should he hide any thing from them, if he were not reduced to it? Why should he complain of them to others, if he had no subject of complaint? His governour is naturally his first confident; we see by the eagerness with which he runs to tell him his thoughts, that he imagines his very thoughts imperfect, till he has imparted them to his governour. Be assured

that if a child hath no reason to fear your checks or reprimands, he will tell you every thing, and that he is to be trusted with nothing he ought to keep secret from you, when we are certain he will keep nothing from you.

What makes me place the greater confidence in my method, is, that in tracing its effects as exactly as possible, I see no situation in the life of my pupil, that does not place him in a favourable view. In the midst even of those transports, into which the force of temperament may hurry him, and wherein, revolting against the hand that would restrain him, he begins to spurn against my influence; even in those agitations, and fits of passion, I trace his primitive simplicity: his heart, as undepraved as his constitution, knows not the dissimulation of vice; neither reproaches nor contempt have rendered him mean or cowardly; nor hath the baseness of fear taught him to disguise his sentiments. He possesses all the indiscretion of innocence, is sincere without scruple, and knows not as yet the use of deceit. There passes not an emotion in his mind, which is not to be learned from his lips or his eyes; so that the sentiments he entertains are not unfrequently sooner known to me than to himself.

So long as he continues thus freely to open to me his mind, and to take pleasure in disclosing to me his thoughts, I have nothing to fear; but if he becomes more timid and reserved; if I perceive in his conversation, the first embarrassment of

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of bashfulness and shame; instinct already displays itself, there is not a moment to lose, but if I do not speedily instruct him, he will soon acquire information in spite of me.

It is possible that some of my readers, though they should adopt my ideas, will think that nothing more is meant by such instruction, than the taking an opportunity of mentioning the subject in conversation, and that then the whole business is done. The human heart is not to be governed, however, in so easy a manner. What may be said will signify nothing, unless a proper preparation be made for the hearing it. The soil must be plowed before it is sown: the plants of virtue also are difficult to rear, their seeds requiring long cultivation in order to make them take root. One great reason why preaching is in general so useless, is because sermons are delivered indiscriminately before all sorts of people, without discretion or choice. How can the same sermon be thought equally proper to a number of auditors of different dispositions, understandings, humours, ages, sexes, ranks, and opinions? There are not two persons perhaps in the whole, to whom, what is thus indiscriminately delivered to all, is properly adapted: add to this that our dispositions and affections are so inconstant, that there are not two moments in a man's whole life, in which the same discourse would make exactly the same impression on him. Judge then, whether at a time when the irritated passions impose on the understanding

derstanding, and tyrannize over the will, it be proper to inculcate the sober maxims of prudence. Never go to reason, therefore, with young people, even when arrived at the age of reason, till you have first prepared them properly to hear it. Most of the lessons which are thrown away are lost more through the fault of the masters than through that of their disciples. The pedant and the preceptor teach nearly the same things; but the first teaches them at random; and the last only when he is sure they will have their effect. Persons who walk in their sleep often tread securely on the edge of a precipice, from which they would fall headlong if they were suddenly awaked. So hath my Emilius escaped many unseen dangers, in his sleep of ignorance; if I awaken him, however, on a sudden, he might be totally lost. Let us endeavour, therefore, to get him first away from the edge of the precipice, and then we may show it more securely at a distance.

Reading, solitude, and leisure, with an effeminate and sedentary life, spent among the women and young persons, afford those dangers which are most to be feared at his age. I would divert his attention to other sensible objects; and, by giving another turn to his thoughts, wean him from that which they now might have begun to take: it is by exercising him in some laborious employment that I would check the activity of his imagination. When the hands are employed
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in labour the imagination is at rest; when the body is wearied with fatigue, the heart is not readily inflamed by the passions. But the readiest and easiest precaution is, to bear him off from local danger. I take him away, therefore, from town, and from objects of temptation. This, however, is not enough: in what desert, in what savage asylum will he be secure from those dangerous images which will pursue him? It is nothing to separate him from dangerous objects, unless I can also banish the ideas of them from his remembrance, unless I can hit upon the art of detaching him from them entirely, and, in a manner, also, from himself; I might otherwise as well leave him where he was.

Emilius has learnt a trade; this, however, is not our present resource, he also loves and understands agriculture; but the employment of agriculture is not sufficient in the present case. The occupations he is versed in are too easy and familiar, so that by amusing himself with them, he is in a manner doing nothing; he will be thinking of other things, and his head and hands never labour in concert. He must be engaged in some other occupation, that will be interesting on account of its novelty, that will keep up his attention, and induce his application to it; an occupation he will be passionately fond of, and to which he will entirely devote himself. Now the only one that appears to me likely to be attended with all these circumstances is hunting. If hunting be in any case an innocent amusement,

ment, if it be at any time a proper exercise for men, it is in the present case that we should have recourse to it. Emilius is possessed of every qualification proper for this exercise; he is robust, agile, patient, and indefatigable. There can be no doubt that he will soon acquire a taste for it; that he will pursue it with the ardour natural to his age; and forget, at least for a time, those dangerous propensities which arise from a life of softness and effeminacy. The chase hardens the heart as well as the body, and accustoms us to blood and cruelty. Diana is described as an enemy to love; the allegory is very just; the languishing sentiments of that passion take their rise only in softness and repose; violent exercises suppress all tender sentiments. The lover and the hunter are so differently employed amidst woods and forests, that the same objects excite very different ideas.

The refreshing shades, the secret bowers, and pleasing retreats of the former, are only feeding-places, holds, and shelter for game, with the latter. Where the one hears nothing but the voice of the nightingale and the singing of birds, the other is thinking of the noise of the horns, and cry of the dogs: the one thinks of nothing but nymphs and dryads, the other of nothing but huntsmen, hounds, and horses. Walk out into the fields with two such different persons, and you will presently discover, by their discourse, that the earth doth not present the same scene to both,

both, and that their ideas have as different a turn as their inclinations and pleasures.

I can comprehend how those different tastes sometimes unite, and in what manner a time is found for all things. But the passions of youth do not thus divide themselves; give them but one occupation they are fond of, and every thing else is presently forgotten. The variety of our desires arises from that of our knowledge, and the first modes of pleasure we are acquainted with are, for a long time, those only which we pursue. Not that I would have the youth of Emilius spent entirely in the pursuit of game, nor do I take upon me to justify, in any case, that ferocious amusement; it is sufficient for me that it may serve so far to suspend a more dangerous passion, as to make him calmly attend to my discourse about it, and to give me time to describe without exciting it.

There are seasons in human life so interesting as never to be forgotten. Such is to Emilius that of the instructions I am speaking of; which should influence his conduct all the rest of his life. One of the mistakes of the present age is to be too abstracted in our reasoning, as if men were nothing but intelligence. In neglecting the language of the signs which speak to the imagination, we lose the most emphatical of all languages. The impressions made by words are always slight, and we speak to the heart much better by means of the eyes than of the ears. By endeavouring to attribute every thing to rea-

fon, we have reduced our precepts into mere words, we have laid no stress on actions. Reason is not an active faculty; it may sometimes restrain, but seldom excites, and never inspires us to do any thing great. To be always reasoning is the folly of little minds. Great souls speak a different language—the language which persuades and excites to action.

I observe that, in these modern ages, men have no other influence over each other than what arises from power or interest; whereas the ancients effected great things by the powers of persuasion, because they did not neglect the language of the signs. All conventions were made with great solemnity, in order to render them inviolable: before the establishment of the civil powers, the Gods were the magistrates of mankind; it was in their presence that individuals made their treaties, alliances, and promises: the face of the earth was the book wherein they preserved their archives: the rocks, trees, and stones consecrated by these acts, and rendered respectable to uncivilized man, were the leaves of this book, ever open to the publick eye. The well dug in ratification of oaths, the oak of Mamre, the hill of the covenant; these were the simple, but august monuments of the sacred nature of contracts: no sacrilegious hand was lifted against these monuments; and the good faith of mankind was better secured by the force of these mute witnesses than they now are by all the vain rigour of the laws.

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In their governments, the pomp of royal power struck awe into the subject. The external marks of dignity, the throne, the sceptre, the purple robe, the crown, the diadem, were looked upon as things sacred; the person adorned with them was held in reverence, and though without soldiers to enforce his commands, he had only to speak, in order to be immediately obeyed. Whereas at present, when monarchs affect to throw off these marks of dignity*, what is the consequence of it but contempt? The majesty of kings has no influence on the minds of their people; they are obeyed only because of their troops, and the regard of their subjects arises only from the fear of punishment. Kings no longer take the trouble to wear the diadem, nor their nobles their respective marks of distinction; but they must have numerous hands in readiness to see their orders executed. However

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* The Romish clergy have very judiciously preserved these marks, and, after their example, some republicks; among others that of Venice. Hence the Venetian government, notwithstanding the fall of that state, is still in possession of its ancient Majesty, and of all the affection and adoration of its people; so that next to the Pope adorned with his Tiara, there is not a monarch or potentate on earth so much respected as the Doge of Venice, without power or authority, but rendered respectable by wearing a woman's night-cap under his ducal coronet. The ceremony of the Bucentaur, so much ridiculed by superficial wittlings, would alone animate the Venetian populace to shed the last drop of their blood, in defense of their tyrannical government.

flattering this may seem, it is easy to see that in the end this change is by no means to their interest.

What the ancients effected by the power of eloquence is really amazing; but this eloquence did not consist only in studied harangues; the orator being never so powerfully persuasive, as when he spoke the least. The most pathetick language is not that of words but of signs; it does not speak of things but exhibits them. The object which we present to the sight strongly affects the imagination, excites the curiosity, keeps the mind in suspense concerning what is going to be said, and very often speaks sufficiently of itself alone. Did not Thrasibulus and Tarquin in cutting off the heads of poppies, Alexander in clapping his seal on the lips of his favourite, and Diogenes in walking before Zeno, speak more expressively than if they had made each a tedious harangue? What circumlocution had been necessary to convey all the meaning of those simple actions! Darius, entering Scythia with his army, received, from the King of that country, a bird, a frog, a mouse, and five arrows. The ambassadour, who brought them, delivered his present and returned without speaking. In our times such a messenger would pass for a fool; this terrible harangue, however, was in those days well understood, and Darius made the best of his way into his own country. Had a letter or verbal message been sent instead of these emblems; the more menacing the terms
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the less terrible it would have appeared: it would have been looked upon as a blustering rhodomontade, which Darius would only have laughed at.

How attentive were the Romans to the language of signs! They wore garments peculiar to their different ranks and ages; they had their togæ, and distinguishing ornaments of various kinds, their rostrums, their lictors, their fasces, their crowns, ovations, triumphs, &c. All was parade and ceremony; and all had its effect on the minds of the citizens. It was of no little consequence to the state that the people should assemble in one certain place rather than in any other; that they should be in view, or not in view, of the capitol; that they should deliberate on particular days, &c. Persons accused of crimes and candidates for favour wore distinct habits; the warriors boasted not of their exploits, they showed their wounds. Let us suppose one of our modern orators haranguing the people on the assassination of Cæsar, and endeavouring to excite them to revenge his death; he would doubtless expatiate on the horror of the deed, and give a pathetick description of his bleeding wounds and lifeless corpse. Mark Anthony, however, though not deficient in verbal elocution, did nothing of all this: he brought and placed before them the dead body itself. What Rhetorick!

But this digression leads me insensibly from my subject, as many others have done before,

and my ramblings are too frequent to admit them to be long. To return, therefore, to my subject.

Never enter into formal abstract argumentation with youth. Invest reason with a body, if you would render it perceptible to their view. Let the language of the understanding be enforced by that of the heart, in order to excite their attention. Cold and uninteresting arguments, I say again, may determine our opinions, but they cannot determine our actions; they may induce us to believe, but not to act; we demonstrate what ought to be thought, and not what ought to be done. If this be true, with respect to mankind in general, it is still more so with regard to young people, as yet under the influence of their sensations, and who do not reflect so much as they conceive.

I shall take particular care, therefore, even after having made the necessary preparation I have been speaking of, not to break abruptly into the apartment of Emilius; to hold a long discourse with him on the subject I would instruct him in. I shall begin with him by working first on his imagination, fixing upon the time, place, and circumstances the most favourable to the impressions I should be desirous to make on him; I should summon all nature in a manner, to be witness to our conversation; I would even call upon the Supreme Being to confirm the truth of my discourse; I would make him the judge between Emilius and me; I would
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mark the place, the rocks, the woods, and surrounding hills, as monuments of the engagements between us; I would assume in my looks, my accent, and gesture, all that ardour and enthusiasm, with which I would endeavour to inspire him. I would then speak, and he would hear me; I should be moved, and he would be no less affected. In appearing penetrated with a sense of the sacred nature of my obligations, I would render him more respectable; I would enforce my arguments with affecting images; I would not tire him out with diffuse and frigid maxims, but address him in the utmost warmth of affection: my arguments, indeed, should be grave and sententious, but my heart will be fuller than it ever was before. In such a situation it is, that I shall declare to him what I have done for him: and in that shall make him look upon himself as made for me; he will see, in the tenderness of my affection, the reason of all my sollicitude. What surprise! what agitation shall I put him in, by changing all at once my language towards him! Instead of contracting his mind, by speaking to him always of his own interest, I shall hereafter only speak to him of mine, which will affect him still more. By this method I shall fire his young heart with all those sentiments of friendship, generosity, and gratitude which I have planted therein, and which it is so delightful to cultivate. I will press him to my heart, and tenderly weeping over him, say—Thou art my all, my child; thou art my own work,
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and on thy happiness mine depends; if thou shouldst frustrate my hopes, thou wilt rob me of twenty years of my life, and wilt bring my grey hairs with sorrow to the grave.—It is thus that young persons may be rendered attentive, and that we deeply impress on their minds the remembrance of what is said to them.

I have hitherto endeavoured to give examples of the manner in which a preceptor ought to convey instructions to his disciple on difficult occasions. I have strove several times to do the same on the present; but, after several attempts, am obliged to renounce it; convinced that the French language is too quaint and prudish to support, in a book, the simplicity of the primary instructions to be given on certain subjects.

The French tongue, it is said, is the chastest of all others; for my part, I think it the most obscene; the chastity of a language appearing to me not to consist in the ingenious evasion of gross expressions, but in the not having them to avoid. For to avoid them, it is requisite we should think of them; and there is no language in which it is more difficult to avoid the indecency of ambiguous expressions, than it is in the French. The reader, ever more ingenious in the discovery of obscene meanings than the writer in avoiding such expressions, is often scandalized at the most innocent. How can any thing pass through unchaste ears without contracting something of their impurity? A people, modest in their manners, have, on the contrary,
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proper terms for every thing; and these terms are always modest, because they are always modestly employed. It is impossible to conceive a language more modest than that of the Bible, and that precisely, because it is the most simple. To render the same expressions immodest, we have only to translate them into French. What I should say on this occasion to Emilius, would convey no unchaste or immodest idea to his ears; but, that it should appear equally modest to the reader, it is necessary he should have a mind as chaste as that of Emilius.

I cannot help thinking that some judicious reflexions, on the real purity of discourse and the false delicacy of vice, might be useful in those moral conversations to which this subject would naturally tend; for in learning the language of modesty, we ought also to learn that of decorum; and it is very necessary that he should know why these two languages are so widely different. However this be, I maintain that, instead of those idle precepts, with which we are prematurely dunning the ears of youth, and which they only laugh at, when they would have been seasonable, we should wait, and prepare them, for the proper time to inculcate them; that we should then disclose to them the laws of nature in all their truth and simplicity; at the same time annexing to such instruction the sanction of those laws, in the moral and physical evils, which the breach of them inflicts on the delinquents; that, in speaking to them
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of the inconceivable mystery of generation, we should speak also of that charm which the Authour of nature has annexed to that act; of that exclusive attachment which renders it so delightful; of the obligations of fidelity; of the modesty attending it, and enhancing every charm; that in speaking to them of marriage, we should not only describe it as the most delightful of all kind of society, but as the most inviolable and sacred of all contracts: we should on this subject enforce all those reasons which render this tie so respectable with all mankind, and bring a curse and contempt on every one who violates the marriage bed. We should give them a true and striking description of the horrors of debauchery, its stupid debasement, and the insensible declivity by which the first act conducts to the succeeding, and at length involves every one, who treads that slippery path, in ruin. By demonstrating to them, I say, that health, strength, courage, virtue, love itself, and all the blessings of life, depend on our regard to chastity; I maintain that we shall render it amiable, and make them not less desirous of learning by what means to preserve it; for chastity is ever respected so long as it is preserved, and is never despised but when it is lost.

It is not true that vicious inclinations are invincible, and that we are incapable of subduing them, while we are not habituated to their gratification. Aurelius Victor tells us, that many persons were so transported with the love
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of Cleopatra, that they would willingly have sacrificed their lives for a night's enjoyment of her; nor is the truth of it impossible, while they were in the height of their infatuation. But let us suppose that the most violent of these men, one the least capable of subduing his passions, saw before him the apparatus of his torture; being assured of perishing thereby in a quarter of an hour; he would not only become in a moment superior to the strongest temptations; but it would cost him very little trouble to resist them: the shocking image which accompanied them would divert his mind from them, and permit him to recover himself. It is the indifference only of our will which occasions our weakness; we are always strong enough to perform what we strongly desire. *Volenti nihil difficile* Did we but detest vice as much as we love life we should as easily abstain from committing an agreeable crime, as from a mortal poison, that should be known to lie concealed in delicious viands.

Whence comes it not to be easily seen, that, if the lessons which are given to a young man on this subject, are of no effect? It is owing to their not being proper for his age, and that it is always necessary to clothe reason in such forms as will make it interesting. Speak to him with solemnity when it is necessary; but let every thing you have to say be so far attractive as to engage his attention. Oppose not his desires with moroseness; stifle not his imagination but cherish

cherish it, lest it should engender monsters. Speak to him freely of the pleasures of love, and our intercourse with women; let him find in your conversation that complacency which is flattering to his young heart; spare no pains to induce him to make you his confident, as by that means only you can ever be truly his master: when you have done this also, you need not be apprehensive that he will be tired of your conversation; he will be for making you talk to him more than you will be inclined to do.

For my part, if I have taken the necessary precautions prescribed by these maxims, and should hold with Emilius such discourse as is proper at this juncture, I have not the least doubt, that he will of himself attain the point to which I would conduct him; that he will be eager to place himself under my guardianship; and that with all the ardour peculiar to his years, and with a sense of the dangers by which he is surrounded, he will thus apply to me for protection. “O, my friend, my master, and protector! resume, I pray you, that authority which you are desirous of resigning at a time when it is most necessary for you to exert it. You have hitherto had no power over me but what took its rise from my weakness; you have it now from my voluntary submission; which will render it but the more sacred. O defend me from the numerous enemies by which I am encompassed; and particularly from those deceitful ones which I carry about me; watch over your work, that I may yet

yet remain worthy of you. I will be ever obedient to your laws; or if I disobey, it must be in spite of myself; preserve me free, by protecting me from my passions, which would enslave me; prevent me from being subjected to their tyranny, and compel me to sustain the mastery over them, by not obeying my senses, but my reason."

When you have brought your pupil to make this concession (and if you do not, it is your own fault) be careful how you take him at his first word; lest, if ever your authority should seem too harsh or severe, he should think himself entitled to cast it off, under pretence of his having been surprised into submission. This then is the proper time for gravity and reserve, such a behaviour will also impress him the more, as it will be the first time you ever assumed it with him.

You will do well to say to him—"You are very ready, young man, to enter into difficult engagements; it is proper, however, that you be made acquainted with their nature before you form them: you know not with what impetuosity the passions hurry such young men as you, into the abyss of vice, under the appearance of pleasure. You have not, I know, so base a mind as ever to break your faith with me; but how often will you not repent the having given it me! How often will you not curse the man who loves you, when, to snatch you from the evils that threaten you, he will find himself obliged

obliged to wound you to the very heart! As when Ulysses, charmed by the Syrens, cried out to his conductors to loosen his bonds, so will you, seduced by the charms of pleasure, wish to break those ties by which you are restrained; you will importune me with your complaints: you will reproach me for my tyranny, even when I am the most tenderly concerned for your welfare; while I am studying only your happiness, I shall incur your hate. O, my Emilius, I shall never be able to support the pain of being hateful to you! I should even purchase your happiness too dear at this price. Do not you see, my dear friend, that in obliging yourself to obey me, you oblige me to govern you, to disregard my own happiness by devoting myself to your's, to regard neither your complaints nor your displeasure, and to oppose incessantly both your desires and my own? You impose on me a more heavy yoke than you bear yourself. Before we submit ourselves to such constraint, let us consult our own strength; let us both take time to reflect on this matter; remembering that those who are the slowest to promise, are the most certain to keep their word."

Remember also yourself, well-meaning preceptor! that the more difficulty you make to enter into such an engagement, the more easy you render its execution. It is necessary that a young man should be sensible that he undertakes a great task, and that you also engage in a much greater. When the time comes that he
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shall have signed the contract, if I may so express myself, you may change your tone: make your government as easy, as you have represented it severe. You may say to him—"My young friend, you want experience, but I have taken care that you should not want understanding. You are now in a capacity to judge of the motives of my conduct; to which end you need only wait till your passions subside. Begin, however, always by your obedience, and afterwards require of me a reason for my commands: I shall be ever ready to do this, when you are in a situation to understand me; nor shall I ever be afraid to submit any affair between us to your decision. You promise to be tractable, and I promise you never to make use of your docility, unless to make you the happiest of mankind. Your security in my promise, is the life you have hitherto led. Find me any other person of your age, who hath passed his days so agreeably as you have done, and I will then venture to promise nothing."

After having thus established my authority, my first care should be to prevent the necessity of making use of it. I would spare no pains to gain still further on his confidence, in order to render myself the friend of his heart and the arbiter of his pleasure. So far from opposing the inclinations natural to his years, I would consult them in order to become their master: I would enter into his views, that I might be the better able to direct his actions; nor would I be
anxious

anxious to secure his distant happiness, at the expense of the present. It is not my design that he should be only once happy, but that he should, if possible, be always so.

It is usual with those who would secure youth from the ill consequences of their passions, to set that of love in a criminal light, to represent it as a sentiment not to be cherished by young people; just as if it were a passion to be gratified only by the old. None of these deceitful lessons, to which the heart constantly gives the lie, can be persuasive. Conducted by a more certain instinct, a young man smiles in secret at such gloomy maxims, in which he nevertheless pretends to acquiesce, and only waits for an opportunity to prove them of no effect. Such a proceeding, in tutors, is directly contrary to nature. By following an opposite method, I shall arrive more certainly at the end we both aim at. I shall not be afraid to cherish that agreeable sentiment he is so choice of; I shall describe it, as it really is, to be the supreme happiness of life; and in so doing encourage him to indulge it. In giving him to understand also what additional charms the union of hearts confers on the pleasures of sense, I shall raise in him a disgust of licentious pleasures; and even, while I encourage him to be amorous, make him prudent.

How confined a capacity is that which only discovers in the growing desires of a young man, an obstacle to the prudential lessons of reason!

For my part, they present to me the true means of rendering him docile to those very lessons. We can have no hold of the passions, but by means of the passions themselves; it is by their own power we must oppose their tyranny, and it is always in nature herself, that we must seek the proper instruments to regulate her work.

Emilius was not made to live always alone: as a member of society, he must discharge the obligations he lies under to it. Formed to live among mankind, it is requisite he should know them. Of man, in general, he is not ignorant; it remains for him, therefore, to become acquainted with individuals. He knows what is done in the world; it remains for him to know how to live in it. It is time to give him an external view of that grand machine, with the operations of whose secret springs he is already so well acquainted. He will no longer regard it with the stupid admiration of an ignorant novice; but with the discernment of a just and clear understanding. His passions, doubtless, will sometimes mislead him; for where is the man who is not sometimes misled by his passions? But he will not, at least, be misled by those of others: if he regards them at all, it will be with the eye of a philosopher, without being seduced either by example, or by prejudice.

As there is one age proper for the study of the sciences, so there is another for acquiring a knowledge of the manners of the world. Whoever is brought acquainted with these too young,
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adopts them all his life, without choice or reflection; and though not insufficiently, yet it is always without knowing what he is about. But he who, in studying manners, enters into the reasons and motives of them, adopts them with more discernment, and consequently with more grace and propriety. Give me a child of twelve years of age, perfectly ignorant of every thing, and at fifteen I will return him to you as learned as any that you may have earlier instructed; with this difference, that the learning of your's will lie altogether in his memory, and the knowledge of mine in his judgement. In the same manner, introduce a youth of twenty years of age to the world; if well conducted there, he will, in a year's time, be rendered more amiably and judiciously polite, than if he had been accustomed to publick life from his infancy: for the former being in a capacity to trace the motives for the respective behaviour of persons of different ranks, ages, and sex, will be able to reduce good manners to a system, and extend its principles to unforeseen cases and circumstances; whereas, the other, having no other rule than common practice, if he should ever happen to stumble on any new situation, would be immediately embarrassed and know not how to behave.

The young ladies in France are all educated in convents till the time of their marriage. Do we see that they are then obliged to take any extraordinary pains to adopt the manners, which

are, nevertheless, to them so very new? or are the Parisian ladies to be charged with a stiff and embarrassed air, or with being ignorant of the customs of the polite world, because they were not introduced to it in their infancy? This is one of the prejudices of people in high life, who, knowing nothing of greater importance than this frivolous science, mistakenly imagine young persons cannot be initiated therein too early.

It is certain, however, that they should not, on the other hand, neglect such accomplishments too long. Those who have spent their younger days altogether at a distance from the great world, will never shake off that air of embarrassment and constraint, which ever attends a clownish behaviour; nor will they, by any future commerce with the world, be capable of divesting themselves of that impropriety of manners and conversation, which are only rendered the more ridiculous by our efforts to get rid of them. Every kind of instruction hath its proper season to be chosen, and its peculiar inconveniences to be avoided. It is peculiarly on the present occasion that care should be had to both these circumstances.

When, according to my method, the same means answer several ends, and I avoid one inconveniency even in the prevention of another, I conclude I am always right, and that such method is a very good one. What it suggests to me at present I think confirmed by experience.

rience. If I were to be austere and contradictory with my pupil, I should forfeit his confidence, and he would soon hide his inclinations from me. If, on the contrary, I were to be complaisant and easy, or wilfully to shut mine eyes, of what advantage would my guardianship be to him? I should in that case only give a sanction to his licentiousness and quiet his conscience at the expense of my own. Were I to introduce him to the world, on the sole plan of instructing him, he would soon acquire more knowledge, perhaps, than I should choose. If I should prevent his ever seeing the world, what would he have learned of me! Every thing, perhaps, except that art, which is the most necessary, as well for the man as the citizen, the art of living among his fellow-creatures. If I should direct his application to objects of distant utility, they would not be at all engaging, as he is interested in nothing but the present moment: again, if I content myself with only directing his amusements, of what service am I to him? He grows enervated but acquires no information.

I shall, therefore, do none of these; having one expedient that will answer all occasions. "Your heart (say I to him) young man, requires a companion; let us go in search of one that is proper for it: we shall not, perhaps, easily find her, as true merit is rare, but let us not be impatient, or discouraged by disappointments. Doubtless there is such a person in the world,

and we shall find her in the end, or at least one that nearly approaches what we seek." With this flattering object in view, I introduce him to the world, what need have I to say any thing more? Do not you see clearly that in this I have done every thing?

I leave you to imagine whether, in describing the mistress I design for him, I shall not be able to engross his attention; whether I shall not be able to render those qualities he ought to admire truly amiable, and dispose all his sentiments to the propriety of what he ought to seek or shun? I must be the most incapable of all rhetoricians if I do not make him passionately in love, without knowing with whom. It is nothing at all to the purpose, that the object I describe is imaginary; it is sufficient that it serve to disgust him with those which might otherwise actually tempt him: it is sufficient that the comparisons he will be led to make, induce him to prefer the chimerical object to those which are real: for what is true love in itself but chimera and illusion? We love the image in our fancy much more than the object to which it is applied. Were we to see the object of our passion such as it really is, there would be at once an end of love. The person frequently remains the same though our passion decays, but we no longer view it in the same light. The veil of delusion falls off and love takes its flight. Now, in forming an imaginary object, I am free to make what com-

parisons I please, and can easily prevent the illusion of those which are real.

I would not, however, have a young man, for this reason, deceived, by placing before him a model of perfection which cannot exist; but I should make choice of such defects in his mistress as would be agreeable to him, and would serve to correct his own. Neither would I have even the imposition passed on him, of telling him the object described really existed: but if he was delighted with the copy, he would soon wish for the original. From wishing any thing to be and supposing it, is an easy transition; this is the case with some artful descriptions, which, by means of a few striking touches, give to the imaginary object a greater appearance of reality. I would go so far as to give his imaginary mistress a name; I would say to him laughing, let us call your future mistress Sophia: Sophia is a lucky name, and though she should not happen to be of that name, she will at least be worthy of it; we will, therefore, give her the honour of it before-hand. After having said thus much, without either affirming or denying her existence, if her name should now and then seem to escape you by chance, his suspicions on this head will be confirmed; and he will believe that you keep the person of his intended mistress a secret from him, and that at a proper time he shall be brought acquainted with her. If once he arrive so far, and a proper choice is made of those features it may be expedient

ent to display, all the rest is easy; he may be ventured into the world without danger: defend him only from his sensual appetite, his heart is secure.

But whether he realises the model, I have rendered so amiable, or not, yet if such model be well executed, he will be no less ready to attach himself to whatever may resemble it, and to avoid what is different, than if it were a real object. How efficacious must be this method, to preserve his heart amidst the dangers to which his person is exposed; to restrain his passions by the force of his imagination, and to detach him above all from those well-bred females, who set so great a value on their politeness, and teach a young man good breeding at the expense of his integrity! Sophia is so modest! with what an eye must he regard their advances? Sophia hath so much simplicity! how can he possibly admire their affectation? His notions of female merit are too different from what he sees, for the latter ever to prove very dangerously seductive.

All those who speak of the government of children, adopt nearly the same maxims and prejudices, because they make but imperfect observations, and still more inconclusive reflexions. It is neither the constitution nor the passions that are the first seducers of youth, it is opinion and manners. Nay, I could prove this to be true, even with regard to the boys who are educated in colleges, and the girls who are brought up in convents; the first lessons which

both attend to, being those of vice; nature doth not corrupt them, but example. But we shall leave these to their own depraved manners, which are incorrigible. I speak here only of a domestick education. Take a young man, modestly educated in his father's house in the country, and examine him the moment he arrives at Paris: you will find in him just notions of moral virtue and decency, and a will as undepraved as his understanding. You will find that he holds vice in contempt, and conceives an aversion to debauchery. At the mention of a prostitute, you will read in his looks the effects of innocence. I maintain it that no such youth could prevail on himself to enter alone the miserable habitations of those abandoned wretches, even though he knew their use, and felt them necessary.

Examine the same young man, however, six months after, and you will hardly know him again. His libertine discourse and licentious manners would be apt to make you mistake him for another person, if the pleasantry with which he rallies his former simplicity, and his blushes on being put in mind of it, did not evince him to be the same, and that he is ashamed of it. How soon and surprisngly is he new modelled! What can be the cause of so great and sudden an alteration? Can it be the progress of temperament? Would not this have made the same progress in the house of his father? And yet he surely would not there have
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acquired the same manners or maxims ! Is it owing to the first gratification of the passions ? that hath a contrary effect. In the first indulgence of these, we are timid and restless, preferring secrecy and silence to noise and boasting. Our first pleasures are ever kept concealed ; that modesty which seasons their delight hides them from the world : the first mistress we enjoy makes us fearful and not impudent. Taken up entirely by a situation so new to him, the anxious youth enjoys it by himself, and is ever apprehensive of losing it. If he be boastful and loud, he is neither passionate nor tender ; the more he avows, the less is his enjoyment.

A different manner of thinking only hath effected this difference of behaviour. His heart is still the same ; but his opinions are altered. His sentiments, more slow to change, will, indeed, be perverted in time, and then he will be totally corrupted. He is hardly entered upon the world, before he is subjected to a second education, directly contradictory to the first ; by which he is taught to despise what he before esteemed, and to esteem what he despised : he is taught to regard the lessons of his parents and tutor as pedantick jargon, and the duties they inculcated as a puerile morality which he ought to disdain when he is grown up. He thinks himself obliged in honour to alter his conduct ; he becomes licentious without desires, and impudent through false modesty. He ridicules virtue and decorum before he can take

pleasure in vice, and piques himself on his debaucheries before he is actually debauched. I shall never forget the frank confession of a young officer in the Swiss guards, who was always greatly disgusted with the riotous pleasures of his comrades, and yet durst not absent himself from their parties for fear of their raillery. "I use myself to them (said he) against my inclination, as a man learns to chew tobacco; I may thus probably acquire a taste for them in time, one must not be always a child."

Thus it is less from sensuality than from vanity that we ought to guard a young man on his entrance into the world; he is more subservient to the inclinations of others than to his own; ill example making more libertines than a passion for the sex.

This being granted me, I may ask if there be a young man in the world better armed against whatever may attack his manners, sentiments, and principles, than mine? Is there any one more capable to withstand the torrent? Against what temptation is he not in a state of defense? If his desires lead him to the sex, he finds not what he seeks, and his heart, already engaged, is his security. If his appetites are urgent, where will he gratify them! The horror of adultery and debauchery keep him at an equal distance from the married woman and common strumpet: and it is always by one of these that youth are first debauched. A marriageable young girl may be a coquet; but she will

will not be abandonedly impudent; she will not throw herself into the arms of a young man, who might marry her if he thought her modest and prudent; besides she will always have somebody to keep an eye on her conduct. Emilius, on his side also, will not be entirely left to himself; both at least will be under the restraint of the fear and shame inseparable from their first desires; they will not proceed at once to the greatest familiarities, and they will not have time to approach them by degrees without obstacles. To be able to act otherwise, he must have taken lessons of his comrades, and have learnt of them to laugh at reserve, and become insolent after their example. But what young man is less liable to be misled by example than Emilius? who can be less liable to be perverted by raillery than he, who hath no prejudices of his own, and who regards so little the prepossessions of others? I have laboured twenty years to arm him against the force of ridicule; it will require, therefore, some time, at least to make him the dupe of it: ridicule is with him the argument of fools, and nothing renders a man so insensible to raillery, as to be above the influence of prejudice. Instead of pleasantries, they must attack him with reasons; and when they come to those, I am in no fear lest any young witlings should carry off my pupil; conscience and truth are both too strongly on my side. But, if prejudice should interfere, an attachment of twenty years is still

something even in that light: he will never be made to believe that I have only been teizing him with futile instructions; and with an upright and susceptible heart, the voice of a true and faithful friend is able to prevail over the clamours of twenty seducers. As in such a case, nothing more would be requisite than to show they deceive him, and that in pretending to treat him as a man, they really treat him as a child, I should always affect simplicity as well as gravity and precision in my arguments; in order that he might perceive it is really I, who treat him as a man. I should say to him—
“ You see it is your interest as well as mine, that influences me, and that as I have no interest separate from your’s, I can have no other motive for what I advise: but what motive have these young people, in persuading you to adopt their notions? Doubtless they are striving to seduce you; they can have no regard either for your person or your interest; their only motive must be a secret malice at seeing you more respectable than themselves; they would debase you to their mean standard, and reproach you for being governed only, that they may have the government of you themselves. Can you think to be a gainer by such a change? Is their wisdom so much superior, or is their attachment of a day’s standing stronger than mine? To give any weight to their raillery, it is necessary that we should be able to give some to their authority; and what experience have they to raise
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their maxims above our's? They only imitate other licentious fools, as they would have you in turn imitate them. In casting off the pretended prepossessions of their fathers, they only subject themselves to those of their comrades. I do not see what they get by this conduct, but I know they certainly forfeit two great advantages by it, that of paternal affection, whose counsels are so tender and sincere; and that of experience, enabling us to judge from what we know; for fathers have been children, and children have not been fathers.

“ Do you believe, however, that these young people are sincere in their foolish maxims? No, my dear Emilius, they deceive themselves in order to deceive you; they are not consistent with their own principles. Their hearts give them constantly the lie, and sometimes their lips. You shall hear one of them turn every thing that is modest and virtuous into ridicule, who would be driven to despair if his wife should adopt the same licentious principles. Another will carry his libertinism so far, as to care little about the manners of the woman he is going to marry, or still more infamous, those of the wife he hath already married; but urge him further, speak to him of his mother, and see if he will consent as readily to pass for the bastard son of an adulteress, for the usurper of the name and estate of a family to which he hath no right! Who is there among them would consent that his own daughter should be dishonoured, as he

would dishonour the daughter of another? There is not one of them, who would not be ready to take away your life, should you put in practice, upon him those principles which he endeavours to inculcate. Hence you may see clearly their inconsistency, and that not one of them really believes what he says. Such are my reasons, my dear Emilius; weigh their's, if they pretend to any, and compare both. Should I, after their example, make use of contempt and raillery, you would see them afford a fairer subject for ridicule than myself. But I am not afraid of standing the test of a serious examination. The triumph of the jester is but of a short duration; the truth will remain, when their absurd laughter is silenced."

You cannot imagine that Emilius at twenty years of age should be so docile as I suppose him! How different are your notions and mine! For my part I cannot conceive how he should be docile when but half that age; for what influence can you then have over him? It hath cost me fifteen years labour to establish such an influence. I did not educate him at that early period, I was then only preparing him for education. He is at present so well prepared as to have acquired docility; he can distinguish the voice of friendship, and knows how to be obedient to reason. I leave him, it is true, the appearance of independence; but he was never so completely subservient; he is now obedient because he is desirous to be so. Till I could gain
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the ascendancy over his will, I remained the master of his person, and quitted him not a moment. At present, I leave him sometimes to himself, because my influence over him is constant and perpetual. On quitting him, I embrace him, and say, with an air of confidence, "Emilius, I trust you with my friend, I give you up to his honest heart, and doubt not but he will account for you."

Virtuous affections are not to be depraved in a moment, when they have received no previous alteration; nor are the principles immediately deduced from the first dictates of reason to be eradicated without time. If I observe that any change in either is the consequence of my absence, it will never be so long, nor will he be so far capable of concealing its effects from me, as that I shall not perceive the danger before the evil, and be in time to prevent it. As we are not totally depraved at once, so we learn not all at once to dissemble: if ever any man was a bad dissembler also, Emilius is such; having never in his life had a single occasion to dissemble.

By these and other similar means, I imagine Emilius so well guarded from foreign objects and vulgar maxims, that I had much rather see him in the midst of a circle of the worst company in Paris, than alone in his chamber, given up to all the restlessness and inquietude of his age. Do what we will, of all the enemies that can attack a young man, the most dangerous, and that alone from which we cannot separate

him, is himself: this enemy, however, is dangerous only through our own fault; for, as I have often said, it is the imagination that inflames the passions. Our sensual desires are not, properly speaking, physical necessities; nay, it is not true that they are any real necessities at all. If no lascivious object had ever presented itself to our sight, if no immodest idea had ever entered the mind, this pretended necessity had, in all probability, never been felt; and we should have remained chaste without temptations, without resistance and without merit. We know not what imperceptible fermentations, certain sights and situations excite in the blood of youth, without their being able to account for that first inquietude, which does not easily subside, nor remain long before it is again excited. For my own part, the more I reflect on this important crisis, and its attendant causes, the more I am persuaded that if a man were brought up in a desert, without books, without information, and without women, he would die immaculate though he should live to the age of Methusalem.

But we are not speaking here of a savage of this kind. In educating a man among his equals, and for society, it is impossible, it is even improper, to keep him always in this salutary ignorance; and the greatest misfortune attending wisdom, is to be wise by halves. The remembrance of objects once striking, and the ideas of things already acquired, attend us in our retirement, and people our retreats with images more seductive

seductive than the objects themselves; rendering solitude as fatal to him, who carries with him such company, as it is salutary to those who are perfectly alone.

Watch carefully, therefore, over a young man; he will guard himself against external danger, but it is you who must guard him against himself. Be never absent from him, night nor day; sleeping constantly in the same chamber. Put no confidence in instinct, when you have once exceeded its bounds. Instinct is a safe guide when it proceeds alone, but becomes suspicious when mixed with human prejudices and customs; it must not be destroyed, but regulated; and that, perhaps, is more difficult than to suppress it entirely. It would be extremely dangerous for it to teach your pupil the means of amusing his passions, and supplying the opportunities of gratifying them; should he once acquire the knowledge of this destructive supplement, he would be utterly undone. His body and mind would from that time become enervated, carrying to the grave the deplorable effects of a most pernicious habit, the most fatal indeed that a young man can be subject to. Doubtless it would be better for him even to —. If the impetuous desires of a vigorous constitution become invincible, I say, my dear Emilius, I pity you; but I should not hesitate a moment what to advise; I would not permit the intention of nature to be altogether eluded. If you must be under the subjection of a tyrant, I should give the preference

ference to that from which I might be able to deliver you. Whatever happens, I shall be better able to save you from the women than from yourself.

Till a youth arrives at the age of twenty years his body is growing, and stands in need of all its substance; continence during that interval is prescribed by nature; if he neglects her prescriptions herein, it is at the expense of his constitution. After this term, continence becomes a moral duty; it is of use to teach us the command over ourselves and our appetites; but moral duties have their modifications, their rules, and their exceptions. When human weakness renders an alternative inevitable, of the two evils we are to prefer the least; and in every case it is better to commit a fault, than to contract a vicious habit.

You are to observe, reader, that I am not now speaking of my own pupil, but your's; his passions, which you have suffered to ferment, are now become your masters; yield, therefore, openly to their superiority, without disguise. If you know how to display this submission in its full light, he will be less proud than ashamed of it, and you may secure to yourself, by artful management, the right of conducting him when going astray, so far at least as is necessary to make him avoid the most dangerous precipices. It is requisite that the disciple should take no step without his master's knowledge; and it is better that a governour should approve of a fault
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and be deceived in his own judgement, than that he should be deceived by his pupil, and the fault committed unknown to him. Whatever tutor conceives, he ought to wink at any thing, will find himself very soon obliged to shut his eyes entirely; the toleration of one abuse brings on another, and before we reach the last link of that chain, we shall have subverted all order, and brought every moral obligation into contempt.

Another error in tutors which I have constantly opposed, but of which little minds will never correct themselves, is the affectation of magisterial dignity, and the pride of passing for a faultless character in the eyes of their pupils. This method is very wrong. It is strange they do not see that, by thus endeavouring to establish their authority, they destroy it; that in order to gain attention to what is said, the speaker must descend to the persons he addresses, and that, in order to engage the human heart, he must be himself a man. These faultless personages are neither affecting nor persuasive, so that their disciples always object that it is easy for them to oppose those passions they do not feel. Keep not your own foibles too much a secret from your pupil, if you have a mind to cure him of his. Let him observe in you the same struggles he experiences in himself; let him learn to overcome himself by your example, and not have it to say, with other young people, "these old folks, vexed that they are no longer young,
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want to treat us, that are young, like themselves; and, because they have no desires, they make a crime of our's."

Montagne says, he one day asked M. de Langey, how many times he had been drunk for the King's service, during his negociations in Germany? In the same manner, I would ask the tutor of a young gentleman, how often he had been in a brothel, for the service of his pupil? How often? No: I mistake. If the very first time doth not deprive the young libertine of the desire of ever entering such a place again; if remorse and shame be not the consequence; if he doth not come and pour into your bosom a torrent of tears; give him up at once; he is no better than a monster, or you no better than an idiot; you can never be of any service to him. We shall pass over these dangerous expedients, however, as having nothing to do with our system of education.

What precautions you will say are to be taken with a young man of a good family, before he is exposed to the corrupt manners of the age! These precautions are doubtless laborious and troublesome; but they are indispensable: it is the neglect of them that is so ruinous to all our youth: it is owing to the debaucheries of their earlier years that men are so much degenerated, and that we see them what they at present are. Base and cowardly even in their vices, they betray that littleness of soul, which arises from the early debilitation of the body; and have hardly
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so much life in them as to move about. The pitiful refinement of their thoughts displays the superficiality of their minds; they are strangers to grand or noble sentiments, and possess neither simplicity nor vigour. Abject in every thing, and mean as they are wicked, they have not the courage even to be great in their wickedness. Such are the despicable race of mortals that compose the majority of our youth; so that should there be one among them who hath lived temperate and sober, who hath preserved himself, from the contagion of example, he will, at thirty years of age, be able to crush the whole tribe of insects, and become their master with less trouble than it cost him to remain his own. Emilius may be so, if he will; but he will disdain them too much even to hold them in subjection.

At present, behold my pupil entering on the world, not with a view to display his superiority, but to acquire a knowledge of life, and to find out a companion worthy of him. Whatever be his rank, or to whatever society he is first introduced, his outset will be modest and simple: God forbid he should be so unhappy as to distinguish himself at first above his equals: the qualifications which soonest strike us are not those of Emilius; he neither possesses nor desires to possess them. He has too little value for even the judgement of mankind to set any on their prejudices; and he is never desirous they should esteem before they know him.

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In his behaviour he is neither bashful nor vain, but ingenuous and sincere; he knows no restraint nor disguise; acting with the same freedom in the midst of an assembly as if he were alone. But is he on this account rude, disdainful, or inattentive to others? Quite the contrary: if in a life of solitude he should give himself no concern about others, is that a reason he should do so when living amongst them? He does not, indeed, affect to prefer them to himself in his behaviour, because he really does not so in his heart; but then he as little affects an indifference which is equally foreign to it: if he knows nothing of the formalities of artificial good-breeding, he hath all the natural politeness of humanity. He cannot bear to give any one pain; at the same time he will offer no one his place out of mere ceremony, though he will very readily give it up out of good-nature, if he sees any one neglected and thinks him mortified by such neglect; for it would hurt Emilius less to remain standing, by choice, than to see any one else remain so on compulsion.

Although Emilius hath no esteem for mankind in general, he doth not show any contempt for them, because he laments and pities them. As he cannot give them a taste for what is really estimable, he leaves them to the contented enjoyment of their own opinions, lest if he should deprive them of their imaginary pleasures, he should only make them still more unhappy. He is, therefore, prone neither to disputation

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nor contradiction; on the other hand, also, he is neither complaisant nor ceremonious; he gives his own opinion without controverting that of others; because he prefers liberty to every thing, and accounts freedom one of his most valuable privileges.

He speaks little, because he does not covet the notice and attention of others; for the same reason it is, that his discourse is never useless nor frivolous. Emilius knows too much to be a great talker. Much speaking arises either from a pretension to wit, or from the great consequence in which we hold mere trifles, foolishly believing other people think as much of them as we do. The man who knows things so well, as to hold them in due estimation, never speaks too much; he judiciously estimates also the attention which is paid him, and the interest his hearers may have in his discourse. Generally speaking, those people who know little talk much, and those who know much talk little: it is natural for a blockhead to think the little he knows important, and to tell it to all the world. But the man of knowledge does not open his packet so readily: he hath too much to say, and is sensible that much more may be said after him; he, therefore, remains silent.

So far from being offended at the manners of others, Emilius very readily conforms to them; not with a view to appear versed in the customs of the world, or to give himself an air of politeness; but, on the contrary, merely to avoid rendering

dering himself distinguished or particular; being never so much at his ease, as when no notice is taken of him.

At his first entrance in the world, he is doubtless an absolute stranger to its customs: he is on this account, however, neither timid nor bashful. If he doth not thrust himself forward in company, it is not through the effect of embarrassment, but because, he must be unnoticed himself, if he would take notice of others: and as to what he may himself be thought of, he is under no concern about it, nor is he, in the least afraid of being ridiculed. Being hence always tranquil and indifferent, he is never under the perplexity of a false modesty. Whether he is himself regarded or not, he does every thing in the best manner he is able; and being always at liberty to observe the actions of others, he acquires their manners with a facility, which the slaves of prejudice have not to boast. It may be affirmed that he will sooner learn the customs of the world, for the very reason that he thinks them of so little importance.

Be not deceived, however, by the complacency of his looks, to compare him with the civil young foplings of the age. He is resolute, but not self-sufficient; his manners are free, but not supercilious; an air of insolence belongs only to slaves; independence is a stranger to affectation: I never saw a man of a truly proud mind betray it in his behaviour: this affectation is peculiar to the vain and abject, who have no
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other means of exerting authority. I remember somewhere to have read, that a foreigner coming one day into the dancing-school of the celebrated Marcel, the latter asked him what countryman he was. "I am an Englishman," replied the stranger. "You an Englishman! (returned the dancing master) impossible! Can you be a native of that island, whose natives share in the publick administration, and constitute a part of the legislature? No, Sir, that downcast look and shuffling gait betray you to be the titled slave of some petty German elector."

I know not whether this conclusion displayed any great knowledge, in the true relation between internal character and exterior deportment. For my own part, who have not the honour to be a dancing-master, I should have drawn a very different one. I should have said, "This Englishman is no courtier, I have never heard that courtiers have a downcast look and shuffling gait: but a man may seem awkward and timid in a dancing-school who would appear quite the contrary in the House of Commons." Marcel must surely have taken all his own countrymen for so many ancient Romans!

When we love others we are desirous of being respected by them: Emilius respects his fellow-creatures, and, therefore, is desirous of pleasing them. The like reason prevails still in a greater degree in regard to the fair sex. His age, his morals, his design, all concur to increase
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that desire in respect to them. I say, his morals; for these contribute not a little; men of good morals are the true admirers of the women. They may not have the same jargon of gallantry, but their assiduities are more sincere and tender. I should know a man of good morals, in the company of a young woman, from an hundred thousand debauchees in the same situation. Judge then what Emilius ought to be, with a constitution unblemished, and so many motives to restrain it. He will, no doubt, be often timid and embarrassed in the company of the ladies: this embarrassment, however, will not displease them, as the least coquettish among them too often take a pleasure in observing and increasing it. Again, his sollicitude will take a different form according to the age and circumstance of the parties: thus he will be more modest and respectful in the company of married women, and more lively and tender in that of the young and unmarried. He never loses sight of the object of his researches, and bestows accordingly the greatest attention on such things as call it to mind.

Nobody can be more exact in the observance of every thing that is dictated by nature, or even of every thing relative to the good order of society; but he will prefer the first always to the last, and will show a greater respect to a private person, if older than himself, than he would even to a magistrate of his own age. As he is at present, therefore, most commonly the youngest person

person in the company, he is constantly one of the most modest; and that not from the vanity of appearing humble, but from a natural sentiment, supported by reason. He will have none of those impertinent pretensions to the knowledge of the world, which excite young coxcombs, by way of amusing the company, to interrupt, and talk louder than persons much older and wiser than themselves. He will not, on his part, authorise the answer that was given by an old gentleman to Louis XV. who asked him which he preferred, the last age or the present? "Sire, I spent my youth, in paying a respect to old men; and I am obliged to pass my age, in paying a respect to children."

Having a soul susceptible and tender, but estimating nothing by the standard of common opinion, although he loves to give pleasure to others, he gives himself no concern to be held in consideration by them. Hence it follows, that, being more affectionate than polite, he will never give himself the airs of pride or affectation, and that he will be more touched by one cordial embrace, than by a thousand encomiums. For the same reasons, he will not be negligent of his carriage or behaviour; nay, he may even take some pains in dress; not with a view, however, to be thought a man of taste, but to render his person the more agreeable; he will never have recourse to the gilt frame; nor will any mark of wealth ever defile his garment.

It is easy to be seen that nothing of all this requires me to display a parade of precepts; it being only an effect of his former education. A great mystery is made of the customs of the world, as if we should not naturally fall into those customs at a proper age; or as if the first rules of good-breeding were not deduced from sincerity and good-nature. True politeness consists in testifying our benevolence for mankind; it displays itself of its own accord where it exists: it is for those only, who have it not, to learn the art of counterfeiting its appearances.

“The most unhappy effect of fashionable politeness, is that it teaches us the art of dispensing with the virtues it imitates. Let us be educated to cherish the principles of benevolence and humanity, and we shall have politeness enough, or shall stand in no need of it.

“If we should not have that which is accompanied by the Graces, we should have that which bespeaks the honest man and the good citizen; we should stand in no need of having recourse to the falsehood of appearances.

“Instead of being artificially complaisant in order to please, it will be sufficient to be good; instead of being false, and flattering the foibles of others, it will be enough to be indulgent to them.

“Those with whom we proceed, also, in this manner, will be neither vain nor depraved
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by it: they will become only grateful and corrected."

It seems to me, that if any method of education can be productive of the politeness here required by M. Duclos, it is that which I have here been tracing.

I own, nevertheless, that, from being taught maxims so very different to those which generally prevail, Emilius will never behave altogether like the rest of the world; and, indeed, God forbid he ever should; but in whatever he differs from others, he will be neither disagreeable nor ridiculous; his singularity will be apparent, but never troublesome. Emilius will be, if you will have him so, an agreeable stranger. His singularities will be, at first, overlooked, on the supposition of his *improving himself*; and when you are afterwards accustomed to his behaviour, and see it is not changed, you will overlook it also, with observing, that *it is his way*.

He will not be courted and entertained as an agreeable man, but he will be loved and respected without your knowing why. Nobody will compliment his wit, but every one will be ready to make him the umpire between those who are allowed to have the most. As he is not perpetually hunting after new ideas, he does not pique himself upon his genius. I have made him sensible that all the ideas which are salutary, and truly useful to mankind, are the most obvious; that these, at all times, form the real

bonds of society, and that it belongs to superiour geniuses to distinguish themselves only by notions pernicious to themselves, and fatal to mankind. Such a manner of distinguishing himself, therefore, doth not excite his emulation. He knows where he ought to look for his own happiness, and in what he may contribute to the happiness of others. The sphere of his knowledge extends no farther than to what is profitable. His path is strait and well-bounded; being under no temptation also to leave it, he remains unobserved in the number of those who pursue the same tract. Emilius is a man of common-sense, and desires to be nothing more; you may think to depreciate him by such an appellation; he will always think himself honoured by having it bestowed on him.

Although the desire of pleasing doth not henceforward permit him to be absolutely indifferent about the opinion of others, he lays no other stress on such opinion than as it relates immediately to himself, without taking any notice of those arbitrary estimations, which have no other foundation than fashion or prejudice. He will be ambitious to acquit himself well of every thing he attempts; and even to acquit himself better than any one else. At running he will be more swift, at wrestling more active and strong, at work more dexterous, and at games of skill more artful; but he studies little those advantages which are very obvious in themselves, or require confirmation from the
judgement

judgement of others, such are those of having more wit than another, of being more eloquent, more learned, and the like; and still less is he covetous of those which are not immediately attached to his person, as the advantage of a more illustrious birth, of being thought more wealthy, of appearing more important, or imposing on the world by splendour and magnificence.

As he loves mankind, because they are his fellow-creatures, he will have the greatest esteem for those who most resemble himself; and judging of that resemblance from a conformity of taste in respect to moral objects, he will be very glad also to be approved by them, in every thing regarding his moral character. He will not say, indeed, I rejoice that I am approved by them, but I rejoice that what I have done well meets with their approbation: I am glad that those who honour me, do themselves honour in so doing; while they continue to judge so sensibly, it is a desirable thing to obtain their esteem.

In studying mankind from their manners in the world, in the same manner as he did heretofore from their passions in history, he will meet with frequent opportunities of reflecting on those things which flatter or disgust the human heart. Hence he will begin to philosophise on the principles of taste, a study properly adapted to this æra of his life.

The more refined and abstracted, the more false are our definitions of taste. Taste is nothing more than the faculty of judging what is pleasing or displeasing to the majority. Depart from this definition, and we no longer know what taste is. It does not hence follow that the majority are persons of taste; for notwithstanding the majority judge sensibly of every object, there are few persons who judge in the same manner on all; and although the concurrence of the more general modes of taste constitutes a good one, there are but few persons of taste; as there are but few beautiful persons, notwithstanding the assemblage of the most common features constitutes beauty.

It must be observed, that we are not here speaking of what we love because it is useful to us, or hate because it is hurtful. Taste is exercised only on matters indifferent, or at most barely amusing; and not on those which depend on our necessities: taste is not required to judge of the latter; appetite and inclination are sufficient. This it is that renders the decisions of pure taste so difficult, and as they seem to me so arbitrary; for setting aside instinct, which determines it, I can see no motive for its decisions. We ought further to distinguish between the rules of taste in morals, and in physicks. Those of the latter appear to be absolutely inexplicable; but it is proper to observe that moral considerations enter into every thing that depends on
imitation

imitation*: thus we sometimes account for beauties which appears to be physical, and really are not so. I may add, that taste has its local regulations which makes it dependent, in a thousand instances, on climate, manners, and government; that it has others which depend on age, sex, and character; and that it is in these matters that there is no disputing about taste.

Taste is natural to all mankind; but they have it not universally in the same proportion; it does not display itself equally in individuals, and it is in all subject to alteration from various causes. The proportion of our taste depends on that of our natural sensibility; its form and cultivation depend on the societies we have lived in, or company we have kept. In the first place, it is necessary to live in a very numerous society, in order to make many comparisons—Secondly, it is requisite they should be societies of dissipation and amusement; for in those of business, men are governed not by pleasure but profit—In the third place, there either should not be too great an equality of condition in such societies, or the influence of custom should be moderate, or pleasure should be more prevalent than vanity: for otherwise the mode suppresses taste, and the object of research is not that of pleasure but of distinction.

In the latter case it is no longer true that a good taste is that of the majority. And why so?

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Because

* This is proved in an Essay on the Principles of Harmony, inserted in the collection of my writings.

Because its object is changed. The multitude have no longer a judgement of their own; they judge only after others whom they think more enlightened than themselves; they approve, not what is deserving, but what is already approved. In all times and places, let every man judge for himself; and what appears to him most agreeable will have the plurality of suffrages.

No artist can execute any thing beautiful but by imitation. All the models of true taste are to be found in nature. The farther we depart from this master the more preposterous are our designs; as, in that case, we deduce our models from such objects as happen to delight us; and the beauty of imagination, subject to prejudice and caprice, is nothing more than that which pleases those who direct us.

The directors of our taste are the connoisseurs, the great and the wealthy; and these are directed by their interest or their vanity; the latter to make a display of their riches, and the former to make a profit, by inducing us to new modes of expense. By this means luxury establishes its influence, and makes us admire whatever is difficult or costly; the pretended beautiful, so far from imitating nature, being esteemed such only because it is unnatural. Thus luxury and bad taste are inseparable: for wherever the taste be costly it is false.

It is particularly in the connection between the sexes that our taste, whether good or bad, is formed; its cultivation being the necessary effect
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of the object of that connexion. But the facility of enjoyment lessens the desire of pleasing: the taste of course degenerates; and this appears to me another very plain reason why good taste depends so much on good morals.

Consult the taste of the women in matters merely physical, or those which depend on the judgement of the senses: consult that of the men in morals, or those matters which depend more on the understanding. Were the women such as they ought to be, they would confine themselves to things of which they were competent judges, and their judgement would be always right; but since they have set themselves up for criticks and arbiters in literature, they no longer know any thing. The authours who consult our learned ladies in the composition of their works, are sure to be ill-advised, as the beaux who consult them about their clothes, are as sure to be ridiculously dressed. I shall have occasion, by and by, to speak of the real talents of the sex, of the manner of cultivating them, and of those things on which their decisions ought then to be attended to.

Such are the elementary considerations, which I lay down as principles, in reasoning with my *Emilius*, on a subject that is far from being indifferent to him in his present circumstances, and to the research he is now employed in: and, indeed, to whom should such a subject be indifferent? The knowledge of what is agreeable or disagreeable to mankind is not only necessary to

him who stands in need of them, but also to him who is desirous of being useful to them: it is necessary to know how to please, in order to be useful to mankind; and the art of writing agreeably is far from being an useless study, when it is employed in recommending the voice, of truth.

If, in order to cultivate the taste of my pupil, I had it in my power to make choice of a country where the cultivation of taste was just commenced, or of another where it was already degenerated, I would follow the contrary order, beginning with the last and ending with the first. My reason for this conduct is, that taste degenerates through an excessive delicacy, which renders us sensible of many things, of which the generality of mankind are not susceptible: this delicacy leads to the spirit of discussion; the more we refine upon objects the more they multiply; this refinement rendering the sense more delicate and less uniform.

In this case there arise as many different tastes as persons; while in our disputes about the preference of them, learning and philosophy display themselves; and thus it is we are taught to think. Refined observations can never be made but by persons of extensive knowledge, in as much as they succeed to all others; and the attention of those people who are but little accustomed to numerous societies is taken up by the more obvious and striking. There is not at present a civilised place in the world, perhaps,
where

where so bad a taste prevails in general as at Paris. It is in this capital, nevertheless, that good taste is cultivated; there appearing few books held in any estimation in Europe, whose authours have not formed their taste at Paris. Those who imagine it sufficient to read the books which are written there, are mistaken; there is much more to be learned from the conversation of authours than from their books; and even authours themselves are not those persons of whom the most is to be learned. It is the spirit of society which sets thinking minds at work, and extends their views as far as they can go. If you have the least spark of genius, go and spend a year at Paris; you will soon arrive at all you are capable of being, or you will never come to any thing.

We may learn to think justly in places where a bad taste prevails; but we must not think in the same manner as those who have such a bad taste; and it is very difficult to abstain from this, when we reside long among them. We ought to improve by their means the faculties of thinking, without employing those faculties in the same manner. I shall be cautious, therefore, not to polish the taste of Emilius till it alter its form: but, when once he has acquired a sensibility refined enough to perceive and compare the different tastes of others, I shall bring him back to the most simple object, in order to confirm his own.

I shall go farther still, in order to preserve his taste from being depraved by example; holding with him, even amidst the tumult of dissipation, such useful conversation, and directing it to such pleasing objects, that it cannot fail of being rendered both amusing and instructive. This is the time for reading, and making choice of entertaining books. This is the time to teach him how to analyse a fine discourse, and make him sensible of the beauties of eloquence and diction. To acquire the languages merely for their own sake is a trifle; their use is not so important as is generally imagined, the study of them, however, leads to a knowledge of grammar in general. To understand the French perfectly we ought to learn Latin; we ought to study and compare the one with the other, to comprehend the rules of the art of speaking.

We may add to this, that there is a certain simplicity of taste, which affects the heart, and is to be found only in the writings of the ancients. We find them replete with knowledge, and sound in judgement, as well in treating of rhetoric, poetry, and all kinds literature, as they are in history itself. Our modern authours, on the contrary, make use of many words and say but little. To make their judgement perpetually a law for us, is not the way to form our's. The difference between the ancient and modern taste is evident in all publick monuments and even on the tombs. Our's are covered with
eulogiums

eulogiums, on their's we read nothing but facts:

Sta, viator, Heroem calcas.

Had I even found this epitaph on an ancient monument, I should immediately have guessed it to have been modern; for nothing is so common as heroes among us, and nothing was so rare among the ancients. Instead of telling us the man was a hero, they would have simply related his actions. Compare the epitaph of an hero with that of even the effeminate Sardapalus:

*I built TARSUS and ANCHIALE in a day, and
now I am dead.*

Which of these two epitaphs, in your opinion, is the most expressive? The inflated style of our statuary is good for nothing but to puff up pigmies. The ancients described men of their natural size, and we see they were men. When Xenophon did honour to the memory of those warriors who were slain by treachery in the retreat of the ten thousand, he says, "*they died irreproachable in war and friendship:*" and this is all: this laconick and simple eulogy may serve to show the sentiments of which the writer's heart was full; and indeed that reader is to be pitied who is insensible to the beauty of this encomium.

The following inscription was cut on a marble at the straits of Thermopylæ:

*"Go, traveller, and say at SPARTA, that we
perished here, in obedience to her laws."*

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It is obvious enough that the academy of inscriptions had no hand in this composition. I am much mistaken if my pupil, who sets so little value on words, does not soon remark this difference; and if it doth not influence him in his choice of books. Transported with the manly eloquence of Demosthenes, he will say, this was an orator; whereas in reading Cicero, he will say, this was a lawyer.

Emilius will, in general, have more taste for the ancient writers than for the moderns: were it for no other reason than that the ancients, being the first, are the nearest to nature, and their genius is more peculiarly their own. Whatever may have been said by La Motte and the Abbé Terrasson, there is no real progress in the understanding of the human species, because what we gain on one side we lose on the other; and because individuals all set out from the same point, and the time which is taken up in learning what others have thought being deduced from that they should have employed in learning to think for themselves, they possess more acquired knowledge and less force of genius or capacity of reasoning. Our minds, like our hands, are accustomed to do every thing by means of implements, and nothing of themselves. Fontenelle used to say, that the famous contest concerning the superiority of the ancients and the moderns, was nothing more than a dispute whether the trees were formerly of a larger size than they are at present. But if
cultivation

cultivation was supposed to have changed their magnitude, this dispute was by no means so impertinent as he meant to insinuate.

Having thus made my pupil recur to the genuine sources of pure literature, I next give him a view of its muddy sinks and sewers, in the repositories of modern compilers; in journals, translations, and dictionaries. He just casts an eye over these, and throws them aside, never to take them up again. For the sake of diverting him, I bring him acquainted with the pompous transactions of our academies; leading him to observe that each individual of which they are composed, is ever more ingenious and useful alone, than as a member of those learned bodies; hence he naturally concludes what is the utility of all these fine establishments.

I carry him to the theatres, not to study morals, but taste; for there it particularly displays itself to those who are capable of reflection. You have nothing to do, I tell him, with morality here; this is not the place in which to learn it. The stage was not erected for the promulgation of truth, but to flatter and amuse; there is no school in the world where the art of pleasing, and of captivating the human heart, is better taught. The study of the theatre leads to that of poetry; as they have exactly the same object. If he hath but the least taste for this art, with what pleasure will he study the languages of the poets, the Greek, the Latin, and the Italian! These studies will afford him
amuse-

amusements subject to no restraint; for which reason he will only make the greater progress therein; they will prove most delightful at an age, and in circumstances, in which the heart is so warmly interested in all kinds of beauty formed to affect it. Imagine to yourself on one side my Emilius, and on the other a young graduate of the college, reading the fourth book of the *Æneid*, or Tibullus, or the banquet of Plato. What a difference between them! How greatly will the heart of the one be moved by circumstances that do not at all affect the other! Stop, my dear youth! throw aside your book; I see you are too much affected: I would have you pleased with the language of love, but not seduced by it; be susceptible, but be prudent: if you are but one of these, you are nothing.

But whether Emilius succeeds or not in the cultivation of the dead languages, the Belles-Lettres, or poetry, it is of little consequence. He will be no less respectable if he knows nothing of all these things, nor doth his education depend on such frivolous acquisitions.

My principal object, in teaching him to be sensible of, and to admire, the truly beautiful of every kind, is to fix his taste and affections, to prevent his natural inclinations from being perverted, and to hinder him from seeking those means of happiness in his wealth which he ought to find in himself. I have said elsewhere, that taste is nothing more than the art of being skilled in trifles, and this is very true; but as
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the satisfaction of life depends on an assemblage of trifles, this art is far from being unimportant: it is, indeed, by this art we are taught to enjoy all the real happiness in our power. I do not here mean the happiness attendant on moral virtue, which depends on the good disposition of the mind, but only that which is merely voluptuous and sensual, abstracted from prejudice and opinion.

Permit me, reader, the better to explain this idea, to dismiss *Emilius* for a moment (his heart being too pure to serve as a rule for others) and to deduce from myself an example, more perceptible, and better adapted to the manners of the world.

There are some stations in life which seem to change the very natures, whether for the better or worse, of those who fill them. A poptoon, for instance, becomes a brave fellow, by entering into the regiment of Navarre: nor is it only in the military order that men acquire the spirit of the community, or that such acquirement is for the better. I have shuddered an hundred times to think that, if I had the misfortune to fill to-day a certain post in a certain country, I should almost inevitably prove to-morrow a tyrant, an oppressor, a destroyer of the people, hurtful to my sovereign, and, by my office, an enemy to humanity, to justice, and to every kind of virtue.

In the same manner, if I were rich, I should have taken all those steps which were necessary
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for me to become so: I should be, therefore, insolent and mean, sensible and tender of myself alone, pitiless and hard-hearted to the rest of mankind, a disdainful spectator of the miseries of the vulgar; for I should give no other appellation to the indigent, that it might be forgotten that I was formerly of the same class. In a word, I should make my fortune the instrument of my pleasures, which would entirely engage my attention; and so far I should resemble the rest of the wealthy part of the world.

There is one thing, however, in which I think I should differ from them greatly; that is, I should be more sensual and voluptuous than ambitious and vain, and should give myself up to the luxury of ease, more than to that of ostentation. I should even be ashamed to make too great a parade of my wealth, and should think I always heard the envious man, whom I mortified by my splendour, whispering in the ear of his neighbour—*How fearful is that knave lest he should not be taken for what he is!*

From amidst that immense profusion of earthly blessings which present themselves, I would make choice of such as were the most agreeable, and the most easily to be appropriated to myself. To this end, the first use of my wealth, would be to purchase liberty and leisure; to which I should add health, if health were to be bought; but as health is not to be purchased but by temperance, and, as without health we

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can have no true enjoyment of life, I should live temperate from motives of sensuality.

I would always remain as near to nature as possible, in order to gratify the senses she hath bestowed on me; being well assured that the more natural were my enjoyments, the more I should find them real. In the choice of objects for imitation, I should take those of nature always for models; in the gratification of my appetites nature should have always the preference; in matters of taste I should consult her ever; and as for my viands, I should always prefer those which nature hath the best prepared, and that pass through the fewest hands in coming to our tables. I should prevent the adulterations of artifice by rendering them useless to my gratification. My gross and childish epicurism would not enrich my proveditor, nor should I give its weight in gold for poison instead of wholesome food. My table should not be spread with covers of magnificent trash and foreign carrion: I would even be lavish of my own trouble to gratify my sensuality, as even the trouble I should take on such occasions would be in itself a pleasure, and would enhance that which was to come. If I had an inclination to taste the product of a distant part of the world, I would rather go thither after them, like Apicius, than have them brought to me: for the most exquisite of foreign viands always want a sauce which is not imported with them, nor can be prepared for them by any cook whatever;

whatever; viz. the air of the climate that produces them.

For the same reason, I should not follow the example of those who never enjoy themselves where they are, and set the seasons always at variance, and climates at variance with the seasons; who, requiring summer in the winter, and winter in the summer, go to Italy to shiver with cold, and to the north to be burned up with heat; without reflecting that, while they think to avoid the rigour and excess of the seasons, they always feel them most in those places where nature has not taught the inhabitants to guard against them. For my own part, I should either remain always in one place, or take directly the contrary method: I would enjoy what was most agreeable to the season, and what was peculiar to the climate; I should enjoy a multiplicity of pleasures and customs, all different from each other, and yet agreeable to nature: I would go and spend the summer in Naples and the winter in Petersburg; sometimes fanned by the soft breezes as I lay reclined in the cooling grotts of Tarentum; at others fatigued with dancing amidst the illuminations of a palace of ice in Russia.

I would, as well in the service of my table, as in the ornaments of my apartments, imitate in a simple manner the varieties of the seasons, and partake of the pleasures of each without anticipating the succeeding. There is some difficulty, but no taste, in thus disturbing the
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order of nature, in wresting from her those involuntary productions which she yields with regret, and which, having neither substance nor flavour, cannot be nourishing to the stomach, or pleasing to the palate. Nothing can be more insipid than those productions of nature which are forced and out of season; thus it is, at an immense expense, that a wealthy Parisian is capable, by means of furnaces and hot-beds, to furnish his table the whole year round with tasteless fruits and insipid vegetables. With what pleasure can I eat cherries when it freezes, or melons in the depth of winter, when my palate neither wants moisture nor refreshment? Can I prefer the roasted chesnut, in the burning heat of summer, to currants, strawberries, and other cooling fruit, which the earth affords me without any trouble? To cover our chimney-pieces in the month of January with forced vegetation, with pale and scentless flowers, is not so much to add charms to winter as to rob the spring; it is to deprive ourselves of the pleasure of traversing the woods, in search of the first violet, of espying the opening bud, and crying out in a transport of joy: "Mortals, ye are not abandoned, nature lives anew!"

In order that I might be well served I would have few domesticks; this has been already said, and will bear again repeating. A citizen hath more service done him by a single foot-boy, than a duke by the half-score gentlemen that surround him. I have thought an hundred times
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of the advantage of having my bottle and glass placed beside me on the table, that I may drink when I pleased, whereas at a table beset with numerous attendants the call to drink might be twenty times repeated before I should quench my thirst. Every thing that is done for us by others is always ill done, however they manage it: for this reason I would never send to my tradesmen, but go myself. I would do this, indeed, for various reasons: first, because I would not have them treat with my servants before they had treated with me; and further, that I might make a better choice of the commodities I should buy, and not pay so dear for them: I would go among these sort of people also for the sake of an agreeable exercise, and to see a little what was doing out of my own house; I should in this find some recreation, and sometimes improvement; in short, I would amuse myself thus, were it for no other reason than the barely moving about; this would be always something gained; a too sedentary life makes us listless and low-spirited; local-motion is a good remedy against this evil. Besides this, porters and footmen are very bad interpreters; I would not have these people always between me and the rest of the world; nor would I go about every where in a carriage, as if I were fearful of being accosted in the street. The horses of a man who makes use of his legs are always ready: if they are fatigued or sick, he knows it before any one else; and is not obliged

obliged to stay at home under that pretence, when his coachman hath a mind to make holiday: when he is abroad, also, he is not liable to have his patience wearied out by accidents, or to remain blocked up by carriages when he is in haste to be gone. In short, if no one can serve us so well as ourselves, were we as powerful as Alexander, and richer than Cræsus, we ought not to admit of the services of others, except in those things we cannot perform ourselves.

I would not choose to inhabit a palace, for in this palace I should occupy but one apartment: whatever is common belongs to nobody, and the apartments of my servants would be as strange to me as the houses of my neighbours. The Asiatics, though very voluptuous, are all lodged in houses simply furnished. They regard life as a journey, and their habitations as inns. This consideration weighs but little with wealthy Europeans, who furnish out their houses as if they were to live in them for ever: I have a different reason which would produce the same effect. It would seem to me, that the establishing myself with so much parade in one place, would be in a manner to banish myself from every other, and to keep me a prisoner in my own palace. Is not the world itself a palace noble enough? and is it not at the service of the wealthy whenever they please to enjoy it. *Ubi bene, ibi patria*; this is the rich man's motto. He is at home wherever money

will pass, and he can convey his strong-box. Wherefore, then, should he circumscribe himself by walls and gates, as if he were never to go out of them! Doth an epidemical disease, a war, or a rebellion drive me from one place, I go on to another, and find my house arrived there before me. Why should I take the trouble to build a house for myself, when there are houses built for me in every part of the world? Why should I, who am so eager to live, make so much preparation for the future enjoyment of what I may possess to-day? It is impossible to make our lives agreeable by continually acting inconsistently with ourselves. Empedocles thus reproached the Agrigentines for their eager pursuit of pleasures, as if they had not a day to live; and for building houses and palaces, as if they should never die.

Besides, to what purpose should I have so large an house, having so few people to inhabit it, and fewer things to put in it? My furniture should be as simple as my taste; I would have neither a gallery of pictures, nor a library; particularly if I loved reading and understood painting; as I should then know that all such collections must be imperfect, and that their deficiencies would give us more chagrin than the having nothing of them at all. In this particular, it is well known that abundance occasions want; a circumstance that every maker of collections must have experienced. The real connoisseur, therefore, should never make

such collections: those who know how to make use of a cabinet themselves never keep one to show to others.

Gaming is not a proper amusement for a rich man; it is the resource of those who have nothing to do: and I should be too much employed in my pleasures to have time to throw away to so little purpose. As I am solitary and poor, I never play, except sometimes at chess, and even that is too much: if I were rich, I should play still less, and then only for trifling sums, that I might not see others dissatisfied at losing, or be so myself. The interest we take in play, losing its motive in a rich man, can never be converted into a passion unless in minds of a wrong or degenerate turn. The profits which may accrue to a rich man from play are always less affecting than the losses he sustains: he runs the risk also on the whole to be rather a loser than a gainer; so that no man who reasons rightly, can become very fond of an amusement, wherein the chances of every kind are against him. Whoever gratifies his vanity by the advantages of fortune, may employ those advantages in objects much more pleasing: nor are they less remarkable in the lowest play than in the highest. A taste for gaming is indeed the fruit of avarice and indolence, and is the product only of vacant minds; I imagine myself possessed, therefore, of sentiment and knowledge enough to dispense with such a substitute. We seldom see thinking persons very fond of play, which

either suspends that habit or gives it a turn to dry calculations; thus one use and perhaps the only one that is consequent on a taste for the sciences, is that of checking in some degree this sordid passion. Such persons choose rather to be employed in proving the utility of play than in playing themselves. For my part, I should oppose it even among the gamesters, and should have more pleasure in laughing at them when they lost, than in winning their money.

I should be the same in private life as in my commerce with the world, desiring that my fortune should contribute to make every one about me easy, and prevent a sense of their inequality of condition. The glitter of dress, is, in many respects, inconvenient. To preserve as much freedom as possible in those I conversed with, I would always go dressed in such a manner as to seem always in my place, in whatever rank of men I should be engaged: and to be particularly distinguished among none, I would so choose my garb that without affectation, or change of personage, I could pass equally unnoticed in a club of common tradesmen, or in an assembly of the best company. By this method, being master of my own conduct, I am within reach of the pleasures and amusements of every station. It is said there are some ladies who shut their doors against persons plainly dressed, and admit nobody without lace; I would, therefore, spend my days elsewhere, but if those ladies were
young

young and pretty, I might sometimes put on lace to spend an evening with them.

The only rules for the choice of company would, with me, be mutual attachment, and conformity of taste and character: I should indulge myself in the pleasures of society, also, as a man, but not as a rich one: I would never suffer them to be vitiated by the principles of interest. If my opulence shall have left me any humanity, my benevolence would be extensive: but I would have a society about my person and not a retinue—a company of friends and not dependents: I should not choose to be the patron of my guests, but their host. Independence and equality would give to my connexions all the candour of benevolence, and where neither duty nor interest should enter into consideration, friendship and pleasure only would be our law.

A man cannot purchase a friend or a mistress. It is indeed easy enough to procure women for money; but this is not the way to acquire the love of any. So far is love from being bought or sold, that money infallibly destroys it. Whoever pays, though he were the most amiable of men, cannot be long the object of affection, were it for no other reason than that he pays. It will not be long before he pays for some other, or rather another will be paid for with his money? by which double connexion, formed by interest and debauchery, without love, without honour, and without true

pleasure, the faithless, mercenary, and wretched woman, treated in the same manner by the favourite who receives, as she herself treats the fool who bestows, remains thus acquitted between both. It would doubtless be agreeable to be liberal towards a beloved object, if such liberality were not liable to be converted into hire. I know but one way to indulge it, therefore, toward a mistress, without putting an end to her affection; and that is to give her up every thing, and to depend afterwards on her bounty. It remains only to know where is the woman with whom such a proceeding would not be extravagant.

The lover who pretended to enjoy *Lais* without her having any enjoyment of him, talks idly. That enjoyment which is not reciprocal is nothing; it is at most only the enjoyment of the sex, but not of the individual. Now where the moral pleasures of love do not exist, why should such a mighty affair be made of the rest? Nothing is more easy to acquire than such a brutal satisfaction, and a poor mule-driver hath more opportunities of being happy in this respect than a monarch.

Oh! that one could but sufficiently display the inconsistency of vice, and show, when it obtains what it wished for, how much it is disappointed! Whence can arise our cruel avidity to corrupt innocence, to make a victim of a young object we ought to protect, and whom by that first step we plunge into a gulf of misery

misery, from which death only can relieve her? Whence but from brutality, vanity, and folly? The pleasure taken in it is not that of nature, but of prejudice: and that of the meanest of prejudices, as it arises from a contempt of ourselves. He who is sensible of his being the most contemptible of mankind, is afraid of risking a comparison with others, and, therefore, would be the first, in order to be less odious. It is remarkable that persons the most eager after this imaginary enjoyment, are never the most amiable or young; such as are themselves capable of giving delight, and who might be more excusable for being nice and difficult. No, the man who hath the advantage of person, merit, and sensibility, is not afraid of the experience of his mistress; justly confident of himself, he says to her—"You are not ignorant of pleasure, but no matter; my heart promises you such as you have never experienced."

But an old satyr, accustomed to debauchery, in every respect disagreeable, both in person and manners, incapable as unworthy of pleasing any woman who is acquainted with others, conceives he may make himself amiable to an innocent girl, in profiting by her inexperience, and being the first to excite in her the emotions of nature. His only hope is to please by the circumstance of novelty; this is incontestibly the secret motive of this fantastical desire: but he is mistaken, the horror and disgust he excites are no less natural than the emotions he attempts

to raise. He is mistaken also even in his ridiculous attempts: the same nature takes care to vindicate her rights; every girl, who sets herself to sale, is already given away; and having bestowed herself, agreeably to her own choice, hath made the very comparison of which the dotard of a purchaser is afraid. He purchases, therefore, an imaginary pleasure, and is not held the less in abhorrence.

For my own part, whatever alteration wealth would make in me, there is one circumstance on which I should never change. Though I should possess neither virtue nor humanity I should retain at least some taste, feeling, and delicacy, which would hinder me from exhausting my wealth, like a dupe, in hunting after chimeras, and from throwing away my money and time in getting myself abused and laughed at by children. If I were young, I should pursue the pleasures of youth: and as I would enjoy them voluptuously, I should not pursue them in the manner of the wealthy. If I were rich and of the same age as I am, the case would be different; I would prudently confine myself to pleasures adapted to my years; I would cherish my taste for those I could still enjoy, and suppress those inclinations which would serve only to torment me. I would never subject my grey beard to the disdainful railleries of young wenches: I could never bear to see my caresses make them turn away with disgust, to give them occasion to tell ridiculous

culous stories at my expence, or to imagine them describing the fumbling efforts of the old ape, by way of avenging themselves for having endured them. If, indeed, my ill-resisted habits should at any time convert my ancient desires into real wants, I might possibly satisfy them; but it would always be attended with shame and confusion. The necessity should not give rise to a passion; I would get rid of it as well as I could, and there it should end; I would no more make my weakness a matter of employment, nor have on any occasion more than one witness to my folly. Human life affords other pleasures when this is exhausted; in our vain pursuit of those that escape us, we deprive ourselves, therefore, of those which remain. Let us vary our taste with our years, nor transpose the ages any more than the seasons. We should at all times be consistent with ourselves, and never counteract nature; such vain efforts only wearing out life, and preventing our enjoyment of it.

The multitude, who lead active lives, are never weary of themselves: if their amusements are not much diversified, they are taken but seldom; their long intervals of labour and fatigue give them a higher relish for the pleasures of an holiday. As for the rich, their great misfortune is spleen and uneasiness: in the midst of all their expensive amusements, surrounded as they are by numerous flatterers or attendants, all contributing to their pleasure,

they pine away their lives in discontent; the women, in particular, being at a loss to employ or divert themselves, are devoured by it, under the name of the vapours: which sometimes degenerates into an horrible disease, depriving them not only of their reason, but their lives. For my own part, I know no situation in life so miserable as that of a fine woman at Paris, except it be that of the agreeable coxcomb her follower; who, from the vanity of being thought successful in his amours, supports the tedious length of the most melancholy days that ever were passed by an human creature.

The mode, decorum, and ceremony, which arise from luxury and politeness, confine the course of life within the most insipid round of uniformity. The pleasure, we are desirous of appearing to enjoy in the sight of others, is lost both to them and to ourselves *. Men are never so ridiculous as when they act from established forms; he, who knows how to vary his situation

* Two ladies of fashion, at Paris, in order to be thought fond of taking much amusement, laid themselves under a voluntary injunction of never going to bed till five o'clock in the morning. In the depth of winter, therefore, their servants were often kept waiting for them in the streets; having enough to do to keep themselves from freezing. On entering, however, one evening, or rather one morning, into the apartment where these two ladies, so fond of amusement, passed away their hours without counting the clock, they were found, both together, without any other company, fast asleep, each in her easy chair, by the fire side,

situation and his amusements, will efface to day the impresson he made yesterday; he is looked upon as nobody perhaps by others: but he enjoys himself, being entire and independent in all times and places. My only settled mode should be this: in every situation and circumstance not to trouble myself about other people, and to employ every day by itself, as if it were independent on the preceding or following. As with the crowd, I should be one of the crowd, so in the country I should be always a rustick; and when I talked about husbandry, the peasants should not laugh at me. I would not go to build a town in the fields; or require, in the corner of some distant country, to have a view of the Thuilleries from my apartment. On the side of a pleasant hill, well shaded with trees, I would have a little white house with green window shutters, which I would make my rural habitation. To have it thatched with straw, it would be best for all seasons: I should, however, magnificently prefer, not the cold and dull-looking slates, but tiles, because they have a neater and livelier aspect than thatch, and besides that the houses in my country are covered with nothing else, so that they would remind me a little of the happy days of my youth. The area before my door should be full of poultry, and in the stabling should be ranged proper stalls for my cows, as I am extremely fond of milk. My garden should be calculated entirely for the use of the kitchen; and instead,

of a park I would have a pretty orchard; the fruits of which should be at the service of every one who pleased to gather them. I would not be so niggardly magnificent as to plant superb espaliers, which every one would be afraid to touch. This petty prodigality, however, would not be very costly, because the asylum I should make choice of, should be situated in some distant province of plenty and poverty, where money is sufficiently scarce and provisions proportionably cheap.

There would I get together a company of friends, more select than numerous, such as loved pleasure and understood it: of women, who could rise from the sofa, to join in the amusements of the country, and to take up sometimes, instead of cards and counters, the hay-makers rake and the basket of the fruit-gatherers. There should all the affected airs of the town be laid aside, while becoming real villagers we should find such a numerous diversity of amusements, as would only serve to puzzle our choice in the evening, which to partake of the next day. Exercise and employment would thus give us new appetite and new tastes: our meals would be all entertainments, and their plenty would please more than their delicacy. Cheerfulness, rustick labour, and rural sports are the best cooks in the world, and high-seasoned ragouts appear very ridiculous to those who begin their labour with the rising sun. My table should be served also
with

with no more order than elegance; I would make every place occasionally my dining-room, sitting down sometimes to meals in the garden, sometimes on board a boat, and at others under a spreading tree: at others again I would dine at a greater distance from my house, by the side of a clear spring, on the fresh grass, under a tuft of alders and filberds; a joyous troop of guests bringing along, in cheerful procession, the apparatus of the feast: the green turf should serve us both for table and chairs, the borders of the fountain for a buffet, and the neighbouring trees should furnish the desert. Our viands should be served up without order, appetite easily dispenses with ceremony: while every one, professing openly to love himself best, is not at all offended that each helps himself as soon as he can, and to what he most likes. From this cordial and moderate familiarity would arise a pleasant contest, equally free from rudeness and constraint; a hundred times more delightful and amicable than the affected forms of ceremony. We would have no impertinent footman watching our behaviour, criticising on our conversation, counting the morsels we put into our mouths, amusing themselves with making us wait for drink, and grumbling at our sitting too long at dinner. We would be our own servants, in order to be our own masters; each would be served by all the rest; the time would pass away imperceptibly, our repast would afford us also repose and should last as long as the burning heat of day. If any pea-

fant should happen to pass by, returning from his work, with the implements of his labour on his shoulder; I would cheer his honest heart by a civil salutation, and a cup or two of generous wine. This condescension would make him support his poverty more cheerfully, and would give me the satisfaction of perceiving myself still actuated by the principles of humanity.

If at any time the country-people were assembled at their rural festivals, I would be one of the first to join them with my little company: if any marriage should be solemnised in my neighbourhood, as I should be known to love mirth and rejoicing, I should be invited to the wedding. On this occasion, I should make the good people some present, simple as their condition; and should receive a return of inestimable value, little known to my equals, in frankness and true pleasure. I would sup with them cheerfully at one end of their long table, join in the burthen of an old rustick song, and dance in their barn, with greater satisfaction than I should at the politest assembly.

Hitherto, it may be said, every thing goes on bravely; “But what would you do about hunting? Can you live in the country and not hunt?” I understand you; I have as yet only described a farm, and in that was certainly wrong: I supposed myself rich, I should, therefore, have pleasures that are exclusive and destructive; this is quite another affair, I must have manors, woods, keepers, homage, incense, and holy water.

Very

Very well; but these manors will have neighbours jealous of their privileges, and possibly desirous of usurping those of others: our keepers may go to quarrelling, and perhaps their masters too: hence will arise discontent, animosities, and law-suits. These things are not very agreeable. My tenants will not look on with pleasure and see their corn destroyed by my hares or wild-boars. As they dare not kill them, they will of course drive them away; and thus, having spent their days in cultivating their lands, they will be obliged to spend the night in guarding them: they will have their drums, their horns, and their bells; this noise will of consequence disturb my sleep. I shall dream of the wretchedness of these poor people, and shall not be able to help reproaching myself. Had I the honour, indeed, to have been born a prince, all this would not affect me; but being only an upstart of acquired wealth, I should have an heart a little plebeian.

But this is not all; plenty of game would tempt thieves and encroachers; I should soon have these to punish; I should stand in need of prisons, jailers, and executioners; all which appears to me very cruel. The wives of the wretched culprits would besiege my gates, and importune me with their cries; or else I must have them driven away and ill-treated. On the other hand, the poor people, who were no poachers, and whose crops have been injured by the game, would come to make their complaints likewise: the one would be punished

for having destroyed the game, and the other ruined for having spared it; what a melancholy alternative! I should see nothing on every side but objects of misery; I should hear nothing but sighs and complaints: it appears to me that this would greatly diminish the pleasure of sacrificing hares and partridges at one's ease.

Would you disengage your pleasures from their attendant pains, take none that are exclusive; the more you make others partakers of them, the more pure and refined are they to yourself. I would fix my residence, therefore, in a country where every one should be at liberty to shoot and hunt at pleasure, and where I could have the amusement without so much trouble. The game might not be here so plenty indeed, but more address would be required to put it up, and it would afford more pleasure in the chase. I shall ever remember the transports my father used to experience, on shooting the first partridge in the season, and the joy he once felt on finding an hare, which he had been in search of the whole day. Yes, I will maintain it that my father, though alone, with his dog and gun, tired with fatigue, and his flesh torn with thorns and briars, used to return home at night, with his little prey, more contented with his day's sport, than all your hunters of quality, who mounted on good horses, and followed by attendants with a score of fowling-pieces, do nothing but fire, charge their pieces, and murder the game around them, without address,
without

without honour, and almost without exercise. The pleasure, therefore, is equally great, and the inconvenience much less, where one has no manor to protect, no poacher to punish, nor poor people to torment. So that this is a good reason for preferring such a situation: for, do what you will, mankind are not to be continually oppressed with impunity; the constant curses of a neighbourhood rendering the game, purchased at that rate, sooner or later very dear.

Once more I repeat it, exclusive pleasures are destructive to all pleasure. Genuine amusements are those which we partake of in common with others: those we are desirous of enjoying alone, are no longer to be enjoyed. If the walls which I build round my park, form a dull and melancholy enclosure, I have only been at a great expense to deprive myself of the pleasure of a prospect, which I am obliged to seek at a distance. The dæmon of property infects every thing he touches. A rich man is desirous of possessing every thing, and conceives he shall be happy only where he is not; he is, therefore, constantly flying from himself. For my part, I should act in this particular, were I rich, as I do being poor. At present I enjoy much more of the possessions of others than I shall ever do of my own; making myself master of every thing that pleases me in my neighbourhood; there is no conqueror more absolute in this respect than I am; I even take the same liberty with the possessions of princes, and accommo-
date

date to my use every foot of land that lies open and pleases me, without distinction; I even give names to the several grounds and enclosures in my walks, calling the one my park, the other my terras, and look on myself as the master. I walk about them with impunity, I return often to maintain my possession; and wear out the soil as much as I please with walking; and you will never be able to persuade me, that the owner of the lands which I thus appropriate, makes any more use of the money they produce him, than I do of his estate. If at any time my walks are interrupted by a hedge, a ditch, or other new enclosures it concerns me but little, as I can easily remove my park to some other spot; there is room enough in the adjacent fields, and I may pillage my neighbours a long time, before I shall be at a loss for an asylum.

Thus have I given a specimen of true taste in the choice of agreeable amusements, and of the spirit of their enjoyment; all the rest is only illusion, chimera, and ridiculous vanity. Whoever departs from these rules, however rich he may be, will only squander away his wealth, without ever knowing the value of life.

It will doubtless be objected to me that such amusements as I have been describing are equally within the reach of all men, and that no one need be rich in order to enjoy them. This is precisely the point I have been aiming at. True pleasure is always in our power, if we will enjoy it; it is prejudice alone that makes every thing difficult,

difficult, and drives happiness from us; it being an hundred times easier to be happy than to appear so to others. The man of taste and real voluptuary hath nothing to do with wealth; it is sufficient for him to be free and independent. Whosoever enjoys health and the necessaries of life, let him but cast aside the imaginary conveniences of opinion, and he is rich enough: this is the *aurea mediocritas* of Horace. Look out, therefore, ye possessors of strong coffers, for some other employment for your wealth; it is useless to the purchase of pleasure. Emilius doth not know this better than I do; but, having a less corrupted heart he will be more feelingly sensible of it, and all the observations he will make in the world will only serve to confirm him in it.

In thus spending our time, we are still constantly in search of Sophia, but as yet cannot find her. It was of consequence that she should not be found so soon, and, therefore, we have been looking for her where I was very sure she was not to be found.

At length, however, it is time to look for her in good earnest, lest my youth should find one he mistakes for her, and should discover his error too late. Farewell then to Paris, the city of noise, smoke, and dirt, where the women are become destitute of honour, and the men of virtue. Paris, adieu! we are in search of love, happiness, and innocence; we can never, therefore, be too far from thy walls.

B O O K V.

WE are now come to the last act of the drama, but not as yet to the unravelling of the plot.

It is not good for man to be alone; and Emilius is now a man: we have promised him also a companion, who must, therefore, now be given him. This companion is Sophia. But, in what asylum is she to be found? To discover where she is, it is necessary she should first be known. When we are made acquainted with her character, we shall be the better able to judge of her habitation: not that when we have found her our task is at an end. Mr. Locke closes his treatise on education with observing, that, as his young gentleman is fit to be married, it is time to leave him with his mistress. For my own part, as I have not the honour to educate a gentleman, I shall beware of imitating Mr. Locke in this particular.

S O P H I A.

SOPHIA should be such a woman as Emilius is a man; that is, she should possess every thing requisite in the constitution of her species and sex, to fill her place in the physical
and

and moral order of things. To know whether she be so qualified, we shall enter first on an examination into the various instances of conformity and difference between her sex and our's.

In every thing which does not regard the sex woman is the same as man; she has the same organs, the same necessities, the same faculties: the corporeal machine is constructed in the same manner, its component parts are alike, their operation the same, and the figure similar in both; in whatever light we regard them, they differ from each other only in degree.

On the other hand, in every thing immediately respecting sex, the woman differs entirely from the man; the difficulty of comparing them together, lying in our inability to determine what are those particulars in the constitution of each that immediately relate to the sex. From their comparative anatomy, and even from simple inspection, we perceive some general distinctions between them that do not appear to relate to sex; and yet there can be no doubt that they do, although we are not capable of tracing their modes of relation. Indeed, we know not how far the difference of sex may extend. All that we know, of a certainty, is that whatever is common to both is only characteristick of their species; and that every thing in which they differ, is distinctive of their sex. Under this two-fold consideration, we find so much resemblance and dissimilitude that it appears even miraculous, that nature should form two beings so much alike,

alike, and, at the same time, so very different.

This difference and similitude must necessarily have an influence over their moral character: such an influence is, indeed, obvious, and perfectly agreeable to experience; clearly demonstrating the vanity of the disputes that have been held concerning the superiority or equality of the sexes; as if, in answering the different ends for which nature designed them, both were not more perfect than they would be in more nearly resembling each other. In those particulars which are common to both, they are equal; and as to those wherein they differ no comparison is to be made between them. A perfect man and a complete woman should no more resemble each other in mind than in feature; nor is their perfection reducible to any common standard.

In the union of the sexes, both pursue one common object, but not in the same manner. From their diversity in this particular, arises the first determinate difference between the moral relations of each. The one should be active and strong, the other passive and weak: it is necessary the one should have both the power and the will, and that the other should make little resistance.

This principle being established, it follows that woman is expressly formed to please the man: if the obligation be reciprocal also, and the man ought to please in his turn, it is not so immediately necessary: his great merit lies in his
power,

power, and he pleases merely because he is strong. This, I must confess, is not one of the refined maxims of love; it is, however, one of the laws of nature, prior to love itself.

If woman be formed to please and be subjected to man, it is her place doubtless to render herself agreeable to him, instead of challenging his passion. The violence of his desires depends on her charms; it is by means of these she should urge him to the exertion of those powers which nature hath given him. The most successful method of exciting them is, to render such exertion necessary by her resistance; as in that case self-love is added to desire, and the one triumphs in the victory which the other obliged him to acquire. Hence arise the various modes of attack and defense between the sexes, the boldness of one sex and the timidity of the other; and, in a word, that bashfulness and modesty with which nature hath armed the weak, in order to subdue the strong.

Can it ever be thought that she had dictated indifferently the same advances to one as the other, and that the first to form desires should be also the first to display them? What a strange mistake in judgement must be such a conclusion! Their intercourse being productive of consequences so very different to each, can it be natural for both to engage in the mutual conflict with the same readiness and intrepidity? Is it not very evident that from their unequal waste in the encounter, if reserve did not impose on one the
same

same moderation as nature imposes on the other, the consequence would soon be fatal to both, and that the human race would be brought to destruction by the very means established by nature for its preservation? Considering the influence of women over the passions of men, and how readily they can affect even the remains of an almost exhausted constitution, it is plain that, if there were an unhappy climate on earth, whence philosophy had banished all female reserve, the men, subjected to the tyranny of the women, would be soon sacrificed to their charms; particularly in hot countries, where are born more women than men, the latter would all be hurried presently to their graves, without any possibility of helping themselves.

That the females of animals have not the same modesty and reserve makes nothing against my argument; as their desires are not, like those of women, left without restriction. In the latter, their reserve supplies the place of a physical restraint; while the former have no desires but what arise from physical necessity. This being satisfied, their desire ceases; they no longer repulse the male in appearance*, but in reality; acting contrary to the daughter of Augustus, they receive no more passengers on board when the vessel

* I have already remarked, that shyness and an affected aversion to the males are common to the females of every species of animals; and that even when they are most disposed to admit their caresses. One must have paid no attention to their actions to doubt of this.

vessel hath completed its cargo. - Even when they are falacious their time is short and presently over; instinct urges them on, and instinct restrains them. What substitute could be found for this negative instinct in women, if you deprive them of modesty? To expect that they should have no inclination towards the man, is to expect them to be good for nothing.

The Supreme Being intended in every case to do honour to the human species: in leaving the desires of man unlimited, he gave him, at the same time, the law of reason for their regulation, in order that he might be free to command himself: in leaving the passions of woman also unrestrained, he gave her modesty to restrain them. To these he hath further added an actual recompense for the regular use of their respective faculties; to wit, the delight which is taken in modesty, when such is made the standard of our actions. All this appears to me more than equivalent to instinct in brutes.

Whether the female, therefore, of our species, be inclined to gratify the desires of the male or not, she is by nature constantly coy, and betrays a seeming reluctance to yield to his embraces. She does not resist or defend herself, however, always with the same resolution, nor of course with the same success. In order that the assailant should be victorious, it is necessary that the assailed should permit or direct the attack: for of how many artful means is not the latter possessed to compel the former to exert himself? The
 4 most

most free and delightful of all actions admits not of any real violence; both nature and reason are against it: nature, in that she hath provided the weakest part with sufficient force to make an effectual resistance, when she pleases; and reason, in that real violence on such an occasion, is not only the most brutal of all actions, but the most contrary to its end and design; both because that, by such means, the man declares war against his companion, and thus authorises her to stand up in defense of her person and liberty, even at the hazard of the life of the aggressor; and also because, that the woman is the only proper judge of her own situation, and that a child would have no father, if every man were at liberty to usurp the rights of a husband.

Hence we deduce a third consequence from the different constitutions of the sexes; which is, that the strongest should be master in appearance, and be dependent in fact on the weakest; and that not from any frivolous practice of gallantry or vanity of protectorship, but from an invariable law of nature, which, furnishing woman with a greater facility to excite desires than she has given man to satisfy them, makes the latter dependent on the good pleasure of the former, and compels him to endeavour to please in his turn, in order to obtain her consent that he should be strongest. On these occasions, the most delightful circumstance a man finds in his victory is, to doubt whether it was the woman's weakness that yielded to his superior strength, or whether

whether her inclinations spoke in his favour: the females are also generally artful enough to leave this matter in doubt. The understanding of women answers in this respect perfectly to their constitution: so far from being ashamed of their weakness they glory in it; their tender muscles make no resistance; they affect to be incapable of lifting the smallest burthens, and would blush to be thought robust and strong. To what purpose is all this? Not merely for the sake of appearing delicate but through an artful precaution: it is thus they provide an excuse beforehand, and a right to be feeble when they think it expedient.

The progress of our knowledge, increased by our vices, hath made the opinion of the moderns on this head very different from that of the ancients; and we hardly ever hear talk of rapes, as they are become so little necessary, and are no longer credited*: whereas they were very common in the earliest ages of the Greeks and Hebrews, because such notions were agreeable to the simplicity of nature, and are such as experienced libertinism only can eradicate. If we have fewer instances, however, in modern times of such acts of violence, it certainly is not because men are less licentious, but because they have less credu-

* There may happen, however, to be such a disproportion in the strength and age of the parties, as to admit of an actual rape; but as I am here treating of the relative state of the sexes in the common course of nature, I do not suppose any such disproportion.

lity; such a repulse, as would have intimidated the simple ravisher of former times, would in our's be disregarded with a smile: a resolute silence is now held to be the firmest resistance. There is a law recorded in Deuteronomy, by which a young woman, when debauched, was condemned to suffer with her seducer, in case the crime was committed within the city; but if it happened in the fields, or other unfrequented place, the ravisher was punished alone: *for (says the law) the damsel cried, and there was none to save her.* This favourable interpretation, doubtless, taught the young women to take care how they were surpris'd in places that were frequented.

The effect of this change of opinion on manners is very perceptible. Modern gallantry is one of its consequences. The men, finding that their pleasures depended more on the goodwill of the fair sex than they at first imagined, cultivated the art of captivating them by complaisance.

Thus we see how physicks insensibly lead us to morals, and in what manner the grosser union of the sexes gave rise, by degrees, to the more refined rules and softer maxims of love. The great influence of the women, therefore, is not owing to the voluntary submission of the men, but to the will of nature: they were possessed of it before they appeared to be so; that very Hercules, who violated the fifty daughters of Thestius, was nevertheless compelled to wield the distaff

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distaff by Omphale; and Sampson himself, strong as he was, was no match for Dalilah. This power of the fair sex cannot be taken from them, even when they abuse it; if ever they could lose their influence, they would undoubtedly have lost it long ago.

There is no parity between man and woman as to the consequences of their sex. The male is such only at certain momentary intervals; the female feels the consequences of her sex all her life, at least during youth; and, in order to answer the purposes of it, requires first a suitable constitution. She requires next careful management in her pregnancy, repose in child-bed, ease and a sedentary life during the time of suckling her children, and, to bring them up, such patience, good-humour, and affection as nothing can disgust: she serves as the means of their connexion with their father; it is she who makes him love them, and gives him the confidence to call them his own. What tenderness and sollicitude ought she not to be possessed of, in order to maintain the peace and unity of a whole family! Add to this, that her good qualities should not be the effects of virtue, but of taste and inclination, without which the human species would soon be extinct.

The relative duties of the two sexes do not require an equally rigorous observance in both. When women complain, however, of this partiality as unjust, they are in the wrong: this inequality is not of human institution, at least it

is not the effect of prejudice, but of reason. It certainly belongs to that party which nature hath more immediately entrusted with the care of children, to be answerable for that charge to the other. Neither of them, indeed, is permitted to violate their mutual engagements; every faithless husband, who deprives his wife of the only compensation for the severer duties of her sex, being guilty of cruelty and injustice. A faithless woman, however, does still more; she dissolves the union of her family, and breaks through all the ties of nature: in giving to a man children which are not of his begetting, she betrays both, and adds perfidy to infidelity. Such an action is naturally productive of the worst of crimes and disorders. If there be a situation in life truly horrid, it is that of an unhappy father, who, placing no confidence in his wife, cannot indulge himself in the most delightful sentiments of the heart; who doubts, while he is embracing his child, whether it be not the offspring of another, the pledge of his dishonour, and the usurper of the rights of his real children. What a scene doth a family in such a case present to us! Nothing but a community of secret enemies, whom a guilty woman arms one against the other, by compelling them to pretences of reciprocal affection.

It is not only of consequence, therefore, that a woman should be faithful to her husband, but also that he should think her so. It is requisite for her to be modest, circumspect, and reserved;

and that she should bear in the sight of others, as well as in her own conscience, the testimony of her virtue. If it be necessary for a father to love his children, it is first necessary for him to esteem their mother. Such are the reasons which place even the preservation of appearances among the number of female duties, and render their honour and reputation no less indispensable than chastity. From these principles is derived a new motive of obligation and convenience, which prescribes peculiarly to women the most scrupulous circumspection in their manners, conduct, and behaviour. To maintain indiscriminately that the two sexes are equal, and that their reciprocal duties and obligations are the same, is to indulge ourselves in idle declamations unworthy of a serious answer.

It is certainly a very superficial manner of reasoning, that of bringing exceptions as proofs to invalidate general laws so well founded. Women, you say, do not always bear children. That is true; their sex is, nevertheless, destined by nature to that end. What! because there are an hundred great cities in the world, where the women, leading a licentious life, have few children, do you pretend that women are naturally barren? What would become of all your populous towns, if the distant countries, where the women live in greater chastity and simplicity, did not compensate for the sterility of your town-ladies? A woman who hath borne but four or five children, would, in many provinces, be far

from being esteemed a fruitful breeder*. In a word, it is to no purpose, that some particular women bear but few children; women in general are not the less formed by nature to become mothers; and it is agreeable to general laws, that nature and manners operate to that end.

But were the intervals between the pregnancy of women so long as is supposed, is it possible for them to change so suddenly their manner of living, without hazard of life or health? Can a woman be one day a nurse, and the next a soldier? Can she vary her temperament and inclination as theameleon doth its colours? Is it practicable to pass, at once, from the secure enclosure of a cloister, and the business of domestick concerns, to brave the inclemencies of the weather, the labours, the fatigues, and the horrors of war? Can a woman be one day timid†, the next courageous; this hour delicate, and the next robust? If we see the young men of Paris hardly able to support the profession of arms, how can it be imagined that women,

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* Were it not so, the species must necessarily perish; its preservation requiring that every woman, taking one with another, should produce nearly four children: for of all the children that are born, almost the half die before the mothers can have any more: two, therefore, must remain to represent the father and mother. The propagation of the species in great cities is far from being in this proportion.

† The timidity of women is another natural instinct given them to prevent the double danger they run during pregnancy.

whose faces were never exposed to the sun, and who hardly know how to walk, should support it, after having spent fifty years in softness and indolence? Can they take up this severe laborious employment at an age when the men usually lay it down? There are some countries, I must own, where the women undergo but little pain in child birth, and bring up their offspring with very little trouble: in those countries, however, the men go about in all seasons half-naked, hardly encounter wild-beasts, carry their canoes as they would a knap-sack, go seven or eight hundred miles to hunt, sleep on the bare ground in the open air, support incredible fatigues, and pass many whole days together without eating. Where the women are hardy and robust, the men are much more so; and when the men grow soft and effeminate, the women become tender and feeble; so that both changing equally, the difference between them remains the same.

Plato, I know, in his Republick, prescribes to women the same exercises as the men. Having deprived his government of particular families, and being ignorant how to form women, he was reduced to the necessity of making them men. This great genius had such powers of combination and foresight, that he could make such objections to his own system as no one else would ever have thought of; he has but ill resolved, however, some that have been actually made. I do not speak of that pretended community of women, with which he hath been so

often reproached; a proof that those who reproached him had never read his performance: what I mean is, the promiscuous employment of both sexes in the same kinds of business and amusements; which could not fail of producing the most intolerable abuses. I speak of that subversion of the order of things, when the most delightful of all natural sensations are sacrificed to artificial sentiments, which cannot exist without the former; as if the bonds of society could be formed independent of nature; as if the affection we bear to our parents was not the source of our allegiance to the state; as if it was not on account of our little country, our own family, that we attach ourselves to the greater; and as if the good son, the good husband, and the good father, did not constitute the good citizen.

It being once demonstrated that man and woman are not, nor ought to be, constituted alike in temperament and character, it follows of course that they should not be educated in the same manner. In pursuing the directions of nature, they ought indeed to act in concert, but they should not be engaged in the same employments: the end of their pursuits should be the same, but the means they should take to accomplish them, and of consequence their tastes and inclinations, should be different. Having endeavoured to lay down the principles of a natural education for a man, let us trace, in the same manner, the methods to form a woman answerable to him.

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Are you desirous of being always directed aright? Observe constantly the indications of nature. Whatever is characteristick of the sex, should be regarded as a circumstance peculiarly established. You are always complaining that women have certain defects and failings; your vanity deceives you: such, indeed, would be defects and failings in you, but they are essential qualities in them, and women would be much worse without them. You may prevent these pretended defects from growing worse; but you ought to take great care not entirely to remove them.

The women, again, on their part, are constantly crying out, that we educate them to be vain and coquettish; that we constantly entertain them with puerilities, in order to maintain our authority over them; and attribute to us the failings for which we reproach them. What a ridiculous accusation! How long is it that the men have troubled themselves about the education of the women? What hinders mothers from bringing up their daughters just as they please? There are, to be sure, no colleges and academies for girls: a sad misfortune truly! Would to God there were none also for boys; they would be more sensibly and virtuously educated than they are. Who, ye mothers, compels your daughters to throw away their time in trifles? to spend half their lives, after your example, at the toilette? Who hinders you from instructing, or causing them to be instructed in

the manner you choose? Is it our fault that they charm us when they are pretty, that we are seduced by their affected airs, that the arts they learn of you attract and flatter us, that we love to see them becomingly dressed, and that we permit them to prepare at leisure those arms with which they subdue us to their pleasure? Educate them, if you think proper, like the men; we shall readily consent to it. The more they resemble our sex, the less power will they have over us; and when they once become like ourselves, we shall then be truly their masters.

The qualities common to both sexes are not equally allotted to each; though taken all together they are equal in both: the woman is more perfect as a woman, and less as a man. In every case, where she makes use of her own privileges, she has the advantage over us; but where she would usurp our's she becomes inferior. The only reply to be made to this general truth is by bringing exceptions to it; the method of argumentation constantly used by the superficial partizans of the fair sex.

To cultivate in women, therefore, the qualifications of the men, and neglect those which are peculiar to the sex, would be acting to their prejudice: they see this very well, and are too artful to become the dupes of such conduct: they endeavour, indeed, to usurp our advantages, but they take care not to give up their own. By these means, however, it happens that, not being capable of both, because they are incompatible,

tible, they fail of attaining the perfection of their own sex, as well as of our's, and lose half their merit. Let not the sensible mother, then, think of educating her daughter as a man, in contradiction to nature; but as a virtuous woman; and she may be assured it will be much better both for her child and herself.

It does not hence follow, however, that she ought to be educated in perfect ignorance, and confined merely to domestick concerns. Would a man make a servant of his companion, and deprive himself of the greatest pleasure of society? To make her the more submissive, would he prevent her from acquiring the least judgement or knowledge? Would he reduce her to a mere automaton? Surely not! Nature hath dictated otherwise, in giving the sex such refined and agreeable talents: on the contrary, she hath formed them for thought, for judgement, for love, and knowledge. They should bestow as much care on their understandings, therefore, as on their persons, and add the charms of the one to the other, in order to supply their own want of strength, and to direct our's. They should, doubtless, learn many things, but only those which it is proper for them to know.

Whether I consider the peculiar destination of the sex, observe their inclinations, or remark their duties, all things equally concur to point out the peculiar method of education best adapted to them. Woman and man were made for each other; but their mutual dependence is not the

same. The men depend on the women only on account of their desires; the women on the men both on account of their desires and their necessities: we could subsist better without them than they without us. Their very subsistence and rank in life depend on us, and the estimation in which we hold them, their charms and their merit. By the law of nature itself, both women and children lie at the mercy of the men: it is not enough they should be really estimable, it is requisite they should be actually esteemed; it is not enough they should be beautiful, it is requisite their charms should please; it is not enough they should be sensible and prudent, it is necessary they should be acknowledged as such: their glory lies not only in their conduct, but in their reputation; and it is impossible for any, who consents to be accounted infamous, to be ever virtuous. A man, secure in his own good conduct, depends only on himself, and may brave the publick opinion; but a woman, in behaving well, performs but half her duty; as what is thought of her, is as important to her, as what she really is. It follows hence, that the system of a woman's education should, in this respect, be directly contrary to that of our's. Opinion is the grave of virtue among the men; but its throne among the women.

On the good constitution of mothers depends originally that of their children; on the care of the women depends our earliest education; on the women also depend our manners, our passions,

sions, our tastes, our pleasures, and even our happiness itself. For this reason, the education of the women should be always relative to the men. To please, to be useful to us, to make us love and esteem them, to educate us when young, and take care of us when grown up, to advise, to console us, to render our lives easy and agreeable: these are the duties of women at all times, and what they should be taught in their infancy. So long as we fail to recur to this principle, we run wide of the mark, and all the precepts which are given them contribute neither to their happiness nor our own.

But although every woman is, and ought to be, desirous of rendering herself pleasing to the men, there is a wide difference between the desire of being agreeable to a man of merit, a man truly amiable in himself, and the desire of captivating those affected pretty fellows, who are a disgrace to their own sex, as well as to that which they imitate. Neither nature nor reason induce a woman to admire those qualities in a man which resemble her own, nor is her copying their manners by any means the way to captivate their affections.

Whenever she throws aside, therefore, the reserved and modest behaviour of the female, to assume the pert airs of a masculine fop, she renounces, instead of pursuing, the vocation of her sex, and gives up those rights she means to usurp: she may think, indeed, she could not otherwise be pleasing to the men; but she is
greatly

greatly mistaken. Fools only admire fools; and the desire of captivating such characters is a sufficient indication of the taste of such as attempt it. Were there no frivolous and effeminate men, such women would make them; and the follies of the former would be more owing to the latter than are now those of the women to the men. The woman who loves real men, and is desirous of pleasing them, will take her measures accordingly. Woman is by her situation a coquette, but her coquetry changes its form and object according to her views: let us regulate these views, therefore, by those of nature, and women will be properly educated.

Girls are from their earliest infancy fond of dress. Not content with being pretty, they are desirous of being thought so; we see, by all their little airs, that this thought engages their attention; and they are hardly capable of understanding what is said to them, before they are to be governed by talking to them of what people will think of their behaviour. The same motive, however, indiscreetly made use of with boys, has not the same effect: provided they are left to pursue their amusements at pleasure, they care very little what people think of them. Time and pains are necessary to subject boys to this motive.

Whencesoever girls derive this first lesson, it is a very good one. As the body is born, in a manner before the soul, our first concern should be to cultivate the former; this order is common

to both sexes, but the object of that cultivation is different. In the one sex it is the development of corporeal powers; in the other, that of personal charms: not that either the quality of strength or beauty ought to be confined exclusively to one sex; but only that the order of the cultivation of both is in that respect reversed. Women certainly require as much strength as to enable them to move and act gracefully, and men as much address as to qualify them to act with ease.

From the extreme effeminacy of the women arises that of the men. Women ought not to be robust like them, but for them, in order that the men born of them should be robust also. In this respect, convents, where the boarders are coarsely dieted, but take much exercise in the gardens and open air, are preferable to home, where daughters are usually more nicely fed and tenderly treated: here they are always either flattered or rebuked, and sitting under the eye of their mother in a close apartment, hardly ever venture to rise up, walk about, talk, or breathe; they are not a moment at liberty, to play, run, romp about, and make a noise, agreeably to the natural petulance of their age. They are always treated at home with excessive indulgence, or ill-judged severity; never according to the dictates of reason. Thus it is we spoil the persons and the hearts of youth.

Among the Spartans, the girls used themselves to military exercise, as well as the boys, not
indeed

indeed to go to fight, but in order to be capable of bearing children able to undergo the fatigues of war. Not that I approve of their practice in this particular; it is not necessary for the women to carry a musket and learn the Prussian exercise, in order to be capable of bearing robust children; what I would infer from this instance is, that the Greeks well understood the business of education. The young females appeared often in publick, not mixing promiscuously among the boys, but in select companies of their own sex. There was hardly a single festival, sacrifice, or publick ceremony, at which the daughters of the principal citizens did not make their appearance, crowned with chaplets of flowers, singing hymns, dancing with their baskets of oblations in their hands; and presenting to the depraved senses of the Greeks, a spectacle delightful in itself, and proper to counteract the bad effects of their indecent gymnastick. But whatever impressions this custom might make on the hearts of the men, it was an excellent one, as well to form the constitution of the fair sex by agreeable, moderate, and salutary exercise, as to refine the taste, by cherishing in them a continual desire to please without exposing them to a corruption of manners.

No sooner, however, were their females married, than they were secluded from publick view, and shut up in their houses; their future concern relating entirely to the management of their families. Such is the manner

ner of life which both nature and reason prescribe; and hence it was, that the Spartan mothers gave birth to the most healthy, robust, and well-made men in the world. Notwithstanding the dissolute character of some of the Grecian islands also, it is certain that the women of no people on earth, not excepting even the Romans, were at once more prudent and amiable than those of ancient Greece.

It is well known, that a loose and easy dress contributed much to give both sexes those fine proportions of body, that are observable in their statues, and which serve as models to our present artists; nature being too much disfigured among us to afford them any such. The Greeks knew nothing of those Gothick shackles, that multiplicity of ligatures and bandages, with which our bodies are compressed. Their women were ignorant of the use of whalebone stays, by which our's distort their shape, instead of displaying it. I cannot but conceive, that this practice, carried to so great an excess as it is in England, must in time degenerate the species; and I will maintain it to be an instance of wretched taste. Can it be a pleasing sight to behold a woman cut in two in the middle, as it were, like a wasp? On the contrary, it is as shocking to the eye, as it is painful to the imagination. A fine shape, like the limbs, hath its due size and proportion, a diminution of which is certainly a defect. Such a deformity also would be striking in a naked figure;

figure; wherefore, then, should it be esteemed a beauty in one that is dressed?

I dare not be too explicit as to those reasons the women have for persisting to gird themselves up in this manner: a falling breast, a rising belly, &c. are, I confess, disagreeable enough in a young woman of twenty; but these are no longer shocking when a woman is turned of thirty; and, indeed, such defects at any age are less displeasing than the ridiculous affectation of a little miss of forty.

Every thing that confines and lays nature under a restraint is an instance of bad taste: this is as true in regard to the ornaments of the body as to the embellishments of the mind. Life, health, reason, and convenience ought to be taken first into consideration: gracefulness cannot subsist without ease; delicacy is not debility, nor must a woman be sick in order to please. Infirmary and sickness may excite our pity: but desire and pleasure require the bloom and vigour of health.

Children of both sexes have a great many amusements in common; and so they ought; have they not also many such when they are grown up? Each sex hath also its peculiar taste to distinguish in this particular. Boys love sports of noise and activity; to beat the drum, to whip the top, and to drag about their little carts: girls, on the other hand, are fonder of things of show and ornament; such as mirrors, trinkets, and dolls: the doll is the peculiar amusement of
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the females; from whence we see their taste plainly adapted to their destination. The physical part of the art of pleasing lies in dress; and this is all which children are capacitated to cultivate of that art.

You shall see a little girl spend whole days about her waxen baby; be perpetually changing its clothes, dress and undress it an hundred times, and be for ever studying new combinations of ornament; well or ill-sorted, it is no matter: her fingers want dexterity, and her taste is not yet formed; but her inclinations are sufficiently evident. While thus occupied, her time slips insensibly away; she forgets even her meals, and has more appetite to dress than to food. You will say, perhaps, that she dresses up her baby, and not herself. Doubtless, it is her baby she sees, and not herself: she can do nothing as yet about her own person, all her concerns centre in her doll, and in the management of this it is that she displays all her coquetry. This, however, will not be always the case; the time approaches when she will take the same pleasure in ornamenting herself.

Here then we see a primary propensity firmly established, which you need only to pursue and regulate. The little creature will doubtless be very desirous to know how to dress up her doll, to make its sleeve-nots, its flounces, its head dress, &c. she is obliged to have so much recourse to the people about her, for their assistance in these articles, that it would be much more agreeable
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to her to owe them all to her own industry. Hence we have a good reason for the first lessons that are usually taught these young females: in which we do not appear to be setting them a task, but obliging them, by instructing them in what is immediately useful to themselves. And, in fact, almost all of them learn with reluctance to read and write; but very readily apply themselves to the use of their needles. They imagine themselves already grown up, and think with pleasure that such qualifications will enable them to decorate themselves.

The first path being laid open, it is very easy to pursue it: sewing, embroidery, and lace making follow of course: tapestry, indeed, is not so much their taste. Household furniture is too far removed from their present thoughts; it does not immediately relate to their persons, but is rendered interesting by other considerations. The working of tapestry is an amusement for grown women; girls never take much pleasure in it.

Their voluntary progress in these employments may be easily extended to the art of drawing and design, which is by no means indifferent to such as would dress themselves with taste and elegance. I would not have girls, however, apply themselves to draw landscapes, and still less to history-pieces and figures. Foilage, fruits, flowers, drapery, and whatever may tend to enable them to give an elegance to dress, or to design themselves a pattern for embroidery when they meet with none to their taste, are sufficient. If,
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in general, it behoves men to confine their studies to useful knowledge, this is still more necessary for the women; because the lives of the latter, though less laborious, yet requiring greater assiduity, will not permit them to cultivate any talent, to the neglect of their duty.

Whatever may be sometimes said in raillery, good sense is equally the property of both sexes. Girls in general are more docile than boys, and, indeed, we ought to use more authority over them, as I observe hereafter; but it does not thence follow, that we should require them to do any thing, of which they do not see the utility: it is the art of a mother to show them the usefulness of whatever they are set to do; and this is by so much the more easy, as the understanding ripens much sooner in girls than boys. This rule frees their sex, as well as our's, not only from those indolent and useless studies, which answer no good purpose, nor even render those who cultivate them the more agreeable to others; but also all those whose utility is not adapted to their present age, nor perceptible in a future one. If I am against compelling boys to learn to read, it is with still greater reason that I oppose using any such compulsion with girls, at least till they are well instructed in the utility of reading: the manner, however, in which this utility is usually inculcated, is much better adapted to our own notions of things than to their's. And, after all, where is the necessity for a girl's learning to read and write so early? Does she so soon take on
herself

herself the management of a family? I am afraid there are but few who do not make rather a bad use than a good one of this fatal science; and I am certain they have all so much curiosity as to learn it without compulsion, whenever they have leisure and opportunity. Perhaps they ought to learn arithmetick, in preference to every thing else; for nothing can appear more useful at any time of life, nor requires longer practice, than the keeping accounts. If a little girl should have no means of obtaining cherries or sugar-plumbs, but by resolving a question in arithmetick, I will answer for it she would soon learn to calculate for them.

I once knew a young a person who learned to write before she learned to read, and began to write with her needle before she could use a pen. At first, indeed, she took it into her head to make no other letter than the O. This letter she was constantly making of all sizes, and always the wrong way. Unluckily, one day, as she was intent on this employment, she happened to see herself in the looking-glass; when, taking a dislike to the constrained attitude in which she sat while writing, she threw away her pen, like another Pallas, and determined against making the O any more. Her brother was also equally averse to writing: it was the confinement, however, and not the constrained attitude, that most disgusted him. A method was soon taken with the sister to bring her back to her writing: being very nice, and not a little vain, she

she did not choose that her sisters should wear any of her linen; for this reason they used to be marked, a circumstance which was now wilfully neglected: it became necessary for her, therefore, to mark them herself; which she speedily effected; and by that method, it will be readily conceived, soon learned to write.

Let there be propriety in all the injunctions you lay upon young girls, but take care always to impose on them something to learn or to do. Indolence and indocility are two of the most dangerous ill qualities they are subject to, and what they are the most seldom cured of, when they have once contracted them. Girls ought to be active and diligent; nor is that all; they should also be early subjected to restraint. This misfortune, if it really be one, is inseparable from their sex; nor do they ever throw it off but to suffer more cruel evils. They must be subject, all their lives, to the most constant and severe restraint, which is that of decorum: it is, therefore, necessary to accustom them early to such confinement, that it may not afterwards cost them too dear; and to the suppression of their caprices, that they may the more readily submit to the will of others. If, indeed, they are fond of being always at work, they should be sometimes compelled to lay it aside. Dissipation, levity and inconstancy are faults that readily spring up from their first propensities, when corrupted or perverted by too much indulgence. To prevent this abuse, we should learn them,
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above all things, to lay a due restraint on themselves. The life of a modest woman is reduced, by our absurd institutions, to a perpetual conflict with herself: not but it is just that this sex should partake of the sufferings which arise from those evils it hath caused us.

You should ever prevent your daughters from being fatigued and disgusted with their employments, as well as from being too much delighted with their amusements; which is constantly the case in the ordinary methods of education; wherein, as Fenelon observes, every thing that is disagreeable is placed on one side, and every thing agreeable on the other. The first of these two inconveniencies cannot happen, if the preceding rules are observed, unless the persons who are about them are disagreeable. A child, who loves her mother or her nurse, will sit at work whole days by their side without reluctance: the mere pleasure of prattling with them sufficiently indemnifies her for the confinement. But, if she dislike her governess, she will be disgusted with every thing that is required to be done in her presence. It is very rare that girls, who do not take more delight in being with their mother than with any other person in the world, turn out well. In order to judge of their real sentiments, however, it is necessary to study them, and not to depend altogether on what they say; as they begin very young to disguise their thoughts, and become early mistresses of flattery and dissimulation. They ought not, nevertheless, to be
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enjoined to love their mother, as an obligation: affection does not follow duty, nor is it in this particular that constraint should be used. The common attachment and regard of a mother, nay mere habit, will make her beloved by her children, if she does nothing to incur their hate. Even the constraint she lays them under, if well directed, will increase their affection, instead of lessening it; because a state of dependence being natural to the sex, they perceive themselves formed for obedience.

For the same reason that they have, or ought to have, but little liberty, they are apt to indulge themselves excessively in what is allowed them. Addicted in every thing to extremes, they are even more transported at their diversions than boys: this is the second inconvenience of which I spoke before. These transports ought to be moderated; being the cause of many vices peculiar to the women; such, among others, are the caprice and infatuation by which a woman is in raptures to-day with an object she may regard with coldness and indifference to-morrow. The inconstancy of their inclinations is as fatal to them as their excess; both one and the other also are derived from the same source. Deny them not the indulgence of their innocent mirth, their sports and pastimes; but ever prevent their satiating themselves with one, to run to another; permit them not for a moment to perceive themselves entirely freed from restraint. Use them to be interrupted in the midst of their play, and

sent to work, without murmuring. Hábit alone is sufficient to inure them to this, because it is only confirming the operations of nature.

There results from this habitual restraint a tractableness which the women have occasion for during their whole lives, as they constantly remain either under subjection to the men, or to the opinions of mankind; and are never permitted to set themselves above those opinions. The first and most important qualification in a woman is good nature or sweetness of temper: formed to obey a being so imperfect as man, often full of vices, and always full of faults, she ought to learn betimes even to suffer injustice, and to bear the insults of a husband without complaint; it is not for his sake, but her own, that she should be of a mild disposition. The perverseness and ill-nature of the women only serve to aggravate their own misfortunes, and the misconduct of their husbands; they might plainly perceive that such are not the arms by which they gain the superiority. Heaven did not bestow on them the powers of insinuation and persuasion to make them perverse and morose; it did not constitute them feeble to make them imperious; it did not give them so soft and agreeable a voice to vent abuse, nor features so delicate and lovely to be disfigured with anger. When they give way to rage, therefore, they forget themselves; for, though they may often have reason to complain, they are always in the wrong to scold. Each sex should preserve its peculiar

peculiar tone and manner; a meek husband may make a wife impertinent; but mildness of disposition on the woman's side will always bring a man back to reason, at least if he be not absolutely a brute, and will sooner or later triumph over him.

Daughters should be always submissive; their mothers, however, should not be inexorable. To make a young person tractable, she ought not to be made unhappy; to make her modest she ought not to be rendered stupid. On the contrary, I should not be displeased at her being permitted to use some art, not to elude punishment in case of disobedience, but to exempt herself from the necessity of obeying. It is not necessary to make her dependence burthenfome, but only to let her feel it. Subtilty is a talent natural to the sex; and, as I am persuaded, all our natural inclinations are right and good in themselves, I am of opinion this should be cultivated as well as the others: it is requisite for us only to prevent its abuse.

I appeal, for the truth of this remark, to every fair and candid observer. I would not have the examination, however, confined to the women themselves; it is possible that our narrow scheme of educating them may have cramped their genius: but let us observe the children of both sexes. If we compare little girls with boys of the same age, the latter will be found extremely dull and stupid in comparison of the former, or I am greatly mistaken. Of this I will take the

liberty to give an example, attended with the greatest degree of puerile simplicity.

It is very common to forbid children asking for any thing at table; always thinking it requisite to lay them under some needless injunction; as if what they asked for were not easily granted or refused them*, without our making a poor child uneasy between desire and expectation. Every body hath heard of the address of the little boy, who, being thus prohibited to ask, and seeing himself neglected, petitioned only for a little salt, by which means he obtained also some meat. It is here certain that he incurred, in some measure, the penalty of disobedience in asking directly for salt, and by so doing indirectly for meat; the neglect of him, however, was so cruel, that, though he had more openly transgressed this absurd law, and said in plain terms, I am hungry, I can hardly think any body could have found in their hearts to have punished him.

But the method which I saw a little girl, of six years old, once take to gain her point, on a like occasion, was still more subtle and artful. Her situation was also more nice and critical; for being not only strictly forbidden to ask, either directly or indirectly, her disobedience would have been more unpardonable, as she had been already helped from every dish on the table except

* A child will always be importunate when it finds its interest in it: but it will never ask twice for the same thing, if the first denial is always irrevocable.

cept one, of which she was extremely fond; and this had been forgotten.

To effect a reparation of this neglect, therefore, without being charged with disobedience, she began to number the dishes on the table, pointing to each, and saying, "This I have eat of, and that I have eat of;" at the same time making a remarkable pause, and passing over in silence that which she had not tasted; which somebody taking notice of, and saying, "And this; have you not eaten of this too?"—"Oh! no (replied the little epicure, very modestly) not yet." Compare these instances: the latter shows the finesse and cunning of a girl, the former that of a boy.

Whatever is, is right: nor can any general rule in nature be wrong. The superiority of address, peculiar to the female sex, is a very equitable indemnification for their inferiority in point of strength: without this, woman would not be the companion of man; but his slave: it is by her superiour art and ingenuity that she preserves her equality, and governs him while she affects to obey. Woman has every thing against her, as well our faults, as her own timidity and weakness; she has nothing in her favour, but her subtilty and her beauty. Is it not very reasonable, therefore, she should cultivate both? Beauty, indeed, is not very general; it is liable to be destroyed by accident, it loses its power by habit, and its existence by time. Woman's best resource is in her intellectual talents; by which,

however, I do not mean those which are usually so much admired in the gay world, and contribute nothing to her happiness; but such as are adapted to her situation, and enable her to profit even by our advantages. It is hardly to be conceived how useful this address in the women is to ourselves; how much it adds to our social pleasures, restrains the petulance of children, corrects the brutality of husbands, and preserves that order in a family, which would without it be entirely destroyed. That artful and wicked women sometimes make a bad use of this address, is very certain; but what will not vice abuse? Let us not destroy the instruments of our happiness, because the wicked sometimes make use of them to our prejudice.

Dress may make a woman fine, but personal charms only make her please. Our clothes are not ourselves: they often disfigure and are unbecoming, because they are too remarkable: and those which most distinguish the wearer, are often such as are least remarkable in themselves. The usual method of educating girls is, in this respect, quite absurd: they are promised fine clothes, &c. by way of rewards, and are taught to admire affected modes of dress. Again, they are themselves admired when finely dressed; whereas they ought to be given to understand, that so much care to deck them out is bestowed on them only to hide their defects, and that the real triumph of beauty lies in the display of its native charms. A fondness for fashions is thus

a proof

a proof of bad taste, as the person and features do not change with the mode; what is becoming or unbecoming at one time, must therefore be always so.

Should I see a young lady strutting about and priding herself in her fine clothes, and seem uneasy about what people would think of her figure thus disguised; should, I say, these ornaments make her too fine; it is a pity; do you think she is handsome enough to wear plainer clothes? To look well without this stomacher or that aigrette? She herself would very probably be the first to wish them laid aside, that I might judge. I should never pay her so many compliments as when she might happen to be plainly dressed. Were she once taught to regard dress as a supplement only to the charms of her person, and as a tacit confession that they stood in need of such assistance, she would be no longer proud of dress, but humbled by it; so that should any body admire her, when tricked out finer than ordinary, instead of being elated by the compliment, she would be apt to blush for shame.

There are indeed some persons, who require the assistance of dress to render them agreeable: there are none, however, that can require their apparel to be rich and tawdry. Such dresses are owing to the pride of rank, and not to personal vanity; being merely the effect of prejudice. Genuine coquetry is sometimes affectedly elegant, but never affectedly rich: Juno was more

superbly attired than Venus. “ *As you could not make her beautiful, you have made her fine,*” said Apelles, one day, to a wretched painter, who had drawn a picture of Helen, with very rich drapery. In fact, I have always observed; that the most pompous dresses have been worn by ordinary women: there cannot be a more absurd piece of vanity than this. Furnish a girl that hath taste enough to despise the fashion, with ribbands, gauze, muslin, and flowers; and she will presently dress her head, without diamonds, pompons, or lace*, in a manner infinitely more agreeable than if she had employed all the brilliant trumpery of the toy-shop and millener.

As what is once becoming, is always so, and it is expedient to appear ever as agreeable as possible, those women who are good judges of dress, make choice of what is becoming, and keep to it: by which means, they are also less busied about their apparel than such as are perpetually changing. A true regard to dress requires not the labours of the toilette; young ladies have seldom that regular apparatus; their lessons and work take up too much of their time, and yet they are in general as nicely dressed, the article of rouge excepted, as their mamas, and often in much better taste. We are mistaken concerning

* Women, whose complexions are so fair that they have no occasion for lace, give great offence, nevertheless, to others, if they do not wear it. It is almost always the ugly people who set fashions, which the handsome ones are, notwithstanding, foolish enough to follow.

ing the abuse of the toilette, it is owing more to listlessness and disgust than to vanity. A woman of fashion, who spends six hours at her toilette, is not ignorant that she is no better dressed than another, who might spend only half an hour; but the hours thus spent, are so much deducted from the killing length of time, under which we labour; and it is thought more advisable to amuse ourselves with decorating our own persons, than to remain discontented with every thing about us. Without the toilette, how would it be possible to fill up the hours between twelve at noon and nine in the evening? A woman of fashion, in assembling her women about her on this occasion, amuses herself not a little in teasing them; this is something: by this method also she avoids a disagreeable *tête-à-tête* with her husband, whom she sees at no other time; this is still more: then come in the tradesmen, the fine gentlemen, the fine writers, with their verses, songs, and pamphlets; these things could never be so commodiously brought together without the toilette. The only real advantage of the toilette, however, is the pretext for a lady's displaying her charms a little more than when she is full dressed; but this advantage is not so considerable as is generally imagined.

Scruple not to bestow on women the education proper for their sex; bring them up to love the occupations peculiar to it, to be modest, and to employ themselves in the management of family concerns; the parade of the toilette will then

fall into neglect of itself, and the women will only be dressed in a better taste.

The first thing which young persons observe, as they grow up, is that all these foreign aids of dress are still insufficient, if they have no charms in their own persons. Beauty cannot be acquired by dress, and coquetry is an art not so early and speedily attained. While girls are yet young, however, they are in a capacity to study agreeable gesture, a pleasing modulation of voice, an easy carriage and behaviour; as well as to take the advantage of gracefully adapting their looks and attitudes to time, place, and occasion. Their application, therefore, should not be solely confined to the arts of industry and the needle, when they come to display other talents, whose utility is already apparent.

I know some persons are so severe that they would not have girls taught singing, dancing, nor any of the agreeable arts. This seems to me, however, very absurd and ridiculous. Pray on whom would they have these talents bestowed? On the boys? Do these accomplishments best become the men or the women? They will answer, perhaps, that they become neither; that profane songs are criminal; that dancing is the invention of the Devil; and that girls ought to have no other amusements than their sampler and their prayers. Strange amusements, truly, for a girl of ten years of age! For my part, I am somewhat afraid that these little saints, in consequence of being thus compelled to spend
their

their childhood in praying to God, will be tempted to spend their youth in very different employment; and that they will endeavour to make up, when they are married, for the time they will conceive they lost before-hand. It is in my opinion necessary to pay a regard to their age as well as their sex: a little miss ought not surely to lead the life of her grand-mother, but, on the contrary, to be indulged in her vivacity and childish amusements; she should be permitted to sing, to dance, to play about as much as she pleased, and to enjoy all the innocent pleasures of her age: the time will come but too soon, when she must be more reserved, and put on a more constrained behaviour.

But may we not ask, if even the necessity of this change be real? Is this not also the effect of our prejudices? In subjecting modest women only to the more sad and melancholy duties of life, we banish from the marriage-state every thing that should render it agreeable to the men. Need we be astonished that the sad solemnity, which usually prevails at home, should send them to seek diversions abroad? Or that men should be so little inclined to embrace so disagreeable a state? Christianity, by carrying our duties to extremes, hath rendered them absurd and impracticable; by prohibiting songs, dancings, and other worldly amusements, to women, it makes them heavy, morose, factious, and insupportable in their houses. There is no other religion in the world, by which the duties of marriage are

rendered so severe, nor is so sacred an engagement any where so much despised as among Christians. So much pains is taken to prevent the women from being amiable, that husbands are thereby rendered indifferent. I know very well that the latter are blameable in this; but I know also that it cannot be otherwise, as husbands, though Christians, are still men. For my part, I would have a young Englishwoman cultivate her agreeable talents, in order to please her future husband, with as much care and assiduity as a young Circassian cultivates her's, to fit her for the Harem of an Eastern bashaw. It is said that husbands, in general, give themselves little concern about such talents in their wives; I can very easily believe it, as instead of their being employed in pleasing them, they usually serve only as a bait to allure a parcel of impudent young fellows to dishonour them. But, can you imagine that an amiable and prudent woman, possessed of such talents, and consecrating them to the amusement of her husband, would not greatly add to the happiness of his life; and prevent him, when leaving his closet with a mind fatigued with study, from going to seek recreation abroad? Are there no instances of happy families so united, that each can furnish something in itself for their common amusement? And are not the confidence and familiarity subsisting between them, the innocence and sweetness of the pleasures they experience,

infinitely

infinitely superiour to the riotous pleasures of publick entertainments?

The agreeable talents are too much confined to method. They are rendered too abstracted by being reduced to maxims and precepts; and hence those things which should constitute the amusement of young people, are made disgusting to them, as the study of an art. I cannot conceive any thing more ridiculous, than to see an old singing or dancing-master, approach a young, lively, giggling girl, with a frigid and formal air; and assume, in teaching his frivolous science, a more pedantick and magisterial tone, than if he were teaching her the catechism. Is it that the art of singing, for instance, depends on the knowledge of written musick? Is it not possible to acquire a just command of voice, to learn to sing with taste, and even to accompany an instrument, without knowing a single note? Is the same manner of singing adapted to all voices? Doth the same method of teaching suit equally every genius? It is impossible to make me believe, that the same attitudes, the same steps, the same motions and gestures, or even the same dances, are equally proper for a little, lively, sharp-eyed brunette, and a tall beauty with languishing eyes and flaxen hair. When I see a dancing-master give the same lesson, therefore, indiscriminately to both, I say to myself, this man follows the customs of his profession, but he understands nothing of his art.

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It is queried whether girls should be educated under preceptors or governants. For my part, I know not which is best; but I could wish they had no occasion for either one or the other; but that they might be permitted to learn of their own accord what they have so great an inclination to know; and that we did not see such a number of laced-coated dancers running perpetually about our streets. I can hardly believe that the communication held with this sort of people, is less hurtful to their scholars, than their lessons are useful to them; or that their tone, jargon, and manner, give their scholars the first taste for trifles so important to their teachers, whose examples they follow in making them afterwards their only occupation.

As to those arts, whose object it is merely to please, young persons might learn them every where and of every person; of their father, mother, brothers, sisters, friends, governesses, of their looking-glass, and particularly from their own taste. We should never be solicitous to give them lessons of this kind; but let them be the first to require them: we ought never to make a task of what is in itself a recompence, it being in this sort of studies particularly, that the first step to succeed is to be desirous of it. But, if it be absolutely necessary for them to be instructed in form, I shall not determine from which sex it is most proper for them to receive their lessons. I know not whether it be necessary for a dancing-master to take his young scholar

scholar by her soft hand, to make her hold up her petticoat, display her fine arms, hold back her head, and raise her heaving breast; but I know that I would not, for all the world, be that master.

Industry and talents form the taste; by means of taste also it is that the mind insensibly acquires ideas of the truly beautiful, and in time, of moral relations, which depend thereon. This is, perhaps, one of the reasons why the sentiments of modesty and decency take rise earlier in girls than boys: for to imagine that notions so premature are the effect of the lessons of the governess, argues but little acquaintance with the nature of those lessons, and the progress of the human mind. The talent of speaking holds the first rank in the art of pleasing; it is that alone which can give new attractions to those charms which have lost their power over the senses by habit. It is the mind which not only animates the body, but in some sense gives it a new form; it is by the succession of its sentiments and ideas, that it enlivens and diversifies the countenance; it is by the discourse it inspires, that attention is kept on the stretch, and preserves for any long time the same regard for the same object. I conceive, it is, for all these reasons that girls so early acquire an agreeable mode of prattle, that they are emphatick in their discourse, even before they well know what they say, and that men amuse themselves by listening to their talk, even before they can understand them.

The

The tongues of women are very voluble; they speak earlier, more readily and more agreeably than the men; they are accused also of speaking much more: but so it ought to be, and I should be very ready to convert this reproach into a compliment; their lips and eyes have the same activity, and for the same reason. A man speaks of what he knows, a woman of what pleases her; the one requires knowledge, the other taste; the principal object of a man's discourse should be what is useful, that of a woman's what is agreeable. There ought to be nothing in common between their different conversation but truth.

We ought not, therefore, to restrain the prattle of girls, in the same manner as we should that of boys with that severe question; *To what purpose are you talking?* but by another, which is not less difficult to answer, *How will your discourse be received?* In infancy, while they are as yet incapable to discern good from evil, they ought to observe it, as a law, never to say any thing disagreeable to those whom they are speaking to: what will render the practice of this rule also the more difficult, is, that it must ever be subordinate to the former, of never speaking falsely or telling an untruth.

There are indeed many other difficulties attending the practice of this rule: but they belong to a more advanced age. At present, the only pains it will cost girls to be sincere, is to avoid at the same time being rude; and as rudeness

ness is what they are naturally averse to, they may be soon taught by education to avoid it. I have observed from my experience, in the world, that in general the politeness of the men is more officious, and that of the women more obliging. The men appear more desirous to serve you, and the women to please you. It hence follows, that, notwithstanding it be something characteristical in the women, their politeness is less insincere than our's; in them it is only a diffusion of their natural instinct; but when a man pretends to prefer my interest to his own, whatever demonstrations he may make to varnish over the falsehood, I am very certain it is one. It costs the women, therefore, no trouble to be polite, nor, of consequence, girls to become so. Their first lesson is inculcated by nature; art only second her designs, and determines the manner in which they are to be carried into execution. With regard to the politeness of women among each other it is a different thing. They mix with it such an air of constraint, and are so cold in their civilities, that as the restraint is mutual, they give themselves little trouble to hide it, and appear ever sincere in their dissimulation by never striving to conceal it. Not but that young females are sometimes frank and earnest in their friendships. At their age, cheerfulness supplies the place of a good disposition, and, being satisfied with themselves, are satisfied with all the world. It is, however, certain that they salute and caress each other more heartily, and with a better grace

grace in the presence of the men; taking a pleasure as it were, in whetting the desires of the latter, by tantalizing them with the shadow of those favours which they know so well how to make them envy.

If boys ought not to be indulged in asking indiscreet questions, much less should girls; whose curiosity, either satisfied or imprudently evaded, is of much greater consequence, on account of their penetration to foresee the mysteries which are concealed from them, and their address in discovering them. But, without permitting them to ask questions, I would have them be continually interrogated themselves; and excited to prattle, in order to accustom them to a fluency of speech, to make them quick at reply, and to refine their wit and their tongue, as much as possible, without danger. Such conversations, being always accompanied with gaiety, but managed with art and discretion, would be an amusement adapted to their years, and might be made the means of inculcating, in the innocent minds of such young persons, the first, and perhaps the most useful lessons of morality they may ever receive; teaching them, under the appearance of pleasure and vanity, what are the qualities for which men truly hold them in esteem, and in what consist the glory and happiness of a modest woman.

It is easy to be conceived, that if male children are not in a capacity to form any true notions of religion, those ideas must be greatly above the conception

conception of the females: it is for this very reason, I would begin to speak to them the earlier on this subject; for if we were to wait till they were in a capacity to discuss methodically such profound questions, we should run a risk of never speaking to them on this subject as long as they lived. Reason in women is a practical reason, capacitating them artfully to discover the means of attaining a known end, but which would never enable them to discover that end itself. The social relations of the sexes are indeed truly admirable: from their union there results a moral person, of which woman may be termed the eyes and man the hand, with this dependence on each other, that it is from the man that the woman is to learn what she is to see, and it is of the woman that man is to learn what he ought to do. If woman could recur to the first principles of things as well as man, and man was capacitated to enter into their *minutiæ* as well as woman, always independent of each other, they would live in perpetual discord, and their union could not subsist. But in the present harmony which naturally subsists between them, their different faculties tend to one common end; it is difficult to say which of them conduces the most to it: each follows the impulse of the other; each is obedient and both are masters.

As the conduct of a woman is subservient to the publick opinion, her faith in matters of religion should for that very reason be subject to authority. Every daughter ought to be of the same

same religion as her mother, and every wife to be of the religion of her husband: for, though such religion should be false, that docility which induces the mother and daughter to submit to the order of nature, takes away, in the sight of God, the criminality of their error. As they are not in a capacity to judge for themselves, they ought to abide by the decision of their fathers and husbands as confidently as by that of the church.

Women, being incapable of forming articles of faith for themselves, cannot confine them within the limits of evidence and reason; but permitting themselves to be led astray by a thousand foreign impulses, are always wide of the mark of truth. Always in extremes, they are either libertines or devotees: none of them being capable of uniting wisdom and piety.

As authority ought to regulate the religion of the women, it is not so needful to explain to them the reasons for their belief, as to lay down precisely the tenets they are to believe: for the creed, which presents only obscure ideas to the mind, is the source of fanaticism; and that which presents absurdities, leads to infidelity. I know not whether our present catechisms tend most to make people impious or fanatical; but I know they tend necessarily to one or the other.

In order to teach religion to young girls, we ought, in the first place, never to make it an object of sadness or restraint, never to impose it as a task or a duty: of course we should never oblige them to get any thing by heart not even
their

their prayers. Content yourself with regularly performing your devotions in their presence, without ever requiring them, however, to join with you. Let your prayers be short, after the example of Jesus Christ. Repeat them with proper solemnity and reverence; remembering that when we require the attention of the Supreme Being, we certainly ought ourselves to pay the utmost attention to what we say.

It is of less consequence that girls should be early, than that they should be fully and clearly, instructed in the articles of their religion, and particularly that they should be induced to take a delight in them. When you render them burdensome; when you represent God as always incensed at them; when you impose on them, in his name a number of disagreeable duties, which they see you give yourself no trouble to discharge; what can they think but that learning their catechism, and praying to God, are the duties only of little girls, and therefore they long to grow up, in order to be exempted, as you appear to be, from such disagreeable injunctions? —Example! It is example, without which nothing is to be done with children.

When you would explain to them the articles of their faith, let it be by direct instruction, and not in the way of question and answer. They ought never to reply otherwise than as they think; and not in terms dictated to them. All the answers in our catechisms are perverted; it is there the scholar who instructs the master: they are
even

even so many falsehoods in the mouths of children, because they thus take on them to explain what they do not understand, and affirm what they are in no capacity to believe. Nay, I should be glad to find those among the most intelligent of mankind, who do not lie abominably in saying their catechism.

The first question that presents itself in our catechism is this; *Who made you, and brought you into the world?* To which the child, though she believes all the while it was her mother, answers without hesitation, *God*. The only thing she finds in all this is, a question she can hardly understand, to which she makes an answer which she does not understand at all.

I could wish that some able person, who is well acquainted with the progress of the understanding in children, would write a proper catechism for them. It would be, perhaps, the most useful book that ever was penned, nor would it in my opinion be less to the honour of its author. This is very certain, that such a catechism, well executed, would very little resemble our's.

Such a design, however, would not be properly effected, unless the replies were such as a child might make to the questions proposed, without being verbally taught them. At the same time, it must be understood, that the child should find itself sometimes in a capacity to interrogate in its turn. To make the reader understand perfectly what I mean, it may not be improper to
give

give something of a specimen: I perceive, indeed, the difficulty of it; but shall try, at least, to trace a slight sketch of what I propose on this head.

I conceive, then, to begin with the first question of our catechism, it should commence nearly thus:

Nurse.—Do you remember, my dear, when your mama was a little girl.

Child.—No.

Nurse.—No! How so? You that have so good a memory!

Child.—I was not then come into the world.

Nurse.—Then you have not lived always in the world.

Child.—No.

Nurse.—And shall you always live here?

Child.—Yes.

Nurse.—Are you young or old?

Child.—I am young.

Nurse.—And your grand-mama, is she old or young?

Child.—She is old.

Nurse.—Was she ever young?

Child.—Yes.

Nurse.—And why is she not so still?

Child.—Because she is grown old.

Nurse.—Shall you grow old like her?

Child.—I don't know*.

Nurse.—

* Wherever I have made the child answer, *I don't know*, should she give a different answer, we should distrust what she said, and make her carefully explain herself.

Nurse.—Where is the robe you wore last year?

Child.—I have laid it aside.

Nurse.—And why laid it aside.

Child.—Because it was too little for me.

Nurse.—And why was it too little for you?

Child.—Because I am grown bigger.

Nurse.—Shall you still grow bigger?

Child.—Oh! yes.

Nurse.—And what do great girls come to?

Child.—They come to be women.

Nurse.—And what do they become then?

Child.—They become mothers.

Nurse.—And what do mothers grow?

Child.—They grow old.

Nurse.—You, then, will grow old.

Child.—Yes, when I shall be a mother.

Nurse.—And what becomes of people when they are old?

Child.—I don't know.

Nurse.—Why what is become of your grand-papa?

Child.—He is dead*.

Nurse.—

* The child might make this answer, because she had heard it so said; but it would be necessary to see whether she entertained any clear idea of death; for this idea is not so simple, nor so much within the capacity of children as might be imagined. In the poem of Abel, there is given an example of the method that should be taken to communicate this idea to the minds of children. This charming piece breathes a delightful simplicity, which cannot be too much imitated in our conversations with children.

Nurse.—And why did he die?

Child.—Because he was old.

Nurse.—You see then what becomes of people when they are old.

Child.—Yes, they die.

Nurse.—And you, when you grow old, must—

Child, interrupting her.—Oh! no, nurse; I will not die.

Nurse.—Nobody, child, is willing to die, and yet every body must.

Child.—What! must my mama die too?

Nurse.—Certainly, as well as every body else. Women grow old as well as men; and old age brings on death.

Child.—What must one do to make it a long time before one grows old.

Nurse.—Live prudently while one is young.

Child.—Then I will be always prudent, nurse.

Nurse.—So much the better; but after all, can you expect to live for ever?

Child.—When I am grown very, very old—

Nurse.—Well, what then?

Child.—Why, when one is so very old, you say one must die.

Nurse.—You, therefore, will die some time or other?

Child.—Ah! yes.

Nurse.—Who were they that lived before you?

Child.—My father and mother.

Nurse.—And who lived before them?

Child.—Their father and mother.

Nurse.—Who will live after you?

Child.—My children.

Nurse.—Who after them?

Child.—Their children, &c.

In pursuing this method, we trace out, by sensible inductions, a beginning and end of the human race; that is to say, we come by degrees to a father and mother who had neither father nor mother, and to children that will have no children.

It requires a long series of similar questions to prepare a child for understanding the first question in our common catechisms. But to pass on from that to the second answer, which is in a manner a definition of the divine essence; what a transition! When will the intermediate space be filled up! *God is a spirit!* And what is a spirit? shall I lead an infant into those metaphysical obscurities, from which men have taken so much pains to extricate themselves? It is not for a little girl to resolve such questions, it is even the utmost she can do to ask them; in which case I should answer her very simply: You ask me what is God? that question is not easy to resolve. God is not to be seen, heard, or felt; he is to be known only by his works. To form a judgement of what he is, wait till you know what he hath done.

If our tenets are all equally true, they are not all, for that reason, of equal importance. It is very indifferent to the glory of God, that it should be known to us in every circumstance;
but

but it is of great consequence to every member of society, that every man should know, and discharge, those obligations which are imposed on him by the laws of God respecting his neighbour and himself. These are what we ought constantly to teach each other; and are those in which fathers and mothers are bound, above all things, to instruct their children. That a virgin should become the mother of her Creator, and give birth to God, or only to a man united to the Divine Nature; that the substance of the Father and of the Son should be the same, or only similar; that the Holy Ghost should proceed from one of these two, or both conjointly; I do not see that the solution of these difficulties, however essential in appearance, are of any greater consequence to mankind, than it is to know what day of the moon we ought to celebrate Easter; whether we ought to feast or fast, speak Latin or French in church, adorn the walls with images, say or hear mass, marry, or have no woman of one's own. Let every one think of these matters as he pleases, I know not that it is of any consequence to others; at least, I am sure it is of no consequence to me. But what I am, indeed, interested in, as well as every individual of the human species, is, that every one should know that there exists a Supreme Arbiter over the destiny of all mankind, who commands us all to be just, to love each other, to be benevolent, merciful, and to fulfil our engagements with the world, and even with our

enemies, as well as with his; that the apparent happiness of this life is nothing; that there will be another life after this, in which the Supreme Being will reward the good and punish the wicked. These tenets, and others of the like import, are those which it is incumbent on us to teach youth, and to espouse on all occasions among our fellow-citizens.

Whoever opposes such sentiments as these deserves undoubtedly to be punished, as a disturber of the peace and an enemy to society. Whoever sets these aside, and would subject us to his own opinions, though he should purpose to arrive at the same point by different means, disturbs the peace also, in order to establish it in his own manner: he undertakes, with great presumption, to be the interpreter of the Deity, and exacts, in his name, the homage and respect of mankind; he erects himself, as far as he is able, into a Deity, or assumes the place of God. / Such a one ought to be punished for his sacrilege, if not as a persecutor.

Disregard, therefore, all those mysterious tenets, which consist only of words without ideas; all those whimsical doctrines, which usurp the place of morals in those who adopt them, and serve rather to make men vain than virtuous. Confine your children ever within the narrow circle of those doctrines, which relate to morality. Let them be well persuaded that there is nothing necessary for them to know, but that which teaches them to act aright. Make not
your

your daughters theologifts nor difputants; teach them nothing about the things of Heaven, but what relates to the cultivation of human prudence. Accuftom them to think themfelves always in the fight of the Deity; to reflect that he is constantly a witnefs of their actions, their thoughts, their pleasures; ufe them to do good without oftentation, becaufe it is pleafing to God; to fuffer without murmuring, becaufe he will recompence them; and, in fhort, to be, during every hour of their lives, fuch as they could wifh to be in that hour when they fhall all appear before him in judgement. Such is the true religion; fuch is that only which is not capable of being abufed, and admits neither of impiety nor fanaticifm. Let others preach up a religion more fublime; for my part, I fhall acknowledge none but this.

As for the reft, it is proper to obferve, that till girls arrive at the age, when their enlightened reafon or growing fentiment gives ufe to the dictates of confcience, they fhould be governed in their notions of good and evil entirely by the decifions of thofe who are about them. Whatever they are commanded to do, fhould be thought right, and what they are forbidden to do, wrong: they ought at prefent to know nothing farther than this: hence we fee of how much greater importance it is, that we fhould be careful in the choice of perfons to educate girls, than we are of thofe who take the charge of boys. At length, however, the time will come when even girls

will begin to judge for themselves, and when it will be necessary to diversify our plan of education.

I have, indeed, hitherto, perhaps, said too much. How low should we reduce the women, if we gave them no other laws than those of publick opinion? Let us not so far disparage that sex, which governs and doth honour to our's, when we do not debase it. There exists for the whole species, a rule prior to opinion. It is to the fixed and certain direction of that rule we should subject all others; it is the judge of prejudice itself, and it is not that the esteem in which men hold it agrees therewith, so much as that such esteem ought to give it authority with them.

This rule is that of innate sentiment. I shall not repeat what I have already said on that subject: it is sufficient to observe here, that, if these two rules do not concur in the education of women, it will be always defective. Sentiment, without regard to opinion, will not give them that delicacy of mind, which adds to virtue the approbation of the world; and a regard to opinion, without sentiment, will only make them false and deceitful, placing the appearances of virtue in the room of virtue itself.

It is of consequence to them, therefore, to cultivate a faculty which serves as an umpire between the two guides, preventing the mistakes of conscience, and correcting the errors of prejudice. This faculty is reason: but how many
queries

queries offer themselves at that word! Are women capable of solid reasoning? Is it of any use for them to cultivate their reason? Can they do it with any success? Is that cultivation expedient to the functions imposed on them? Is it compatible with that simplicity of manners which becomes the sex?

The various methods of comprehending and resolving these questions, occasion us to give into contrary extremes: some persons confining women to the business of knitting and needle-work among their domesticks, making them only upper servants of their husbands; while others, not content with confirming them in their own rights, excite them to usurp our's; for to permit them to be inferiour to us in those qualities which are more peculiar to their own sex, and to make them our equals in the qualities common to both, what is this but to transfer to women that superiority which nature hath given their husbands?

The motives which lead a man to the knowledge of his various duties is not very complicated; that which directs a woman to the knowledge of her duties is still more simple. That obedience and fidelity which she owes to her husband, that care and tenderness which is due to her children, are such natural and affecting consequences of her situation, that unless she is abandoned to an habitual depravity, she cannot revolt from those internal principles which influence her conduct, nor mistake her duty, while

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she retains that propensity which nature has implanted in her bosom.

I would not indiscriminately condemn the practice of confining a woman solely to the occupations of her sex, and leaving her in profound ignorance with respect to all other concerns: but in such case it is necessary that the publick morals should be very pure and simple, or that her manner of living should be extremely retired. In large cities, and in the midst of licentious men, such a woman would be easily seduced; her virtue would, on many occasions, be merely accidental; but this philosophick age requires a virtue which is at all times a proof against temptation. A woman ought to be sensible beforehand what may be said to her, and in what light it becomes her to consider it.

Besides, being subject to the opinion of men, she should study to merit their esteem: and she ought to be particularly anxious to acquire that of her husband; she should not only endeavour to make him love her person, but engage him to approve her conduct; she ought, in the eyes of the world, to justify the choice he has made, and derive honour to her husband, in consequence of the respect which is paid to his wife. But how should she accomplish these ends, if she is a stranger to our institutions, if she is ignorant of our customs and rules of decorum, if she is not acquainted with the sources of human judgment, nor with the passions by which it is determined? When she becomes sensible that she
must

must depend both on the dictates of her own conscience, and on the opinion of others, it is necessary that she should learn to compare these two rules of action, to reconcile them, and never to prefer the former but when they stand in opposition to each other. From hence she becomes a judge over her judges; she determines within herself when she ought to submit to them, and when she ought to reject their authority. Before she adopts or rejects their prejudices, she considers their weight; she learns to recur to their first source, to obviate them, and render them favourable to her principles: she is cautious never to incur censure, when her duty will allow her to avoid it. These purposes cannot be effected without enlarging her mind, and cultivating her reason.

By recurring constantly to first principles, I am furnished with a solution for every difficulty; I examine things as they are, I trace their causes, and in the end I find that whatever is, is right. I visit families, where the master and mistress jointly do the honours of the house. Both have had the same education, both equally polite, both endowed with the same taste and spirit, both inspired with the same desire to make their friends welcome, and to send every body away satisfied with their reception. The husband is assiduous, and attentive to every minute circumstance: he goes about to every one, and pays his respects to all. The lady keeps her seat; a little circle gathers around her, and

seems to conceal the rest of the company from her observation; nevertheless, nothing escapes her notice; no one departs to whom she has not addressed herself; she has omitted no pains to engage every one; she has said nothing to any individual but what is agreeable, and without breaking into the rules of decorum, the meanest of the company passes no more unnoticed than the highest. Dinner is brought up, and the company take their seats; the master, who knows his guests, will place them according to their ranks; the wife, though a stranger to them, will not mistake their quality. She will discover from their very looks, and their comportment, what is suitable to their station; and every one will be seated in the place he would himself choose. I will not say that no one is overlooked at table. Perhaps the master of the house, in making his round, may have remembered every one. But his wife guesses what you look at with pleasure, and presents it to you; even whilst she is speaking to the person who sits next to her, her eye is directed to the bottom of the table; she discerns those who do not eat because they have no appetite, and those who are afraid to help themselves, or to desire others to help them, because they are either awkward or bashful. When the cloth is taken away, every one imagines that all her attention has been paid to him; no one supposes that she has had time to eat a single morsel herself: whereas, in truth, she has eaten heartier than any one in the company.

When the guests are departed, and the discourse turns on the occurrences which have passed, the husband relates what has been said to him, and what they have said and done with whom he has conversed. If the wife is not always most exact in these particulars, yet on her side she has observed what was whispered at the other end of the salloon; she knows what such a one thought, and conjectures the meaning of such a discourse, or such a gesture; scarce any expressive emotion has been discovered, which she does not interpret, and generally with an exact conformity to truth.

The same turn of mind which makes woman of fashion excel in the art of entertaining company, makes a coquette expert in the art of amusing a number of admirers. It even requires a more exquisite discernment to excel in coquetry, than in politeness; for if a well-bred woman behaves politely to every one, she has done all that is required of her; but a coquette would soon lose her dominion by such an awkward uniformity. By endeavouring to oblige all her lovers she would offend them all. In company, an obliging behaviour to all never fails to please every one; as no one nicely scrutinizes to whom the preference has been given: but in love, a favour which is not exclusive is considered in the same light as a real injury. A man of sensibility had rather a hundred times be the only person ill-treated, than to be carressed with the crowd; for the most mortifying circumstance is not to

be distinguished. A woman, therefore, who would retain a number of lovers, should have the art to persuade every individual that she gives him the preference; and to persuade him into this opinion in the presence of all the rest, to whom she likewise insinuates the same persuasion, in his presence.

Would you behold a man utterly embarrassed? place him between two women, with each of whom he has a secret connexion, and then observe what a ridiculous appearance he will make. Place a woman under the same circumstances between two men (and the instance certainly is not more uncommon) you will be astonished with what address she will delude each, and make them in their turn, laugh at one another. But if this woman expressed the same confidence in each, and treated both with the same familiarity, how could they for a moment be duped by her artifice? By behaving equally to both, would she not discover that both had equal pretensions to her? But how much more artfully does she conduct herself! Far from using them alike, she affects to make a distinction between them; she manages so skilfully, that he whom she flatters thinks it proceeds from affection; and that he whom she slightes imagines that he is disregarded out of affectation. Thus each, content with his lot, imagines her constantly attentive to him, while, in fact, she is wholly taken up with herself.

The

The desire of pleasing every one suggests these expedients to coquettes; whose caprices would disgust if they were not skilfully managed; and it is by this artful conduct that they rivet the chains of their admiring slaves.

Ufa ogn'arte la donna, onde sia colto
Nella sua rete alcun novello amante;
Ne con tutti, ne sempre un stesso volto
Serba, ma cangia a tempo atto e sembante.

How is this art acquired, but by nice and constant observation, which every moment discovers to them what passes in men's bosoms, and enables them to apply to every secret feeling, sufficient power to suspend or accelerate the emotion? Is this art to be learned? No: it is born with women; they are all mistresses of it, and the men never possess it to so high a degree. This is one of the distinguishing characteristicks of the sex. A presence of mind, penetration, and acuteness of observation, constitute the science in which women excel; and the address, with which they make their advantage of these excellencies, is their peculiar talent.

This is the real case, and we have seen why it should be so. Is it said that women are deceitful? Their proper talent is address, not deceit. If you attend to the natural propensities of their sex, you will find that, even while they utter untruths, they are not deceitful. Why do you consult their lips, when it is not through them that nature speaks. Examine their eyes, their complexion, their swelling bosoms, their timid air,
5 their

their faint resistance : this is the language with which nature furnishes them. With their lips, they always say, No! as they ought; but they do not always pronounce that negative with the same accent; and the accent never deceives you. Have not women the same desires with men, without having the same right to express them? Their lot would be very hard, if they could not intimate their lawful desires by a kind of language full as significant as that which they dare not utter? Must their modesty render them unhappy? Is it not necessary that they should have the art of discovering their inclinations without expressing them? What skill is requisite to engage a man to ravish the favour, which they are ardent to grant? Of what consequence is it to them, to affect the hearts of men, without seeming to bestow a thought upon them? How beautifully expressive was the incident of Galathea's apple, and her affected flight? What could she say more? Should she have desired the shepherd to follow her among the willows, and have declared that she only ran away, with a view to be pursued? Had she said so she had deceived herself; for in that case, she would not have engaged him to follow her. The more reserved a woman is, the more address she should be mistress of, even with her husband. Yes, I will maintain, that by preserving coquetry within due bounds, it becomes both modest and sincere.

Virtue

Virtue is simple and uniform, one of my opponents has well observed; it cannot be decomposed to admit one part and reject another. When we love, we love in all its purity; and when we can avoid it, we do not suffer our hearts, and never our lips, to avow sentiments which we ought not to entertain. Moral truth is not what is, but what is proper; that which is evil, ought not to be, and should not be avowed, especially when the confession gives it an effect which it would not otherwise have had. If I were tempted to turn robber, and by confessing my propensity, I attempted to persuade another to be my accomplice, by declaring to him the temptation I am under, do not I in fact yield to it? Wherefore do you insist that modesty renders women deceitful? Are those who possess that virtue least, more friends to truth than the rest? Far from it; they are a thousand times more false. They do not arrive to that degree of depravity, but in consequence of vices which are common to them all, and which only triumph under the mask of intrigue and falsehood*. On the

* I know that those women who have publicly avowed their conduct on a certain delicate occasion, pretend to value themselves for their frankness, and protest that they are endowed with every estimable quality, that one excepted; but I know also, that they have never been able to persuade any but ideots into this opinion. When they have broken loose from the greatest restraint on their sex, what further remains to check them; and what virtue will they retain, when they have forfeited that, which is their peculiar characteristick? When once they have given scope

the contrary, they who are not yet lost to shame, who are not vain of their foibles, who know how to conceal their desires, even from those who inspire them, they, from whom confessions of this delicate nature are extorted with the greatest difficulty, are always the best friends to truth, sincerity, and integrity in all their connexions, and are those on whose fidelity we may in general most surely rely.

I know but one instance in contradiction to these observations, which is Madame del'Enclos. And Madame de l'Enclos has always been considered as a prodigy. Though she despised the virtues of her own sex, it is said that she preserved all the good qualities of our's; they boast of her sincerity, her integrity, the constancy of her attachments, and her fidelity in point of friendship. In short, to crown her reputation, they say that she became a perfect man: Be it so. But with all her vast reputation, I would no more choose such a man for my friend, than for my mistress.

All this is not so foreign from the purpose as it appears to be. I see to what end the maxims of this modern philosophy tend, while it turns into derision the modesty and pretended deceit of the sex; and I perceive the infallible consequence of this philosophy, which would deprive the women

to their passions, they have no longer any interest in resisting them, *Nec sœmina amissa pudicitia alia abnuerit.* No one was ever better acquainted with the human heart in both sexes than the authour of this sentiment.

men of our age of that little share of virtue which they have left.

From these considerations, I believe, we may, in general be able to determine what kind of culture is most suitable to female minds, and upon what objects we ought to turn their reflexions during their infancy.

I have already observed, that the duties of their sex are more easily known than practised. The first thing they should learn, is to be in love with their duty from a principle of interest; which is the only means to render it easy. Every station and every age has its peculiar duties. We are easily acquainted with them, provided we do but love them. Respect your condition as a woman, and whatever station Providence thinks proper to allot you, you will always be a woman of virtue. The essential point is to be what nature formed us, we are always too propense to be what the world would wish us.

Researches into abstract and speculative truths, the principles and axioms of sciences, in short, every thing which tends to generalize our ideas, is not the proper province of women; their studies should be relative to points of practice; it belongs to them to apply those principles which men have discovered; and it is their part to make observations, which direct men to the establishment of general principles. All the ideas of women, which have not the immediate tendency to points of duty, should be directed to the study
of

of men, and to the attainment of those agreeable accomplishments which have taste for their object; for as to works of genius, they are beyond their capacity: neither have they sufficient precision or power of attention to succeed in sciences which require accuracy: and as to physical knowledge, it belongs to those only who are most active, most inquisitive; who comprehend the greatest variety of objects; in short, it belongs to those who have the strongest powers, and who exercise them most, to judge of the relations between sensible beings and the laws of nature. A woman who is naturally weak, and does not carry her ideas to any great extent, knows how to judge and make a proper estimate of those movements which she sets to work, in order to aid her weakness; and these movements are the passions of men. The mechanism she employs is much more powerful than our's; for all her levers move the human heart. She must have the skill to incline us to do every thing which her sex will not enable her to do of herself, and which is necessary or agreeable to her; therefore she ought to study the mind of man thoroughly, not the mind of man in general, abstractedly, but the disposition of the men about her, the disposition of those men to whom she is subject, either by the laws of her country, or by the force of opinion. She should learn to penetrate into their real sentiments from their conversation, their actions, their looks and gestures. She should also have the art, by her own conversation,

fation; actions, looks, and gestures, to communicate those sentiments which are agreeable to them, without seeming to intend it. Men will argue more philosophically about the human heart; but women will read the heart of man better than they. It belongs to women, if I may be allowed the expression, to form an experimental morality, and to reduce the study of man to a system. Women have most wit, men have most genius; women observe, men reason; from the concurrence of both we derive the clearest light and the most perfect knowledge, which the human mind is, of itself, capable of attaining: in one word, from hence we acquire the most intimate acquaintance both with ourselves and others, of which our nature is capable; and it is thus that art has a constant tendency to perfect those endowments which nature has bestowed.

The world is the book of women; if they do not read well it is their own fault, or some passion blinds them. Nevertheless, a true mistress of a family, is not less a recluse in her own house, than a nun in her convent. Therefore before a young virgin is married, we ought to act with regard to her, as they do, or at least ought to do, towards those who are to be confined in nunneries; that is, we should show them the pleasures they are to quit, before we suffer them to renounce them, lest the false idea of pleasures to which they are strangers, should mislead their minds, and interrupt the felicity of their retirement. In France, young ladies
live

live in nunneries, and wives go abroad in the world. Among the ancients it was just the reverse; the maidens, as I have observed, were indulged with entertainments and publick festivals; but wives lived retired. This custom was more rational, and had a better tendency to preserve morals. A kind of coquetry is allowed to young girls who are unmarried; their grand concern is to amuse themselves. But wives have other employment at home, and they are no longer in pursuit of husbands; but such a reformation would not be for their interest, and unhappily they lead the fashion. Mothers, however, make companions of your daughters! cultivate in them a just understanding and an honest heart, and then hide nothing from them which a chaste eye may view without offense. Balls, entertainments, publick fights, even theatres; every thing which, seen improperly, delights indiscreet youth, may without danger be presented to the eye of prudence. The more they are conversant with these tumultuous pleasures, the sooner they will be disgusted with them.

But I hear the clamour arising against me! What girl is capable of resisting such dangerous examples? They have no sooner seen the world, than their heads are turned with every object; not one of them will resolve to quit it. Perhaps this may be the case; but before you have shown them this deceitful picture, have you prepared them to view it without emotion? Have you acquainted them beforehand
with

with the objects it represents? Have you described them such as they really are? Have you armed them against the illusions of vanity? Have you inculcated into their tender minds a relish for true pleasures, which are not to be found in these tumultuous scenes? What measures, what precautions have you used to preserve them from that false taste which misleads them? So far from having opposed any principles against the prevalence of publick prejudices, you have rather nourished them. You have previously made them enamoured with those frivolous amusements they meet with. You make them more in love with them, by affording them an opportunity of devoting themselves to them. Young girls, at their first entrance into the world, have seldom any other governess than their mother, who is often more silly than they, and who cannot show them objects in any other light, than such in which they behold them themselves. Her example, more efficacious than reason itself, justifies them in their own eyes; and the authority of a mother is an unanswerable plea for a daughter. When I propose that a mother should introduce her daughter to the world, it is upon the supposition that she will represent it to her such as it is.

The evil begins still earlier. Convents are, in fact, schools of coquetry; not of that honest coquetry of which I have just spoken, but of that which produces all the extravagancies in women, and makes them the most ridiculous of all

all coquettes. When they quit the convents, to enter all at once into mixed assemblies, young girls find themselves where they could wish. They have been educated for such society, and is it to be wondered that they are fond of it? I am cautious of advancing what I am going to say, for fear I should mistake a prejudice for an observation; but it seems to me, that, generally speaking, in protestant countries, women have stronger attachments to their families, make more amiable wives and more tender mothers than in catholick countries; and if this be the case, there is no doubt but that the difference in part arises from the education at convents.

To love a tranquil and domestick life, we ought to be well acquainted with it; we should have experienced the sweets of it from our infancy. It is in the house of our parents that we must contract a relish for our own family, and every woman who has not been educated by her mother, will not choose to bring up her own children. Unhappily private education is banished from great cities. Society is become so general, and so intermixed, that there is no asylum left for retirement, and we even live in publick at our own houses. In consequence of associating with all the world, we have no longer any family, and we scarce know our relations; we see them as strangers; and the simplicity of domestick manners is lost, together with that agreeable familiarity which constitutes its principal charm. Thus we imbibe with our very milk
a relish

relish for the pleasures of the age, and of the maxims which prevail in the world.

Parents impose an outward restraint on their daughters, in hopes to meet with dupes who will marry them from their appearance. But examine these young girls attentively for a moment. Under an affected air of constraint, they do but ill disguise the eager desires which prey upon them; and you may already read in their eyes their violent inclination to imitate their mothers. But they do not covet a husband; they only long for the license of matrimony. What occasion can they have for a husband, when they may have so many lovers? But they stand in need of a husband as a cover to their intrigues*. Modesty is in their looks, but licentiousness in their hearts: That affected modesty is a symptom of it. They affect it only to get rid of it the sooner. Ladies of Paris and London, pardon me, I entreat you. Miracles are not excepted in any place, but for my own part I am not acquainted with any; and if there be a single individual among you who has a mind thoroughly virtuous, then I am a stranger to the manners of the times.

All our different modes of education equally give young people a relish for the pleasures of high life, and foment the passions which result from that taste. In great cities, depravity is
coeval

* The way of a man in his youth, was one of the four things which the wise Solomon could not comprehend: the fifth was the impudence of an adulteress, *Quæ comedit, & tergens os suum, dicit; non sum operata malum.* PROV. xxx. 20.

coeval with existence, and it begins in infants before the dawn of reason. Young country girls, who are taught to despise the happy simplicity of a rural life, are eager to visit Paris, and to partake of our depravity. The acquirement of vices under the specious name of accomplishments, is the sole object of their journey; and being ashamed, on their arrival, to find themselves so far behind the town ladies in point of boundless licentiousness, they make great haste to distinguish themselves in their turn. Where, in your opinion, does the evil commence? In the place where it was first projected, or in that where it was put in execution?

I do not say that a discreet mother should bring her daughter out of the country, on purpose to show her these scenes which are so pernicious to many; but I say that if she were to bring her to town, yet the girl must have been very indifferently educated, or there will be very little danger in her beholding these scenes. To those who are endowed with taste, good sense, and a love of virtue, they are not so attractive, as they are to such as suffer themselves to be captivated with them. One may see at Paris, young giddy creatures, who come thither in haste to catch the manner of the place, and to put themselves in the fashion for six months, in order to become despicable the rest of their lives; but few people take notice of those, who, disgusted with this noisy empty show, return into the country, well satisfied with their condition,
after

ter having compared it with that which is so much envied by others. How many young ladies have I known brought up to town by tender mothers, and at liberty to fix their abode here, who have declined it themselves, have gone back much more willingly than they came; and, at taking leave of the town, have pathetically said; Oh! let us return to our little cot! We live much happier there, than in palaces here! No one knows how many good girls there are still, who have not bowed the knee before the idol, and who despise the senseless adoration paid to it. Fools only choose to be talked of, discreet women to pass unobserved.

But if, notwithstanding the general depravity, notwithstanding the reigning prejudices, notwithstanding the improper education of girls, there are yet some who preserve a sound understanding, what a figure would they make if that understanding was cultivated by suitable instructions, or, to speak more properly, if their good understanding was not corrupted by bad instructions; for every thing consists in preserving or restoring the natural affections? It is not requisite for this purpose to tire young girls with tedious sermons, nor to read them dry lessons of morality. Dull moral discourses are, in both sexes, the bane of all good education. Melancholy precepts naturally excite their aversion, both against those who inculcate them, and against every thing they say. There is no need, in giving instruction to youth, to make them

afraid of what is their duty, nor to add weight to that yoke which nature has imposed. In explaining their duty to them, our manner should be clear and familiar; we ought not to make them imagine that there is any trouble in discharging their duty; nor should we put on a morose and austere countenance. Every sensation the heart may entertain, should have free vent; their moral catechism should be as clear and as concise as their religious catechism, but it ought not to be quite so solemn. Show them that the source of all their pleasures, and the foundation of all their rights, is derived from the discharge of their duties. Is there any hardship in loving, in order to conciliate affection; in endeavouring to render ourselves amiable, in order to be happy; in endeavouring to procure esteem, in order to be obeyed; in respecting ourselves, in order to acquire respect? How delightful are these privileges! how respectable they are! how cordially do men prize them, when a woman knows how to render them estimable! She need not wait for years, nor expect old age before she attains the enjoyment of them. Her empire is attendant on her virtues; her charms no sooner display themselves, than she reigns triumphant in the gentleness of her disposition, and her modesty renders her sway absolute. What man, however brutal and insensible, does not abate his ferocity, and affect more engaging manners, when he finds himself in company with a young girl of sixteen, who is amiable and discreet; who
says

says little, but is attentive; who preserves decency in her deportment, and decorum in her conversation; whose beauty does not make her unmindful of her sex nor of her youth; who, by her bashfulness, interests every one in her favour, and draws that respect to herself which she pays to the company.

These effects, though external, are by no means frivolous; they do not result altogether from the charms of sense; they proceed from an inward conviction that women are the natural judges of the merit of men. Who would choose that women should despise him? No one whatever; not even he, who has determined to renounce them. And do you imagine that even I, who tell them such severe truths, am indifferent about their opinion? No, Readers, you, who are often more effeminate than they, I prefer their judgement to your's. While I despise their manners, I will yet do honour to their justice: their resentment does not affect me, if I can but obtain their esteem.

What great things might be accomplished from this principle, if we knew how to enforce it! Woe be to the age, wherein women lose their influence, and their judgements are disregarded by men! — It is the last stage of depravity. All civilized people, have paid due regard to women. Reflect on Sparta, reflect on the Germans, reflect on Rome; Rome, the seat of glory and of virtue, if ever they had place on earth. It was there, that the women ho-

noured the exploits of the renowned generals, that they publicly wept over the fathers of their country, that their vows or lamentations were held sacred, as the most solemn judgements of the republick. All the grand revolutions were brought about by women: through a woman Rome obtained liberty; through a woman, the Plebeians acquired the consulship; a woman put an end to the tyranny of the Decemvirs; by means of women, Rome, when on the brink of destruction, was screened from the resentment of an enraged and victorious outlaw. Ye French gallants, what would you have said had you beheld that procession, so ridiculous in the eyes of you men of raillery? You would have held it in derision. With what different eyes we regard the same objects! And perhaps we are all in the right. For let the train be composed of French women, and I can conceive nothing more indecent: let it be made up of Roman ladies, and we should all have the eyes of the Volsci, and the heart of Coriolanus.

I will go farther, and maintain that virtue is not less favourable to love, than to the other rights of nature, and that it strengthens the influence of a mistress, as much as that of a wife or a mother. There is no true love without enthusiasm, and no enthusiasm without an object of perfection either real or imaginary. What can transport those lovers, who have no idea of this perfection, and who regard the object of their affections only with an eye of sensuality? No,
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it is not by such considerations that the soul is transported, and devoted to those sublime raptures which make lovers delirious, and render their passion enchanting. Love, I confess, is all illusion; but the sentiment of true beauty with which it inspires us, and makes us enamoured, is real. This beauty is not in the object we doat on; it is the offspring of our own delusion. Be it so. What then? Are we less forward to sacrifice every ungenerous sentiment to this ideal model of perfection? Do the virtues we attribute to the beloved object, make the less impression on our minds? Do we endeavour the less to detach ourselves from the mean selfishness of human nature? Where is the true lover, who is not ready to sacrifice his life to his mistress? and how can the man who would even resign his life, entertain a gross and sensual passion? We make a jest of knights errant! because they had a true sense of love, and we are slaves to sensuality. When these romantick principles first became ridiculous, the ridicule was not so much the result of reason as of depravity.

In all ages, the natural relations of things remain the same; the agreement or disagreement which result from them are the same; prejudices, under the specious title of reason, only alter their appearance. It will always be great and noble to have a command of ourselves, though it is only in obedience to fantastick notions; and the real motives of honour will always affect the

mind of a discreet woman, who knows how to make her condition instrumental to the happiness of life. Chastity must be a delightful virtue in the estimation of a fine woman, who has any elevation of soul. While she beholds all the world at her feet, she triumphs over all, and over herself; she erects a throne in her own breast, at which all the world pays adoration; the affectionate or jealous, though yet respectful, sentiments of the two sexes, the general esteem of others, and her own self-approbation, incessantly furnish her with the tribute of glory, in recompence of a few momentary conflicts. Her self-denials are but transitory, the reward of them is permanent; what enjoyment must the pride of virtue, joined with that of beauty, afford to a generous mind! Suppose a heroine in romance to be a real character, and she would taste more exquisite delights than Lais or Cleopatra; and when her beauty fades, her glory and delight will still remain: such an one alone is capable of enjoying the time past.

The more difficult and arduous our duties are, the more powerful and persuasive the arguments ought to be on which they are founded. There is a certain solemn stile, with which we constantly din the ears of youth, on the most serious subjects, without producing any persuasion in their minds. From this language so unsuitable to their ideas, and from the little regard they pay to it in private, arises that facility with which they give way to their inclinations, for want of
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being furnished with reasons to resist them, drawn from the nature of things themselves. A girl, prudently and religiously educated, is undoubtedly furnished with powerful weapons against temptations; but one whose mind, or rather whose ears, are only pestered with a mysterious jargon, will infallibly fall a prey to the first ingenious seducer who attempts to delude her. A young and beautiful creature will never despise her person; she will never be sincerely afflicted on account of the great crimes which her beauty may give birth to; she will never seriously, and in the face of Heaven, lament that she is an object of desire; she will never be persuaded in her own mind, that the most tender feeling of the heart is an invention of the devil. Furnish her with other reasons, which may sink deep in her mind, and which may affect herself; for those I have just now enumerated will make no impression on her. The effect will be still worse, if, as is generally the case, we perplex her with contradictory ideas; and after having mortified her, by depreciating her person and her charms as so many sinful blemishes, we afterwards attempt to make her respect that very person, which we have endeavoured to render contemptible, as the temple of Jesus Christ. Ideas too sublime or too low are equally insufficient, and can never associate: we ought to use arguments better adapted to their sex and to their age. The consideration of duty has no longer any

M 4

influence,

influence, than while it is accompanied with motives which induce us to discharge it.

Quæ quia non liceat non facit, illa facit.

No one can be at a loss to know that it is Ovid who pronounces this severe judgement.

Would you inspire young girls with a love of morality? Instead of telling them continually, "Be discreet," show them that it is their interest to be so; make them acquainted with the value of discretion, and you will make them in love with it. It is not sufficient, however, to present this interest to their view at a distance; convince them of their present advantage, with regard to the circumstances of their age, and with respect to the characters of their lovers. Describe to them the man of worth, the man of merit; teach them to know him, to love him, and to love him for their own sakes; persuade them that such a man alone is capable of making them happy, either as friends, wives, or mistresses. Introduce virtue under the guidance of reason; make them sensible that the dominion of their sex, and all their prerogatives, do not depend entirely on their own good conduct, their own morals, but likewise on those of the men; that they can have no sure dependence on mean and groveling souls, and that a man is only qualified to oblige his mistress, in proportion as he is subservient to virtue. Take care likewise that in describing the manners of the present age, you at the same time inspire your daughter with

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a sincere aversion to them: by giving her a true description of our modish people you will teach her to despise them; you will render her averse to their maxims, give her a dislike to their sentiments, and a contempt for their idle gallantries; you will excite in her a more noble ambition, that of reigning over strong and vigorous minds, that which inspired the women of Sparta, who boasted that they ruled over *men*. A forward, audacious, and intriguing woman, who knows no other method of alluring lovers, but by coquetry, nor of preserving them but by repeated favours, makes them obey her like lacqueys on trifling and servile occasions, but in serious and weighty matters she has no authority over them. But a woman who is virtuous, amiable, and discreet, who obliges her lovers to respect her, one who has reserve and modesty, in a word, one who supports love by esteem, will, by a single motion, send them to the farthest part of the world, to battle, to glory, to death, in short, wherever she pleases: such an empire in my opinion is glorious, and is well worth the pains of purchasing*.

M 5

It

* Brantome tells us, that, in the time of Francis the First, a young lady who was troubled with a prating lover, imposed upon him an absolute and unlimited silence, which he observed so religiously for two years together, that every one concluded that he had lost his speech by some distemper. One day, at a crowded assembly, his mistress, who in those days, when love was made in private, was not known as such, boasted that she would cure him instantly, and effected it by this single word, *speak*. Is there

It is with this turn of mind, that Sophia has been educated, with great attention but without trouble, and rather by indulging her taste than by restraining it. Let us now give a short description of her person, according to the picture I gave Emilius, and according to what he himself conceives of the woman who alone can make him happy.

I cannot too often repeat that I do not deal in prodigies. Emilius is not one, neither is Sophia. Emilius is a man, and Sophia is a woman; this is all their glory. Amidst the confusion of sexes which prevails at present, it is almost a prodigy to be of that which Nature has formed us.

Sophia is a woman of family, and of a good disposition; she has a heart easily affected, and her exquisite sensibility sometimes gives her a sprightliness of imagination which is difficult to be controlled. Her understanding is less judicious than acute; her temper easy, but nevertheless unequal; her figure nothing extraordinary, but agreeable: she has a countenance which gives earnest of a soul, and does not deceive you. You may accost her with indifference, but you cannot leave her without emotion. Others are endowed with good qualities in which she is deficient; others possess those which she is mistress of,

not something great and heroick in such a passion? What could the Pythagorean philosophy, with all its parade, do more? What woman in these times could command such a silence for a single day, though she were to pay ever so dear for it?

of, in greater perfection; but none have qualities better blended to form a complete character. She knows how to make her defects turn to her advantage, and if she was more perfect she would be much less agreeable.

Sophia is not beautiful; but when the men are near her, they neglect the handsome women, and the beauties are dissatisfied with themselves. She is scarce tolerable at first sight, but the more you see her, the more lovely she appears; she improves by that which impairs others, and what she gains, she never loses. Many may boast finer eyes, handsomer mouth, a more commanding figure; but no one can have a better turned shape, a fairer complexion, a whiter hand, a more delicate foot, a more benign aspect, a more bewitching countenance. Without dazzling she engages, she charms, and no one can tell how.

Sophia loves dress, and understands it; her mother has no waiting woman but her; she has a fine taste in displaying herself to advantage, but she has an aversion to rich clothes. In her dress, you always see simplicity united with elegance; she is not fond of what glitters, but of what is becoming. She is a stranger to what colours are in fashion, but she knows exactly what suit her complexion. No young lady seems to have bestowed less thought about dress, and yet there is no one whose apparel is more studied; not a part of her attire is taken at random, and yet art is no where conspicuous. Her dress is extremely

modest in appearance, and yet very coquettish in fact: she does not make a display of her charms, she conceals them; but in concealing them, she knows how to affect your imagination. Every one who sees her, will say, There is a modest and discreet girl; but while you are near her, your eyes and affections wander all over her person, so that you cannot withdraw them; and you would conclude, that every part of her dress, simple as it seems, was only put in its proper order to be taken to pieces by the imagination.

Sophia has fine natural talents; she is conscious of them, and has not neglected them; but not having had it in her power to cultivate them with any extraordinary art, she contents herself with exercising her sweet voice in singing with justness and taste, and with using her little feet in walking gently and gracefully, and in making her compliments in every attitude without constraint or awkwardness. Nevertheless, she has had no singing-master but her father, no one to instruct her in dancing but her mother, and an organist in the neighbourhood has given her some lessons on the harpsichord, which she has improved by her own genius. At first she only thought of displaying her hand to advantage on those black keys; afterwards she found that the sharp tone of the harpsichord rendered her voice more mellow, till at length she acquired a sense of harmony. As she grew up, she became susceptible of the charms of expression, and to love
musick

musick for itself. But it is rather her taste than her talent; she does not know how to decypher a single tune by the notes.

That in which Sophia excels most, and in which she has been most carefully instructed, is the proper occupation of her sex, but such as one would not think of, that is, cutting out and making up her clothes. There is not any kind of needle-work in which she is not well skilled, and in which she does not take delight; but the work which she prefers to all others is making of lace, because there is no other which throws the person into such an agreeable attitude, and where the fingers are employed with more grace and activity. She has likewise applied herself to all the branches of house-keeping; she attends the kitchen and the pantry; she knows the price of goods, and is a judge of their quality; she understands keeping of accounts very well, and serves her mother by way of house steward. Being destined to become the mother of a family herself, in managing her father's house she learns to take care of her own; she knows how to supply the duties of the several domesticks, and does it with chearfulness. No one can properly give orders about concerns of which they are ignorant themselves; it is for this reason that her mother employs her thus. As for Sophia, she does not extend her views so far. Her principal duty is that of a daughter, and it is the only one at present which she thinks of fulfilling. Her sole view is to be serviceable to her mother, and
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to relieve her from part of her fatigue. It is true, nevertheless, that she does not perform all her duties with the same pleasure. For example, though she is a little epicure, she is not fond of the kitchen; she always finds something in it which offends her neatness. Her delicacy in these points is extreme; and she has carried it to such excess, that it is become one of her defects: she had rather let the dinner fall into the fire, than soil her ruffle. She would never superintend the garden for the same reason; the soil appears to her too dirty, and she is offended at the smell of a dunghill.

This failing arises from her mother's instructions. According to her, neatness is one of the principal perfections of a woman; a particular and indispensable duty enjoined by nature: there cannot be a more disgusting object than a flatteringly woman, and a husband cannot be blamed for disliking her. She has so continually preached up this duty to her daughter from her very infancy; she has required so much neatness about her person, about her clothes, her apartment, her work, her toilet, that this attention, being grown into a habit, takes up a great part of her time, and is always uppermost in every thing she does; so that with her, doing things well, is but a secondary concern; her principal concern is to do them neatly.

Nevertheless, this foible has not degenerated into a ridiculous effeminacy or vain affectation; she does not admit any of the refinements of

luxury. Nothing but plain water ever enters her apartment; she is a stranger to all perfumes but flowers, and her husband will never find any thing more fragrant than her breath. But the attention she bestows on her person, does not make her forget that her life should be devoted to more noble employment. She is not acquainted with, or she despises, that extravagant delicacy of person which sullies the mind. Sophia is more than neat, she is spotless.

I have said that Sophia was a little epicure. She was so naturally; but by habit she is grown temperate, which habit is now become a confirmed virtue. It is not with girls as it is with boys, who may, to a certain degree, be governed by their voracious appetites. Such a propensity is of consequence to women, and is of too dangerous a nature not to be opposed. When Sophia was in her childhood, if she could get alone into her mother's closet, she never returned empty, for she was not proof against sugar-plumbs and sweetmeats. Her mother discovered her, reprimanded her, punished her, and made her fast. She persuaded her at last that sweetmeats spoiled the teeth, and that eating too much would make her clumsy. Thus Sophia corrected herself. As she grew up, she contracted a taste for other things, which diverted her from that groveling appetite. In women, as well as men, when once the mind is actuated, gluttony has no longer any ascendancy. Sophia has preserved a taste most suitable to her sex; she is fond of
milk.

milk-meats, pastry, and little dainties, but scarce eats any meat; and she has never tasted wine or any strong liquors. Moreover, she eats very sparingly; her sex, not being so laborious as our's, has less need of refreshment. She loves what is good of the kind, and knows how to relish it; but she can dispense with what is not quite so nice, without being uneasy.

Sophia has an understanding which is agreeable without being brilliant, and solid without being profound; an understanding which no one takes particular notice of, because none observe her to have more or less than themselves. She has always the art of pleasing those who converse with her, though her conversation is not embellished according to the idea we form of an accomplished woman; for her ideas are not acquired by reading, but by conversing with her father and mother, by her own observations, and by the remarks she has made in the little company she has seen. Sophia has a natural gaiety; she was even a romp in her childhood; but her mother took care to restrain her giddiness, by degrees, lest she should happen to fail of receiving timely notice when its total suppression should become necessary. She, therefore, became modest and reserved, before it was requisite for her to be mistress of those qualities; and now that the time is come, it is easier for her to practise the habit she has contracted, than it would be for her to acquire it, without exposing the reason for such an alteration in her behaviour.

viour. It is pleasant to observe her sometimes give way to the vivacity of her youth, and then of a sudden recollect herself,* become silent, look down, and blush. The intermediate space between childhood and womanhood should partake of the disposition of each.

Sophia has too exquisite a sensibility to be always even tempered; but she has too much gentleness to let her sensibility be troublesome to others; it is herself only that she makes uneasy. If you say a word to vex her, she never pouts, but her heart swells; and she withdraws, in order to vent her tears. But if her father or mother call to her in the midst of her weeping, and say but a single word, she endeavours in an instant to stifle her sobbing, she dries her eyes, and comes in smiling and chearful.

Neither is Sophia altogether free from caprice. Her humour, when carried too far, degenerates into obstinacy, and then she is apt to forget herself; but give her time to recollect, and her manner of atoning for her foible renders it almost a merit. If she is punished, she is docile and submissive, and you may perceive that her shame arises not from the sense of correction, but of her fault. If you take no notice of her foibles, she never fails to correct them herself; but with so much ingenuity, and with such a good grace, that it is impossible to harbour any resentment against her. She would ask pardon of the meanest domestick, without being mortified by her humility; and when she is forgiven, the joy

joy she discovers, and the caresses she bestows, show from what a weight her tender heart is relieved. In a word, she patiently endures the injuries she receives, and is ready to repair those she undesignedly offers. Such is the amiable disposition of the sex before we have corrupted it. Woman was formed to yield to man, and even to bear with his injustice. You will never bring boys to such a submission. In them, an inward sentiment swells, and revolts against injustice; Nature did not form them to endure it.

*gravem
Pelidæ stomachum cedere nescii.*

Sophia is religious, but her religion is simple and rational, burthened with few of the dogmas, and less with the ceremonies of devotion; or rather being a stranger to any essential point of practice but morality, she entirely devotes her life to the service of God, by doing good. In all the instructions which her parents have given her on this subject, they have always accustomed her to a respectful submission, by saying to her, "My dear, these are points of knowledge not suitable to your age; your husband will instruct you in good time." In short, instead of holding long pious discourses, they have been content to make their own example serve her as lessons, and that example is deeply imprinted in her mind.

Sophia is enamoured of virtue; that love is become her reigning passion. She is fond of it because there is nothing so lovely as virtue; she
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is fond of it because virtue constitutes the glory of a woman, and that a woman of virtue, in her estimation, is equal to an angel; she loves virtue as the only road to true felicity, and because she sees nothing but misery, misfortune, and ignominy, in the life of an abandoned woman. In a word, she loves virtue as it is dear to her honoured father, to her worthy and affectionate mother. Not content with the happiness they derive from their own virtue, they wish for an increase of felicity from the virtues of their daughter, and her prime felicity consists in the hope of making them happy. These sentiments inspire her with an enthusiasm which exalts her mind, and keep all meaner propensities in subjection to so noble a passion. Sophia will be chaste and virtuous to her latest breath: she has made the vow from the bottom of her heart; she made it at a time when she already felt how much it would cost her to preserve it inviolable; she made it at a time when she might be tempted to revoke the engagement, if she had been formed to live under the dominion of the passions.

Sophia is not like one of those lovely French damsels, who are cold by constitution, and coquettish through vanity; who are more desirous of being brilliant than agreeable; and are more studious of amusement than pleasure. The want of an object on which to fix her affections preys upon her mind; it disturbs and makes her uneasy in the midst of amusements; she

she has lost her wonted sprightlinefs; innocent pastimes no longer please her; far from dreading the gloom of solitude, she courts it: there her imagination paints the man who alone can render it delightful. Persons that are indifferent are displeasing to her; she does not desire admirers, but wishes for a lover: she had rather please one worthy man, and be always agreeable to him, than to be a reigning toast to-day, and be despised to-morrow.

The understanding of women sooner arrives at perfection than that of men; acting upon the defensive, almost from their infancy, and being entrusted with a charge difficult to be preserved, they gain an earlier acquaintance with good and evil. Sophia, whose natural constitution makes her forward in every thing, has likewise a riper judgement than is common to girls of her age. There is nothing extraordinary in this: the age of maturity is not in all persons the same.

Sophia is acquainted with the duties and prerogatives of her own sex and of our's: she knows the failings of men, and the vices of women; neither is she a stranger to their qualities and opposite virtues, and she has them all imprinted in her mind. It is impossible to have a higher conception of a virtuous woman, than she has formed to herself, and yet the idea does not alarm her: but she reflects with greater complacency on the honest man, and the man of merit; she is sensible that she is formed for such a man, that she is worthy of him, that she can repay him the
felicity

felicity she may receive from him; she is persuaded that she knows how to discern such an one; she only wishes to find him out.

Women are the proper judges of merit in men, as we are of merit in them: it is the reciprocal privilege of the sexes, and each is sensible of it. Sophia knows and uses her prerogative, but with a modesty becoming her age, her inexperience, and her situation: she does not judge of things beyond her capacity; and she never offers her judgement, but when it is necessary to explain some useful maxim. She never speaks of absent persons but with great circumspection, especially of her own sex. She is of opinion that women become satyrical and detracting, by talking about each other: while they confine themselves to speak of the men, they do us justice. Sophia, therefore, is silent with regard to the women, of whom she never speaks, but to publish something to their advantage; it is a respect which she thinks due to her sex: and as for those of whom she can say no good, she says but little, and her reserve is understood.

Sophia is not much acquainted with the world; but she is obliging, and does every thing with a good grace. A happy disposition supplies the place of a great deal of art. She is mistress of a kind of politeness, which does not consist in ceremony, which does not depend on fashions, nor change with them; which is not regulated by custom, but proceeds from a sincere desire of pleasing, and is always agreeable. She
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is a stranger to frivolous compliments, and does not study mere formal ones. She will not tell you, that she is infinitely obliged—that you do her a great deal of honour—she will not desire you not to take the trouble, &c. Much less is she studious of giving fine turns to her expressions. To the common forms of civility, she replies only by a courtesy, or by simply saying, *I thank you*: but such a reply from her is an encouragement to pay further attention to her. If you do her a real service, she thanks you from her heart, and does not esteem it a mere compliment. She has never suffered the French fashion to subject her to the power of grimace, such as presenting her hand, in passing from one room to another, to an old man of sixty, whom she would rather support. When a perfumed gallant offers her such an impertinent service, she rejects the offer of his officious arm, and tells him she is not a cripple. In fact, though she is not tall, she would never wear high heels; her feet are small enough to dispense with them.

She not only maintains a decent silence and respect among women, but likewise among married men, or such as are older than herself; she will never seat herself above them, but out of obedience; and takes her place below them, as soon as she has an opportunity; for she is sensible, that the privileges of age are beyond those of sex, as having the presumption of wisdom in their favour, which ought to be respected above every thing.

Among

Among young people of her own age, her behaviour is otherwise: a different air is requisite to engage respect; and she knows how to assume it, without departing from that modesty which becomes her. If her company is modest and reserved, she will readily entertain them with the agreeable familiarity of youth; their innocent discourse will be frivolous, but decent: if the conversation takes a serious turn, she would have it tend to some real use; if it grows insipid, she will soon put an end to it; for above all things she despises the prattle of gallantry, as an affront to her sex. She is sensible, that the man whom she would prefer would be above such jargon, and she never willingly endures that behaviour in any one, which would not become the man whose character she has imprinted deeply in her mind. The high notion she has of the prerogatives of her sex, that haughtiness of mind which she derives from the purity of her sentiments, that energy of virtue which she feels in her heart, and which renders her respectable in her own opinion, incline her to receive with indignation those whining love-tales, with which many think to amuse her: she does not indeed receive them with any apparent resentment, but with an ironical approbation, which disconcerts her gallants, and with an indifference they never expected. Let a young fop display his witticisms, let him show his vivacity in applauding her *bon mots*, in commending her beauty, her graces, in expatiating on the inestimable happiness

ness of being agreeable to her, she would interrupt him with this polite reprimand: "Sir, I fancy that I am better acquainted with these matters than you are; if we have nothing more interesting to talk of, I believe we may close the conversation here." It is nothing to her, to accompany such a reprimand with a low courtesy, and thus in an instant to get rid of her admirer. Ask any of your smart fellows, whether it is an easy matter to display their talents to a girl of so perverse a turn?

We must not suppose, nevertheless, that she is not fond of being praised, provided that the commendation is sincere, and that she is persuaded you really think as well as you speak of her. To appear affected with her merit, it is necessary to display your knowledge of it. Encomiums founded on esteem may flatter her proud spirit, but she always rejects the empty compliments of a gallant. Sophia is not an object on which to exercise the paltry talents of a fop.

With such maturity of understanding, and in every respect as forward as a woman of twenty, Sophia, though but fifteen, will not be treated by her parents as a child. They no sooner perceive in her the first emotions of youth than they are earnest to provide against them before they make any progress: and they will endeavour to affect her mind by rational and tender discourse. Tender and rational conversation is suited to her age and character. Supposing this character to be such as I conceive it, why should
not

not her father address her in the following terms—

“ My dear Sophy, you are grown a great girl, and you are not arrived to this maturity to continue a maiden for ever. We wish to see you happy; we desire it for our own sakes; for our happiness depends on your's. The greatest felicity of a virtuous girl is that of making some worthy man happy: you must, therefore, think of being married. You should think of it betimes, for the lot of your whole life depends on matrimony, and you cannot have too much time to reflect on it.

“ Nothing is more nice than the choice of a good husband, unless perhaps it be that of a good wife. Sophy, we trust that you will be that uncommon character, that you will be the glory of our life, and a blessing to our old age: but of whatever merit you are possessed, there are not wanting men in the world, who excel you. There are none, who will not do themselves honour in obtaining you; but there are many who will do you still greater honour. Among the number of these it is your business to fix upon one who is suitable to you, to make yourself acquainted with him, and to make him really acquainted with you.

“ The most complete happiness of matrimony depends on so many concurring circumstances, that it is a folly to expect them all to be united. We must, therefore, make sure of those which are most important; if the rest concur, so much

the better: if not, we must dispense with them. Perfect felicity is not to be attained on earth; but the greatest of all misfortunes, and which we may always avoid, is that of being miserable through our own indiscretion.

“ There are some natural conveniencies, some merely of custom, and some which depend entirely on fancy. Parents are the best judges of the two last, children only are the proper judges of the first. In marriages which are concluded by the authority of parents, they are guided solely by rules of policy and custom: they do not unite persons, but conditions and fortunes. But these are of a fluctuating nature; the persons alone remain the same, and attend them in every change, in spite of fortune: it is only from personal attachments, that matrimony can be happy or miserable.

“ Your mother was a woman of family; I was wealthy: these were the sole motives which induced our parents to unite us. I have lost my fortune, she has lost her name: forsaken by her family, of what consequence is it to her that she was born a woman of fashion? In all our misfortunes the union of our affections hath always been our comfort. The conformity of our inclinations induced us to choose this retirement; we live here happy in our poverty, and are all the world to each other. Sophia is our common treasure; we thank Heaven for having given us this comfort, though it has deprived us of all others. You see, my child, whither Providence

vidence has conducted us! The motives which induced our friends to consent to our union exist no longer, and we derive all our happiness from those circumstances which had no weight with them.

“ It belongs to the young couple to choose for themselves. Mutual inclination should be the principal attachment: their eyes, their hearts should first direct their choice; for as it is their first duty, when they are married, to love each other, and as our affections do not depend upon ourselves, this duty naturally involves another, which is, to begin to love before they are married. This is the right of nature, which nothing can abrogate; they who have attempted to restrain it by so many political institutions, have had more regard to an appearance of order, than to the happiness of the marriage state, or to the morals of the citizens. You see, my Sophy, that we do not inculcate any severe lesson of morality. All we say tends to make you mistress of yourself, and therefore we refer to you the proper choice of a husband.

“ Having thus given you our reasons for leaving you entirely at your own disposal, it is but just that we recommend it to you to use your judgement with discretion. My dear, you are rational and discreet, you possess integrity and piety, you are mistress of talents which become a woman of virtue, and you are not destitute of charms; but you are poor: you have those qualifications which are most truly estimable, and you

want those which are most commonly esteemed. Therefore do not aspire beyond what you are able to attain; regulate your ambition, not by the measure of your own judgement or of our's, but by the common opinion of mankind. If equality of merit alone was in question, I don't know what bounds you might set to your expectations; but do not raise them above your condition, and remember that your fortune stands in the lowest degree. Should a man who deserves you be generous enough to consider this inequality as no obstacle, you should have the spirit to do that which his passion will not let him do. Sophia in that case should imitate her mother, and not enter into a family who do not think themselves honoured by the alliance. You have never known our splendour, you was born during our poverty; you render it agreeable to us, and partake of it chearfully. Take my advice, Sophy, do not covet riches, which we thank Providence for having deprived us of; we never tasted happiness till we lost our wealth.

“ You are too amiable not to be agreeable to any one, and you are not so unfortunate that any worthy man need think you an incumbrance. You will be courted, and perhaps by such as are not worthy of you. If they appear to you such as they really are, you will esteem them according to their true worth; all their parade will not long impose upon you. But though your judgement is good, and you are no stranger to your own merit, yet you want experience,
and

and you do not know how far men can play the counterfeit. An ingenious impostor may study your taste, in order to delude you, and in your presence may carry the appearance of virtues, to which his heart is a stranger. He might ruin you, Sophy, before you would perceive it; and you would become sensible of your error only to lament it. The most fatal of all snares, and the only one which reason can avoid, is that which is spread by our passions; if ever you should have the misfortune to fall into this snare, you would perceive nothing but chimeras and illusions, your eyes would be fascinated, your judgement perplexed, your desires corrupted, your very errors would be dear to you, and if you was able to discover them, you would not correct them. My dear Sophy, I leave you to the guidance of your reason; I do not abandon you to the dictates of your heart. So long as you continue indifferent to any particular object, judge for yourself; but if you happen to fall in love, let your mother have the care of you.

“ I propose an agreement which testifies our confidence in you, and confirms the order of nature between us. Parents generally choose husbands for their daughters, and only consult them out of form; such is the custom. We will act the reverse; you shall choose for yourself, and consult us. Use your privilege, Sophy; use it freely and discreetly: the husband you like must be of your own choice, not of our's; but it is our part to judge whether you do not deceive

yourself with respect to particular circumstances, and act quite otherwise than you intend to do. Birth, riches, rank, and the opinion of the world will have no weight with us. Choose a worthy man, whose person is agreeable to you and whose character pleases you; whatever he may be in other respects, we shall willingly receive him for a son-in-law. His fortune will always be large enough if he is a moral and industrious man, and loves his family. His rank will be sufficiently illustrious, if he enobles it by virtue. Though all the world should censure our conduct, we care not; we do not seek publick approbation; we have nothing in view but your happiness."

I don't know what effect such a discourse would have upon girls educated in the modern way; but Sophia would not be able to utter a word in answer to it. Her bashfulness and tender emotion, would not allow her to give utterance to her thoughts; but I am persuaded that it would be engraved in her mind as long as she lives; and if there is any dependence on human resolution, that she would behave so as to make herself worthy of the confidence her parents place in her.

Suppose the worst to happen, and that she is of such a warm constitution, as to make her impatient till the wished for time arrives; yet I am persuaded that her judgement, her knowledge, her taste, her delicacy, and above all the sentiments which have been inculcated into her mind from her very infancy, will counterpoize the impetuosity

petuosity of her passions, and enable her to overcome them, at least to resist them for a long time. She would rather die a martyr to her impatience, than to afflict her parents, by espousing a worthless man, and exposing herself to all the misfortunes of an indiscreet marriage. The liberty which has been allowed her only serves to increase her natural elevation of mind, and to make her more difficult in the choice of a husband. With the constitution of an Italian, and the sensibility of an Englishwoman, she will be able to restrain her desires and affections, for she has the pride of a Spanish Donna, who, in choosing a lover, does not readily meet with one whom she thinks worthy of her.

Every one is not sensible what resources the mind derives from a love of integrity, and what power a woman feels within her, when she is sincerely virtuous. There are people to whom every thing great appears chimerical, and whose mean and groveling ideas can never conceive what influence the enthusiasm of virtue has over the human passions. There is no addressing such people, but by means of example: so much the worse for them if they will not profit by them. If I was to tell them that Sophia is not an ideal being, that her name alone is of my own invention, that her education, her manners, her character, and her figure have had a real existence, and that a worthy family still deplore her loss, they certainly would not believe me: but after all, why might I not proceed to give the real hi-

story of a girl so like Sophia, that it would be no matter of surprise should it be mistaken for her's. It is of little consequence whether the reader supposes it real or not; let him suppose it all a fiction, it will serve to illustrate my plan, and will answer my purpose.

The young woman, together with the constitution which I have attributed to Sophia, was mistress of every other circumstance besides, which would give her a right to that name, and I leave her in possession of it. After the conversation I have just now related, her father and mother being sensible that she was not likely to meet with a suitable offer in the little hamlet they lived in, sent her to pass a winter in town, under the care of an aunt, whom they made acquainted with their design in sending her thither. For the haughty Sophia had such a pride of soul, that she would triumph over herself, and however earnestly she might desire a husband, she would rather have died a maiden than have determined to go in quest of one.

To facilitate the design of her parents, her aunt introduced her into company, carried her to the assemblies and all publick places; she showed her the world, or rather forced her to see it, for Sophia paid little attention to all the bustle. It was observed, however, that she did not avoid young fellows of an agreeable person, who appeared to be modest and discreet. Her reserve was even an allurements to them; and it appeared somewhat like coquetry; but after having
been

been two or three times in their company, she disliked them. At length, instead of that haughty air, which seems to expect homage, she assumed a more affable carriage, and a more distant politeness. Always attentive to her own concerns she never gave them an opportunity of conferring on her the least obligation: which was a sufficient intimation that she did not mean to receive their addresses.

Minds of nice sensibility are never fond of publick pleasures, the vain and fruitless felicity of those who have no delicate sensations, and who think that they enjoy life while they dissipate it. Sophia, not finding what she expected, and despairing to meet with it, grew tired of the town. She had a tender affection for her parents, nothing could supply their place, nothing could make her forget them; she returned to them a long while before the time fixed for her departure from town.

She had no sooner resumed her offices at home, than they perceived, that though her behaviour was the same, her temper was altered. She was inattentive, impatient, thoughtful, and melancholy, and often hid herself to give vent to her tears. They concluded that she was in love, and that she was ashamed of her passion; they charged her with it, and she denied it. She protested that she had never seen any one who had made the least impression on her, and she declared the truth.

Nevertheless, her languor increased, and her health began to be impaired. Her mother, affected by this alteration, determined to know the cause of it. She took her aside, and addressed her with that insinuating language, and with those irresistible caresses, of which maternal tenderness alone is capable. "My dear child! pour forth your secrets into your mother's bosom. What secrets can you have which are not proper to be trusted with me? Who feels for your uneasiness? Who shares it with you? Who wishes to assuage it, but your father and mother? Ah! my dear Sophy, must your uneasiness be the death of me? Shall not I be acquainted with the cause?"

So far from concealing her inquietude from her mother, the tender Sophia desired nothing more than to place entire confidence in her, and to have the benefit of her consolation. But shame prevented her disclosing her sensations; her modesty could not describe those emotions which in spite of her resolutions agitated her bosom. At length, her confusion suggested her situation to her mother, and she extorted from her the mortifying confession. Far from making her uneasy by unjust reproaches, she comforted, pitied, and wept over her; she had too much discretion, to construe that evil into a crime, which her virtue alone rendered insupportable. But why should she unnecessarily endure an evil, when the remedy was so obvious and justifiable? Why was she afraid to make use of the liberty
which

which had been allowed her? Why did she not accept a husband; why not make choice of one? Did not she know that her destiny depended entirely on herself, and that whatever choice she made, it would be approved, as she was incapable of making a bad one? She had been sent to town, she would not stay there; several had made their addresses, she had rejected them all. What did she expect? What would she have? What a strange contradiction!

The answer was simple. If she had only wanted a companion for her youth, she might quickly have made her election: but a master for life is not to be chosen so readily; and as these two elections are inseparable, it is necessary for a young woman to wait, and sometimes to wear out her youth, before she can meet with a man with whom she would choose to pass her whole life. This was the case with Sophia: she wanted a lover, but that lover must be a husband; and considering the union of affections which she required, the one was almost as difficult to be found as the other.

All the smart, gay fellows she had seen, suited her only in point of age; in every other respect they were deficient; their superficial understanding, their vanity, their frivolous jargon, their irregular morals, their affectation gave her an aversion to them. She wanted to meet with a man, and could find none but apes.

“How unhappy am I!” (said she to her mother) I would willingly fix my affections, and I can

find no object worthy of them. A liking not founded on esteem can never be lasting. It is not merely an husband that your Sophy wishes for! but one whose charming image has been long since imprinted in her mind. She can love him alone, she can make none but him happy; she can be happy herself with no other. She had rather pine and struggle with herself continually, she had rather die single, than live with a man whom she could not love, and whom she should only make miserable; it is better not to be, than to exist only to be unhappy."

Struck with the singularity of these expressions, her mother thought them so extraordinary, that she suspected some mystery at the bottom. Sophia was neither prudish nor coquettish. How could this excessive delicacy be consistent with her character, who from her infancy had only learned to be content with her condition, and to make a virtue of necessity? This picture of an amiable man with which she was so enamoured, and which she so often mentioned in her discourse, made her mother conjecture that this caprice had some other foundation, which she had not discovered, and that Sophia had not confessed all. The poor girl, oppressed with her secret inquietude, only longed to disburthen her mind. Her mother pressed her; she hesitated. At last overcome, and retiring without saying a word, she returned presently with a book in her hand. "Bewail your unhappy daughter (said she) her melancholy is incurable, her tears will never be
dried

dried up. You pressed me to know the cause: there it is," said she, throwing the book on the table. Her mother took it up and opened it: it was the Adventures of Telemachus. She could not solve this riddle: at length, by frequent interrogations and obscure answers, she understood, with a surprise easily to be imagined, that her daughter was the rival of Eucharis.

Sophia was in love with Telemachus, and she loved him with a passion which nothing could abate. As soon as her father and mother discovered her frenzy, they laughed, and thought to bring her to herself by dint of reason. They were mistaken: they had not all the reason on their side; Sophia had some share on her part, and knew how to make use of it. How often has she silenced them by using their own arguments; by showing them that they had done the mischief themselves; that they had not educated her suitably for a man of the present age; that it would be necessary for her to adopt her husband's way of thinking, or incline him to adopt her's; that they had rendered the first impracticable by the education they had given her, and that the latter was the very thing she required! "Give me (says she) a man endowed with my principles, or one into whom I can inspire them, and I will marry him; but till then, how can you blame me? Pity me! I am unhappy, but not frantick. Does the heart depend on the will? Has not my father answered this question? Am I to blame if I love what does not exist?"

exist? I am no visionary; I do not long for a prince, I do not want Telemachus, I know that he is a feigned character; I wish for some one who resembles him; and why should not such an one have existence, since I exist, who find my heart sympathize with his? No, do not let us debase human nature; do not let us suppose that an amiable and virtuous man is an ideal character. He exists, he breathes, perhaps he is in search of me; perhaps he wishes for one who has a mind capable of loving him. But what is he? Where is he? I know not; he is not among those I have seen; and certainly is not one of those whom I ever shall see. O my parents! why have you made me so enamoured of virtue? If I can entertain no other passion, the fault is less mine than your's."

Shall I draw this melancholy detail to a catastrophe? Shall I relate the tedious discourse which preceded it? Shall I describe an impatient mother, who changed her first caresses into severities? Shall I represent an enraged father, forgetting his former promises, and treating the most virtuous of girls as a creature distracted? Shall I picture the unfortunate Sophy, more strongly attached to her chimera by the persecution she underwent, pining, drooping, making slow approaches towards death, and descending into the tomb, at a time when they thought to have led her to the altar? No, I will banish these mournful images. I need not go so far to prove by such an affecting instance, that notwithstanding

withstanding the prejudices which result from the manners of the age, the enthusiasm of honour and virtue is no more a stranger to the breast of women than to that of men; and that there is nothing, which, under the guidance of nature, they are not capable of, as well as ourselves.

Some, perhaps, will stop me here, to enquire whether nature enjoins us to take so much pains to suppress our desires? I answer, No; but I add that we do not derive our inordinate desires from nature. Therefore, whatever is not consentaneous to nature is against it; I have proved this a thousand times.

Let us now join Emilius to his Sophia; let us revive that lovely girl; let us curb the fallies of her imagination, and render her destiny more happy. In describing a woman of common capacity, while I have endeavoured to elevate her mind, I have almost perverted her understanding. In this I have been misled myself.—To return, therefore, to the point we set out from. Sophia has a good disposition, with a mind not above the common rank; so that whenever she excels others, it is the effect of her education.

I Proposed in this book, to say every thing which might be offered, and to leave every one to adopt such sentiments as might be most conformable to his own judgement. I intended at first to have begun very early in forming the
 comfort

confort of Emilius, and to have educated them for each other, and with each other. But on recollection, I found that all these previous arrangements were improper, and that it was absurd to destine two children for each other, before we know whether such an union is agreeable to the order of nature, and whether they will possess the necessary requisites to complete it. We must not confound what is natural to the savage state of mankind, with what is natural to a state of civil society. In the first case, every woman is suitable to every man, because neither the one or the other have any distinction more than their common and primitive formation: in the second instance, every particular character being formed by means of civil institutions, and every mind having received its peculiar and determined bent, not only from education, but from an association, either well or ill combined, of their natural dispositions with that education, it is impossible to unite them properly, without presenting them to each other, in order to discover whether all circumstances are suitable, or at least to prefer that choice in which the greater number of essential requisites concur.

The mischief is, that the social state, at the same time that it discriminates characters, makes a distinction of rank also; and one rank being very unequal to another, the greater the difference of stations, the greater is the confusion of characters. From hence arise disproportionate

marriages, and all the disorders which result from them; from whence it is evident, that, by a necessary consequence, the natural inclinations are perverted, in proportion as the disparity is more or less unequal: the greater distance there is established between high and low, the more the conjugal tie is relaxed; the more rich and poor there are, the fewer fathers and husbands will be found. Neither the master nor the servant have, strictly speaking, any family connexions; they regard only those of their respective situations.

Would you prevent these abuses, and render the marriage state happy, stifle all prejudices, lay aside human institutions, and consult nature. Do not unite young people who are suited to each other only in rank and fortune, and who will never agree, when their circumstances alter; but associate those only who will agree in every situation of life, in every country whatever, and in every condition in which fortune may place them. I do not maintain that equality of condition is absolutely indifferent in matrimony; but I insist that the influence of natural requisites is so much superiour, that the happiness of life depends on them alone; and that there is a certain conformity of taste, humour, inclination, and character, which should engage a discreet father, though he should be a prince or a monarch, to bestow his son without hesitation upon a girl of a congenial turn, though she should chance to be born of a mean family, and should even be the daughter of a beggar.

Yes,

Yes, I maintain it, that let all the misfortunes we can imagine light upon a pair cemented by mutual affection, that they will enjoy more real happiness on mingling their tears, than they would feel in the highest station on earth, embittered by a disagreement of affections.

Therefore, instead of having thought of a wife to Emilius from his infancy, I waited to know what kind of a woman would suit him. It is not I who make choice for him, it is nature; my business is only to discover what election she has made. My business; I say mine, and not his father's; for in committing his son to my care, he resigns his place to me, and substitutes my right in the room of his own: I am the true father of Emilius; it is I who have formed him a man. I would have declined the care of educating him, if I had not been at liberty to marry him agreeably to his inclination: that is, to my own. Nothing but the pleasure of rendering a human being happy can make amends for the trouble it costs to fix him in such a situation.

Do not imagine, nevertheless, that I waited to find a wife for Emilius, till I had prompted him to choose one for himself. The search I directed him to make was only with a view to make him acquainted with women, that he might know their true value. Sophia has been discovered some time; perhaps Emilius has seen her already; but he will not be acquainted with her till the proper time.

Though

Though equality of condition is not essential to matrimony, yet when this equality concurs with other requisites, it gives it an additional value; it is not to be balanced by any other consideration, but where every thing else is equal it turns the scale.

A man, unless he is a sovereign, cannot choose a wife out of every rank; for though he may be above prejudices, others may not; and perhaps a girl might suit him, whom, nevertheless, he may not be able to obtain. There are prudential maxims, therefore, which ought to limit the views of a discreet father. He should not endeavour to advance his son to a condition above his rank; for it may not be in his power to effect it. Admitting it was, he ought not to attempt it; for of what consequence is rank to a young man, at least to my pupil? And at the same time, in aiming at preferment, he exposes himself to a thousand real misfortunes, which he will feel all his life. I even insist that we ought not to endeavour to set advantages of different kinds in competition with each other; as those of nobility and wealth; because we can never agree upon a common standard: and the preference which every one gives to his own possession lays the foundation of discord between families, and often between husband and wife.

There is a material difference, however, whether a man marries above or beneath himself. The first is absolutely repugnant to reason, the latter

latter is more conformable to it. As a family is allied to society by its head, the condition of the master governs that of the whole family. When he enters into an alliance with a woman of inferiour rank, he does not debase himself, he exalts his wife; on the contrary, by marrying a woman above him, he demeans her, without raising himself: thus, in the first instance, there is an advantage without any inconvenience; and in the second, an inconvenience without any advantage. Besides, it is agreeable to the order of nature, that a woman should obey her husband. Therefore, when he chooses one of an inferiour rank, the order of nature and of society concur, and every thing is right. It is quite the reverse when he matches above himself; a man exposes himself to the alternative of being either despised or ungrateful. In that case, the woman, gaining the ascendancy, becomes a tyrant over her master; and the master becoming a slave, finds himself the most miserable and ridiculous of all beings. Such are those unhappy favourites, whom the monarchs of Asia honour and torture by their alliance; and who, it is said, are obliged to creep in at the feet of the bed to get to their wives.

I expect that many readers, who may have recollected that I suppose women to have a natural talent of governing men, will accuse me of contradiction here; but they are mistaken. There is a great deal of difference between usurping a right of empire, and governing him who commands.

mands. A woman's empire is an empire of gentleness, address, and complacency; her orders are caresses, and her menaces are tears. She ought to rule in her family, as a prime minister in the state, by having the art to dictate those orders she would wish to receive. In this sense, it is certain, that the best regulated families are those where the wife has the most influence. But when she pays no regard to what her husband says, when she usurps his prerogative, and would rule of herself, disorder and misery, shame and dishonour, are the consequence.

Supposing the choice to remain between equals and inferiours, I believe that we must still make some restrictions with regard to the latter; for it is difficult to meet with a woman, among the dregs of the people, capable of making a worthy man happy: not that people in the lowest station are more vicious than those in the highest, but because they have less idea of what is good and virtuous, and because the oppression they undergo from others, seems, in their opinion, to render their very vices justifiable.

Man naturally speculates but little. Reflexion is an art which is acquired like all others, but with most difficulty. I know but two classes of each sex, which are essentially different; the one, of those who reflect; the other, of those who have no reflexion: and this difference proceeds entirely from education. A man of the first class ought not to form an alliance with a woman of the latter; for he loses one of the
greatest

greatest blessings of society, to a reflecting mind, when his wife can bear no part in his reflexions. They who pass their whole lives in working for their daily bread, have no ideas beyond their business or their interest, and all their understanding seems to lie in their fingers ends. This ignorance is neither prejudicial to their integrity nor their morals; it is often of service to them. Sometimes by means of reflexion, we are led to compound with our duty, and we conclude by substituting a jargon of words, in the room of things. Our own conscience is the most enlightened philosopher. There is no need to be acquainted with Tully's Offices, to make a man of probity: and perhaps the most virtuous woman in the world, is the least acquainted with the definition of virtue. But it is no less true, that an improved understanding can only render society agreeable; and it is a melancholly thing for a father of a family, who is fond of home, to be obliged to be always wrapped up in himself, and to have nobody about him to whom he can impart his sentiments.

Besides, how should a woman void of reflexion be capable of educating her children? How should she discern what is proper for them? How should she incline them to those virtues she is unacquainted with, or to that merit of which she has no idea? She can only soothe or chide them; render them insolent or timid; she will make them formal coxcombs, or ignorant block-

heads;

heads; but will never make them sensible or amiable.

It is not proper, therefore, for a man of education to take a woman without any, nor consequently to choose one in a station of life which deprives her of that benefit. But I had rather a hundred times have a simple girl, meanly educated, than a learned and witty lady, who should come into my family to erect a literary tribunal, of which herself is president. A witty wife is a scourge to her husband, her children, her friends, her servants, and to all the world. Her sublime elevation of genius makes her despise all the duties of a wife; and she always affects, like Madame de l'Enclos, to display the sense and knowledge of a man. Abroad she is always ridiculous, and justly censured; because it is impossible to avoid ridicule and censure, when we start from our condition, and are not formed for that which we assume. These women of genius never impose upon any but fools. We always know what artist or what friend held the pen or the pencil in all their works. We know what man of letters was the oracle they privately consulted. All this imposture is unbecoming a prudent woman. Even if she had real talents, her pretensions would debase them. On the contrary, it is her pride to pass unnoticed; her glory consists in the esteem of her husband; her pleasure is centered in the happiness of her family. Reader, I appeal to you; be sincere: which is it that

gives you the best opinion of a woman, which makes you accost her with the greatest respect, the seeing her employed in the occupations of her sex, in the cares of her family, surrounded with her children; or the finding her busy in scribbling verses at her toilet, encompassed with pamphlets, trifling billets, and message-cards? Every learned lady would remain a virgin for life, if there were none but sensible men in the world.

Quæris cur nolim te ducere, Galla? Diserta es.

Next to these considerations comes that of person. This is the first thing which makes an impression, and the last which we ought to regard; yet it ought not to be entirely overlooked. Extraordinary beauty ought rather, in my opinion, to be avoided, than desired in matrimony. Beauty soon palls by fruition; at the end of six weeks it is of no value to him who enjoys it, but its inconveniences are as lasting as itself. If a beautiful woman is any thing less than an angel, her husband must be the most unhappy of men; and admitting she were an angel, how will she secure him from being surrounded with rivals? If extreme deformity were not disgusting, I should prefer it to excessive beauty; for, in a short time, either becoming indifferent to the husband, beauty is an inconvenience, and deformity an advantage; but that degree of ugliness which

which produces disgust is the worst of all misfortunes; the idea, instead of being effaced by time, continually increases, till it grows into confirmed antipathy: such a marriage must be truly miserable: even death itself would be preferable.

A medium is desirable in every thing, not excepting beauty. An agreeable and graceful figure, which does not inspire love but esteem, is most to be preferred: it is of no prejudice to the husband, and the advantage turns to the mutual interest of both husband and wife. Graces do not fade, like beauty; they are lasting, they are continually renewing; and a virtuous woman, who has attractions, will, thirty years after marriage, be as agreeable to her husband as she was on her wedding-day.

Such are the considerations which determined me in the choice of Sophia: a disciple of nature's, as well as Emilius. She will suit him better than any other; she will behave to him as a wife ought to behave to her husband. She is his equal in birth and merit, though his inferiour in point of fortune. She is not striking at first sight, but she grows more agreeable every day. Her greatest charm operates by degrees, it does not display itself but upon intimate acquaintance, and her husband will be more sensible of it than any other man living; her education is not extraordinary, neither has it been neglected; she has taste without application, talents without

art, judgement without knowledge. Her understanding is not instructed, but it is cultivated for information; it is a soil well prepared, which only wants sowing, to yield a plenteous harvest. She has read few books beside Telemachus, which fell into her hands by chance. But can a girl capable of being enamoured with Telemachus have a heart without affections, and an understanding without refinement? O how lovely is her ignorance! Happy is he who is destined to instruct her! She will never pretend to be the tutor of her husband, but will be content to be his pupil. Far from attempting to subject him to her taste, she will accommodate herself to his. She will be more estimable to him, than if she was learned: he will have a pleasure in instructing her.—It is time they should be introduced to each other: let us make haste to bring them together.

We quitted Paris without the least regret. That trifling place is not to our taste. Emilius turned an eye of contempt towards the city, and said with concern—“How many days have we lost in a fruitless search! It is not there I am to look for a wife: my friend, you knew that she was not to be found there; but my time is no loss to you, and my misfortunes occasion you no solicitude.” I looked at him attentively, and asked him, without emotion, “Emilius, do you really think what you say?” On this, in an instant he flew into my arms, embracing me tenderly,

derly, without saying a syllable. This is always his reply, when he has been in the wrong.

We are now on the road, like true knights-errant; but not in pursuit of adventures: which, on the contrary, we avoid by quitting Paris. We chiefly resemble them in our erratick, unequal manner of travelling, one while going briskly, and at other times moving gently along.

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 derly, without any visible effort. This is always
 his policy, when he is in the wrong. He is like
 the man who is always right, and who is always
 right by putting a stick in the ground, and
 We chiefly rely on him in our errands, and
 such manner of travelling, one while going brisk-
 ly, and at other times moving gently along.



End of the Third Volume.

